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ABSTRACT
HUME ON THICK AND THIN CAUSATION

Alexander Paul Bozzo, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2018

Hume is known for his claim that our idea of causation
is nothing beyond constant conjunction, and that our idea
of necessary connection is nothing beyond a felt
determination of the mind. In short, Hume endorses a “thin”
conception of causation and necessary connection. In recent
years, however, a sizeable number of philosophers have come
to view Hume as someone who believes in the existence of
thick causal connections — that is, causal connections that
allow one to infer a priori the effect from the cause, and
vice versa. Hume doesn’t wish to deny such connections,
said philosopher’s claim, he only seeks to demonstrate that
we can’t know anything about the nature of the thick causal
connections that make up the natural world.
In this dissertation, I defend the old or traditional
interpretation of Hume on causation. I draw attention to
the important but neglected role of clear and distinct
perception in Hume’s thought, arguing that for Hume our
impressions are clear and distinct perceptions, whereas our
ideas are faint and obscure. Accordingly, Hume’s copy
principle — the thesis that our ideas are copies of our
impressions — is Hume’s way of rendering our naturally
obscure and confused ideas distinct. One need only discern
the impression from which said ideas are copied. In this
way, I show that Hume’s opinion concerning our idea of
thick causation is that it’s an obscure and confused idea,
and that the only clear and distinct idea we can have of
causation is thin causation. Furthermore, since meaning for
Hume is a matter of a word’s being associated with an idea,
Hume thinks that an expression such as “thick causation” is
meaningless or confused. In one sense, then, Hume is a
positivist, and as such doesn’t believe in thick causal
connections.
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Chapter One
The Problem
Hume’s Principles of Human Nature

Hume divides all the perceptions of the mind into two
distinct kinds: impressions and ideas. He characterizes the
difference between these two as follows:

Those perceptions, which enter with most force and
violence, we may name impressions; and under this name
I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions,
as they make their first appearance in the soul. By
ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and
reasoning. (T 1.1.1.1)1

Impressions, therefore, are our forceful and violent
perceptions, and as examples Hume mentions our sensations,
passions, and emotions. Ideas, on the other hand, are our
faint and weak perceptions. When we think or reason, says
Hume, we think and reason with ideas.
Hume doesn’t regard this as a novel distinction, and
he doesn’t anticipate much resistance to it. The
distinction between impressions and ideas, as he soon puts

1

The “T” abbreviates A Treatise of Human Nature, and the numbers indicate the book, part, section, and
paragraph of the Treatise, respectively. Unless noted otherwise, the italics are in the original.
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it, is simply the difference between feeling and thinking
(ibid.).
Hume draws a further distinction within the class of
impressions. This is the distinction between impressions of
sensation and impressions of reflection. Impressions of
sensation include visual, tactile, auditory, gustatory, and
olfactory perceptions, as well as perceptions of pleasure
and pain. Impressions of reflection, on the other hand,
include our emotions and passions, such as love or hatred.
Hume’s interested in these distinctions because he
conceives of himself as embarking on a new science, what he
calls the “science of

MAN”

(T Intro. 4).2 The aim of this

science is to discern (as far as we’re able) the
fundamental constituents of the human mind, and the
fundamental principles that govern its operation. Only in
this way, claims Hume, can we make any progress in the
other sciences. Thus, for Hume, impressions and ideas
constitute the fundamental constituents of the human mind.
The first principle in Hume’s science of human nature
concerns the manner in which impressions and ideas are
related. It claims that ideas are ultimately caused by and
resemble impressions. More specifically, it reads:

2

“Intro” abbreviates Hume’s Introduction to the Treatise, and the numbers indicate the paragraphs.

3

Copy Principle
“[A]ll our simple ideas in their first appearance are
deriv’d from simple impressions, which are
correspondent to them, and which they exactly
represent.” (T 1.1.1.7)

Don Garrett (1997: 21) helpfully divides the copy
principle into two main components: the Causal Thesis and
the Resemblance Thesis. The Causal Thesis states that all
simple ideas are initially derived from simple impressions,
whereas the Resemblance Thesis claims that all simple ideas
exactly resemble their corresponding simple impressions.3
Put differently, ideas are copies of impressions.
Accordingly, Hume believes that the mind first
receives mental content from impressions of sensation,
which are then copied and retained as ideas in the memory,
and are such that they can be entertained and rearranged by
the imagination. These three faculties — sensation, memory,
and the imagination — constitute the three fundamental
faculties of the understanding for Hume. The faculty of
sensation works with impressions, whereas the memory and

3

I shall explain Hume’s reasons for limiting the principle to simple perceptions below. In addition, while
not all representation is a matter of resemblance, Hume intends only the relation of resemblance when
stating his copy principle.
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the imagination work with ideas. Hume helpfully illustrates
this process as follows:

An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes
us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure
or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression
there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after
the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This
idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the
soul, produces the new impressions of desire and
aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be call’d
impressions of reflection because deriv’d from it.
These again are copy’d by the memory and imagination,
and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give
rise to other impressions and ideas. (T 1.1.2.1)

Hume intentionally restricts the copy principle to our
simple perceptions. In order to understand Hume’s reasons
for limiting the principle in this way, we must first grasp
the distinction between simple and complex perceptions.
Simple perceptions — whether they be impressions or
ideas — “admit of no distinction nor separation,” whereas
complex perceptions can be “distinguish’d into parts” (T
1.1.1.2). Hume’s example is the perception of an apple.
One’s perception of an apple — insofar as it’s conceived as
having a certain color, taste, and smell — is a complex
perception, and it’s complex because it has parts (its
color, taste, and smell) that can be distinguished and
separated from one another. The parts themselves, however,
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constitute simple perceptions for Hume, because they don’t
contain parts that can be distinguished or separated from
one another.
As it pertains to the copy principle, Hume asserts
that the Causal Thesis and the Resemblance Thesis each hold
only with respect to simple perceptions. He does so for the
following reason:

New Jerusalem Passage
I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had
impressions, that corresponded to them, and that many
of our complex impressions never are exactly copy’d in
ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New
Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies,
tho’ I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but
shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city,
as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses
in their real and just proportions? (T 1.1.1.4)

Hume claims here that it’s false that all ideas are exact
copies of impressions. Furthermore, he claims that it’s
false that all impressions are exactly copied as ideas. We
sometimes have complex ideas — such as Hume’s idea of the
New Jerusalem — that never had any corresponding complex
impression. Hume has never seen any such city. Similarly,
while Hume has seen Paris, his idea of Paris doesn’t
exactly resemble his former impression; that is, his idea
doesn’t perfectly resemble what he saw on that occasion.
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Thus Hume concludes that our complex ideas aren’t always
perfectly correspondent to complex impressions.
While Hume admits that complex ideas aren’t always
perfectly correspondent to complex impressions, he does
believe that all simple ideas are perfectly correspondent.
We never have a simple idea that isn’t caused by, and that
doesn’t perfectly resemble, some simple impression;4 and we
never have a simple impression that isn’t exactly copied by
some simple idea. This is Hume’s reason for restricting the
copy principle to our simple perceptions.
The simple/complex distinction is also relevant to two
other related principles in Hume’s science of human nature.
These principles are the following:

Separability Principle
“[W]hatever objects are different are distinguishable,
and… whatever objects are distinguishable are
separable by the thought and imagination.” (T 1.1.7.3)

Inverse Separability Principle
“[W]hatever objects are separable are also
distinguishable, and… whatever objects are
distinguishable are also different.” (ibid.)

4

This isn’t strictly speaking correct, however, for Hume does admit the case of the missing shade of blue
(T 1.1.1.10). But, like Hume, I ignore this complication.

7
As an illustration of these principles, consider once more
Hume’s example of the perceived apple. Hume claims that the
color, taste, and smell of the apple can all be
distinguished from one another — that is, you can in some
unspecified sense “tell them apart.” And thus, by the
inverse separability principle, each of these constitutes a
different quality of the apple.
In addition, since the color, taste, and smell of the
apple can all be distinguished from one another, as was
just indicated, they are — by the separability principle —
each capable of being perceived separately from one another.
That is to say, one can conceive of the taste of the apple,
for example, without also conceiving of its color or smell.
Both principles do important work for Hume. Hume’s
separability principle plays a significant role in his
discussion of causation, and his inverse separability
principle plays an important role in his rejection of
abstract ideas. It’s worth considering this latter
rejection now, for understanding Hume’s dismissal of
abstract ideas is helpful in understanding his overall
theory of meaning, an aspect of Hume’s thought that’s
relevant to the aims of this dissertation.

8
Hume’s Meaning-Empiricism

For Hume, as for his philosophical predecessors, the
meaning of a word is its associated idea. Thus the meaning
of a word “T,” for instance, as uttered by P, is the idea K
associated with “T” in P’s mind. Accordingly, words that
lack an associated idea are deemed “meaningless.” This was
Locke’s view, and Hume assumes it without question.5 Since
ideas for Hume are the product of experience (as they were
for Locke), this view is known as meaning-empiricism.
There are some details in the vicinity, however, that
require elucidation. Suppose, for instance, that I utter
the proper name “Trump.” Hume claims that this word has the
meaning that it does solely because I have a specific idea
in my mind — in this case, an idea of Donald Trump6 — that I
associate with the word “Trump.” Moreover, the idea
associated with a word doesn’t merely account for the
word’s meaning; it’s also the word’s vehicle of reference.
My uttering “Trump” is about Donald Trump because my idea
resembles Donald Trump, in much the same way that a
photograph of a landscape resembles the landscape itself.

5
6

See An Essay concerning Human Understanding, III.ii.2, for Locke’s statement of this view.
For reasons that will emerge, an idea of an orange-haired monkey would do just as well.
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When we turn to general terms, however — that is, to
terms that refer to more than one individual — matters
become a bit more complicated.7 The word “man,” for instance,
refers to many different individuals. And since reference,
on meaning-empiricism, is achieved via the associated
idea’s resembling the thing or things referred to, the
associated idea of the general term “man” must in some way
resemble all individual men. Indeed, Locke had introduced
abstract ideas to serve this express purpose:

[T]he Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from
particular Objects, to become general; which is done
by considering them as they are in the Mind such
Appearances, separate from all other Existences, and
the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place,
or any other concomitant Ideas. This is called
ABSTRACTION, whereby Ideas taken from particular
Beings, become general Representatives of all of the
same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable
to whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas.8

Hume, however, doesn’t endorse Locke’s theory about
general terms. Instead, he follows Berkeley in denying the
very existence of abstract ideas.9 Hume denies the existence

7

There are also complications relevant to proper names that I have skipped over. For example, Hume
frequently uses “Adam” as a means of referring to the Adam of the Bible, but certainly Hume has never
seen Adam, and so has no idea of Adam. Hume has a way of addressing such cases, but discussion of his
account would take us far afield. Cf. T 1.3.4.2.
8
Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xi.9.
9
For Berkeley’s view, see his Introduction to A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.
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of abstract ideas because he thinks they present us with
the following dilemma:

[H]ere is a plain dilemma, that decides concerning the
nature of those abstract ideas, which have afforded so
much speculation to philosophers. The abstract idea of
a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities,
which it is concluded it cannot do, but either by
representing at once all possible sizes and all
possible qualities, or by representing no particular
one at all. (T 1.1.7.2)

In other words, on a Lockean view about general terms, Hume
claims that the abstract idea associated with the word “man”
refers to all men either because (i) it at once represents
and resembles all the individual sizes and qualities had by
men, or (ii) it represents all of the individual sizes and
qualities had by men in some indeterminate fashion: that is
to say, it doesn’t resemble any particular man any more
than any other. The problem, says Hume, is that neither (i)
nor (ii) is true.
Hume denies the first horn — the claim that abstract
ideas represent all the individual sizes and qualities had
by men — because this implies an “infinite capacity in the
mind” (ibid.). It’s not entirely clear what Hume means by
this, but the idea seems to be that our mental faculties
simply aren’t up to the psychological task of representing
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all the individual sizes and qualities had by men. Hume
believes that most proponents of abstract ideas agree with
him on this matter, and so he dispenses with this horn of
the dilemma rather quickly.
On the other hand, as characterized by the second horn
of the dilemma, abstract ideas refer to all men by
“representing no particular [man] at all” (ibid.). So as to
best understand Hume’s rebuttal, let’s suppose that “S”
refers to the idea of a man who is represented as six-feet
tall, and that “F” refers to the idea of a man who is
represented as five-feet tall. Recall that ideas are copies
of impressions for Hume, and so S and F will resemble
sensory images of a six and a five-foot tall man,
respectively. For ease of exposition, let’s also suppose
that S and F are the only ideas of men that one has, and
that any other quality factoring into S and F (for example,
hair color) is precisely delineated. Hume labels an idea
that’s precisely delineated in this fashion a determinate
idea (T 1.1.7.5).
Thus, on the present view, the abstract idea of man,
in “representing no particular [man] at all” (T 1.1.7.2),
can no more represent S than it can represent F. That is to
say, it can no more represent a six-foot tall man than it

12
can represent a five-foot tall man. And since
representation is a matter of resemblance for Hume, the
abstract idea of man can no more resemble a six-foot tall
man than it can resemble a five-foot tall man. Accordingly,
this account of abstract ideas requires that abstract ideas
be indeterminate.
Herein lies Hume’s criticism of abstract ideas. If
abstract ideas are indeterminate, then abstract ideas imply
a separation. On the Lockean view, one’s abstract idea of
man is constructed by taking any particular quality had by
S and F (for example, the quality of being six-feet tall
and the quality of being five-feet tall) and separating
these from what’s common to both S and F. As Locke’s
comments above indicate, the abstract idea is what results
after we’ve abstracted out all such uncommon qualities.
The problem, according to Hume, is that the required
separation is impossible. Hume claims that we can’t
distinguish the particular qualities of a thing from the
thing itself — that is, we can’t distinguish a thing’s
particular qualities from its “common qualities.” For
example, Hume writes that “the precise length of a line is
not different nor distinguishable from the line itself” (T
1.1.7.3). But, if Hume’s inverse separability principle is
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correct, then what can be separated can be distinguished,
and, since abstraction implies a separation, we ought to be
able to distinguish the particular qualities of a line from
the line itself, or the particular qualities of some man
from the man himself. But Hume claims that we can’t. And so
Hume concludes that “the general idea of a line,
notwithstanding all our abstractions and refinements, has
in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of quantity
and quality” (ibid.). In other words, Hume concludes that
all of our ideas are determinate, and thus horn (ii) cannot
save Locke’s account of abstract ideas.
This establishes an important constraint on any
acceptable theory of meaning for Hume: if, as Hume claims,
meaning is supplied by an idea, then even general terms
must utilize a determinate idea in order to be meaningful.
But how can a general term refer generally via a
determinate idea, when reference is solely a matter of
resemblance? Hume need not labor long here, however, for he
claims that the discovery has already been made. The
discovery has been made, he claims, by Berkeley, and Hume
“look[s] upon this to be one of the greatest and most
valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in
the Republic of Letters” (T 1.1.7.1).

14
Accordingly, we may put Hume’s accepted theory of
meaning as follows. First, Hume claims that we notice many
different kinds of resemblance among our ideas. For
instance, we see many lines of many different lengths, and,
insofar as they’re all lines, we recognize a resemblance
among them. Second, we form the custom or habit of labeling
each of these ideas (despite their perceivable differences)
with the word “line.” Thus I label a line of six inches
with the word “line,” and a line of eight inches with the
word “line,” and so on. To make matters more perspicuous,
let’s call my idea of a line of six inches “K,” my idea of
a line of eight inches “G,” and any other idea that I
happen to call a line an instance of “H.” Garrett (1997:
24) calls the set of all ideas labeled by a certain term
its revival set, and so our revival set for the word “line”
consists of K, G, and any instance of H. When I happen to
utter the word “line,” one of the ideas in the word’s
revival set — in all its determinacy — comes to mind. Thus
K, or G, or one of H, is called to mind. But we still
manage to refer generally because, when we utter this word,
the custom as well as the idea, is called to mind. And so,
while every idea that we’ve labeled “line” is “not really
and in fact present to the mind” when I utter this word,
every such idea is present to the mind “in power” (T

15
1.1.7.7).10 Consequently, Hume concludes that “all general
ideas are nothing but particular ones, annex’d to a certain
term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and
makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which
are similar to them” (T 1.1.7.1).11
In this way, Hume accounts for meaning without relying
on a Lockean conception of abstract ideas. In the next
section, however, I shall indicate how Hume’s meaningempiricism presents him with a problem.

A Nasty Problem

In the previous section, we saw that Hume identifies
the meaning of a word with its associated idea. That is,
for any term T, Hume claims that:

1. “T”’s meaningful º “T” has an associated idea.

Accordingly, if a word lacks an associated idea, then
that word is meaningless.

10

Hume’s theory of meaning, therefore, incorporates elements of a “use” view of meaning. What one
means by the word “line” is in part determined by which ideas one has labeled by that word, and what
future ideas one is willing to label by that word. In short, it’s partly a matter of how one uses the word.
11
Hereafter, “associated idea” is shorthand for “associated revival set.”

16
In addition, Hume holds (via his copy principle) that
ideas are copies of impressions. Thus:

2. “T” has an associated idea only if “T”’s associated
idea is copied from some impression.

From (1) and (2), it follows that:

3. “T”’s meaningful only if “T”’s associated idea is
copied from some impression.

Thus, to put matters in a way that Hume doesn’t, a word is
meaningful only if it has an associated impression.
These considerations famously lead Hume to endorse the
following well-known test for meaning:

When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a
philosophical term is employed without any meaning or
idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire,
from what impression is that supposed idea derived?
(EHU 2.21)12

12

“EHU” abbreviates An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and the numbers indicate the section
and paragraph, respectively.
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Hume claims, then, that philosophical terms often lack
associated ideas; and that the way to discern whether a
word lacks an associated idea is to discern whether or not
it has an associated impression. If the word lacks an
associated impression, then the word is meaningless.13
As an important example, consider Hume’s discussion of
substance. Traditionally understood, a substance is that in
which a thing’s properties inhere. Thus Locke, for instance,
describes the traditional idea of substance when he writes:

[W]hen we talk or think of any particular sort of
corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, etc. though the
Idea, we have of either of them, be but the
Complication, or Collection of those several simple
Ideas of sensible Qualities, which we use to find
united in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because
we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor
one in another, we suppose them existing in, and
supported by some common subject; which Support we
denote by the name Substance.14

Thus an apple is a substance for Locke just in case it is
“some common subject” or “support” with various qualities —
such as its color, taste, and smell — inhering or

13

I have reservations about this way of characterizing Hume’s method. I give voice to these reservations
in Chapter Five. However, since my focus at present concerns the traditional account of Hume’s test for
meaning, I needn’t detail such reservations here.
14
An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xxiii.4.

18
subsisting in it. It’s this “support,” properly speaking,
that constitutes the apple’s substance.
Locke’s description in the passage quoted above
concerns material substance, that is, substances in which
material properties (such as having a certain shape or
smell) inhere. In addition to material substance, however,
Locke believes there are mental substances:

The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind,
viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, etc. which we
concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor
apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be
produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions
of some other Substance, which we call Spirit.15

Thus mental substance for Locke is any substance in which
mental properties (such as thinking and reasoning) inhere.
In contrast, Hume applies his test for meaning to the
notion of substance and finds it wanting. He writes:

I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much
of their reasonings on the distinction of substance
and accident… whether the idea of substance be derived
from the impressions of sensation or reflection? If it
be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them,
and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes,
it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by
15

Ibid., II.xxiii.5.
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the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I
believe none will assert, that substance is either a
colour, or sound, or a taste. (T 1.1.6.1)

Hume claims, therefore, that substance isn’t the sort of
thing that can be perceived by the senses, and thus Hume
concludes that our idea of substance isn’t derived from an
impression of sensation.
Furthermore, Hume claims that our idea of substance
isn’t derived from an impression of reflection:

The idea of substance must, therefore, be derived from
an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But
the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into
our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly
represent a substance. (ibid.)

Consequently, our idea of substance isn’t derived from
an impression of sensation or an impression of reflection.
Thus, given Hume’s copy principle, Hume concludes that:

We have… no idea of substance, distinct from that of a
collection of particular qualities, nor have we any
other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning
it. (ibid.)

20
For ease of exposition, let’s call a bundle conception
of substance “substanceb,” and the traditional conception of
substance “substancet.” In the above passage, Hume seemingly
claims that we lack an idea of substancet, and thus claims
that all that we can mean by the term is substanceb.
The standard reading of Hume, therefore, is that Hume
departs from Locke insofar as Hume denies our having any
idea of substancet at all. According to the standard reading,
Hume’s account of substance is deflationary: to assert that
an apple is a substance, for example, is merely to say that
it’s a bundle of various qualities — such as its color,
taste, and smell — and nothing more.16 Hence, an idea of a
“support” in which such qualities are said to inhere isn’t
really any idea at all. Consequently, Hume would regard a
word like “substancet” as meaningless.
Georges Dicker provides a nice articulation of this
reading of Hume. Dicker writes that:

When Hume’s test for meaning is applied to the notion
of material substance, it yields the result that the
notion is meaningless and that a thing can be only a
bundle of properties. Likewise, when the test is
applied to the notion of a mental substance, it yields
the result that this notion is meaningless and that a
mind can be only a bundle of conscious states.
16

A collection of qualities constitutes a “bundle” for Hume just in case these qualities are frequently
found together, and are taken to be linked by a causal relation (T 1.4.6.4).
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Meaning-empiricism leaves no room at all for the
notion of substance as distinct from its properties,
whether it be a material substance or a mind. (1998:
21)17

Alexander Rosenberg also endorses this reading of Hume.
Rosenberg writes that:

According to Hume’s theory, since a term names an idea,
the meaning of a term is ultimately given by a set of
impressions that cause the idea that it names, and
terms without such a pedigree are meaningless noises.
In effect this theory of meaning constitutes a
criterion of cognitive significance indistinguishable
from one of the positivists’ earliest attempts to
frame a principle of verifiability. (1993: 66)

As Rosenberg intimates, Hume’s often seen as a kind of
proto-positivist. The logical positivists of the twentieth
century held that a proposition is cognitively meaningful —
that is, has a truth-value — just in case it’s analytic or
empirically verifiable.18 Thus it’s been thought that Hume’s
a positivist insofar as Hume claims that sentences are
meaningful only if the ideas contained in them are copied
from impressions, which in turn are supplied by experience.

17

In the preface to his book, Dicker includes the meaninglessness of “substance” among a list of
conclusions for which Hume is rightly famous. For instance, Dicker writes that “Hume is famous… for
arguing that meaningful words must have an empirical reference, so that ‘substance underlying all of a
thing’s perceivable qualities’ and ‘immaterial soul’ lack meaning” (1998: ix).
18
For a classic expression of this view, see A. J. Ayer (1952).
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In order for a cognitively meaningless sentence to count as
meaningful, the logical positivists claimed that it must be
relegated to the realm of emotive meaning. Their
verifiability criterion wasn’t meant to serve as a
criterion of linguistic meaning generally, but merely as a
criterion of assertoric meaning. In that case, the analogy
between logical positivism and Hume can only go so far, for
Hume’s meaning-empiricism extends to linguistic meaning
generally.
This, then, is the standard reading of Hume’s test for
meaning. But there’s a problem for this interpretation of
Hume. Simply stated, the problem is that Hume provides an
explanation as to why philosophers believe in the existence
of substancet. But explaining why philosophers believe in
the existence of substancet seems to presuppose that we have
some idea of substancet. In order to see how this
constitutes a problem for Hume, I turn to Hume’s
explanation of the philosopher’s belief in the existence of
substancet.
Hume begins by reiterating that “our ideas of bodies
are nothing but collections form’d by the mind of the ideas
of the several distinct sensible qualities” (T 1.4.3.2). In
this passage, Hume’s claiming that our idea of substance is
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nothing more than an idea of substanceb. Nonetheless, Hume
claims that we commonly regard this complex idea “as
thing, and as continuing the

SAME

ONE

under very considerable

alterations” (ibid.). That is, in Hume’s terminology, we
attribute a “simplicity” and an “identity” to our ideas of
bodies, despite the fact that they’re actually composed of
several distinct ideas.
Hume next explains why we attribute a simplicity and
an identity to this collection of ideas. Since Hume’s
explanation of our attribution of identity mirrors his
explanation of our attribution of simplicity, I’ll focus
exclusively on the latter.
First, Hume claims that the act of the imagination
when considering a simple and indivisible object,19 feels
similar to the act of the imagination when it considers a
complex idea “whose co-existent parts are connected
together by a strong relation” (T 1.4.3.5). Since each of
these distinct acts of the mind feel similar, Hume claims
that we mistake a complex object for a simple one.

Hence the colour, taste, figure, solidity, and other
qualities, combin’d in a peach or melon, are conceiv’d
to form one thing; and that on account of their close
19

That is, the act of the imagination when considering a simple impression or idea.
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relation, which makes them affect the thought in the
same manner, as if perfectly uncompounded. (ibid.)

Thus Hume claims that the mind’s attribution of simplicity
to a complex object is explained in part by similar acts of
the imagination.
Nonetheless, the mind isn’t totally misled. For when
the mind “views the object in another light” (ibid.), it
recognizes that each of the object’s qualities are
separable: that is, the mind realizes that the idea is a
complex idea, and that it doesn’t constitute a simple thing.
This realization

obliges the imagination to feign an unknown something,
or original substance or matter, as a principle of
union or cohesion among these qualities, and as what
may give the compound object a title to be call’d one
thing, notwithstanding its diversity and composition.
(ibid.)

Thus Hume’s explanation of how we come to have an idea
of substancet involves the following: (i) similar acts of
the imagination lead the mind to attribute a simplicity to
a complex object, (ii) the mind is uneasy about this
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attribution, and so (iii) the mind “feigns” an unknown
something or support of these qualities.20
The problem, then, is that Hume claims that we have no
idea of substancet — at most, we have an idea of substanceb —
and yet he provides an explanation as to why philosophers
believe in the existence of substancet.
In the words of Louis Loeb, these concessions create a
“nasty problem” for Hume:

Hume declares “substratum” meaningless. [But Hume
then] sets out to explain why the ancient philosophers
believe in the existence of material substrata. These
sections work at cross purposes. How can Hume
consistently set out to explain the psychological
causes of a belief that is without meaning or content
in the first place? (2001: 147)

Robert Fogelin echoes Loeb’s concern. He asks, “What is the
content of the false philosopher’s belief in substance?
Hume’s answer seems to be that it is contentless, but then
what does the belief amount to?” (1985: 11-12).
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Hume acts
in precisely the same way with respect to a host of other
traditional metaphysical terms. For instance, Hume makes
20

A “fiction” for Hume is a complex idea that’s arranged by the imagination, and is such that this complex
idea was never copied from any complex impression. For instance, Hume would count his idea of the New
Jerusalem as a fiction.
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similar claims about the religious belief in invisible
intelligent power, the self, external bodies, the existence
of a vacuum, the idea of changeless time, and the idea of a
cause. In light of this fact, Loeb identifies the following
variant on the main problem:

All contentless concepts are the same, just as there
is only one null set. Yet Hume provides different
psychological explanations of the beliefs in the
existence of material substrata, souls, external
existence and necessary connection. The different
explanations could be appropriate only if the beliefs
somehow differ in content, but they do not differ in
content if the key concepts are meaningless. (2001:
148)

On one hand, then, Hume makes clear claims of
meaninglessness, claims about key metaphysical concepts
like substance, self, body, and cause. On the other hand,
Hume describes and explains the origin of belief in the
existence of these traditional metaphysical concepts. But,
as Loeb notes, these claims work at cross purposes.
We can articulate the nasty problem more rigorously as
follows. First, Hume often claims of some term “T” that

4. “T”’s a meaningless expression.
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In addition,

5. Hume gives an explanation as to why we believe in the
existence of entities denoted by “T”.

But, finally,

6. Explanations as to why we believe in the existence of
entities denoted by “T” presuppose that T’s
meaningful.

The problem is that (4)-(6) are inconsistent.
Moreover, (4)-(6) engender a contradiction at the level
of ideas. To see this, recall Hume’s meaning-empiricism:

1. “T”’s meaningful º “T” has an associated idea.

(1) and (4) entail:

7. “T” lacks an associated idea.
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But (1), (5), and (6) entail:

8. “T” has an associated idea.

Hume’s saddled, then, with the following contradiction:

9. “T” has and doesn’t have an associated idea.

It appears, therefore, that Hume’s committed to a
contradiction. In the case of substance, Hume seems to be
committed to both our having and our lacking an idea of
substancet. Moreover, the purported contradiction is a
serious one, as it’s engendered by aspects fundamental to
Hume’s entire project. Hume seems motivated to explain away
various traditional metaphysical concepts, despite the fact
that he claims that we have no idea of them.
In the chapters that follow, I argue that Hume has the
resources to escape the contradiction. In particular, I aim
to show that Hume can avoid the nasty problem relative to
our idea of causation. While my conclusions can be extended
to other key metaphysical terms, my primary focus is on our
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idea of causation. Accordingly, in the next section, I
shall indicate how the nasty problem is relevant to Hume’s
discussion of causation.

Thick and Thin Causation

In the previous section, we saw that Hume faces a
nasty problem relevant to his discussion of substance. In
this section, I indicate how Hume faces a similar problem
relevant to his discussion of causation.
Hume’s views on causation are best appreciated when
approached within their historical context. Edward Craig
(1987), for instance, has argued that philosophy during
Hume’s time was strongly in the grip of what he calls the
“Image of God doctrine” (13-17). As one might expect, this
is the view that human beings are made in the image of God.
Craig claims that the Image of God doctrine engendered
various metaphysical and epistemological implications. For
instance, proponents of the Image of God doctrine regarded
God’s knowledge as the best and most perfect form of
knowledge, and thus regarded it as the most certain. God’s
knowledge was conceived in terms of his having a priori
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knowledge, and thus a priori knowledge came to be seen as
the most divine and perfect form of knowledge.21
In addition, since God was regarded as the creator of
the natural world, advocates for this view held that nature
operates in a way analogous to a priori inference. This is
the metaphysical implication of the image of God doctrine.
Thus Helen Beebee, for instance, describes the metaphysical
implication of the Image of God doctrine as follows:

The… claim is that nature itself operates in a way
that is analogous to a priori reasoning. The way
nature operates is, of course, via causation: the
processes we see unfolding around us are causal
processes, with earlier stages linked to later ones by
causal relations. The metaphysical upshot of the Image
of God doctrine, as far as causation is concerned, is
thus the view that causal relations are, as it were,
the worldly correlates of a priori inference: causes
necessitate their effects, or guarantee that those
effects occur, in a way that is somehow analogous to,
or perhaps even identical with, the way that premises
of an argument necessitate or guarantee the truth of
their conclusions. (2006: 3)

Accordingly, proponents of the Image of God doctrine
held that causes necessitate their effects, such that if
one “could somehow penetrate into the essence of a cause,
[one] would see that the effect could not fail to come
21

It’s precisely for this reason that proponents of the Image of God doctrine consider mathematics and
logic (and the certainty that each provides) as most worthy of the label “knowledge.” For more on this,
see my discussion in Chapter Two on the distinction between knowledge and probability.
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about” (ibid.).22 Galen Strawson (2014: 109) has termed this
feature of the causal relation its “AP property,” for it’s
this feature that warrants an a priori inference from cause
to effect, and vice versa. Simon Blackburn, in turn, refers
to causal connections that possess the AP property “thick”
causal connections (1990: 237). Thus a thick causal
connection is one that furnishes an a priori inference from
the cause to the effect, and vice versa.
As evidence for this view, consider Descartes’s view
that

it is manifest by the natural light that there must be
at least as much reality in the efficient and total
cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask,
could the effect gets its reality from, if not from
the cause? And how could the cause give it to the
effect unless it possessed it? (Third Meditation: CSM
II 28: AT VII 40)23

A. O. Lovejoy explains:

That “there cannot be more in the effect than there is
in the cause” is one of the propositions that men have
22

As is well known, Kant later utilizes the metaphor of containment in his Critique of Pure Reason to
characterize the notion of analyticity (A6-7/B11).
23
“CSM” abbreviates the edition of Descartes’s works by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald
Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vols. I and II. The roman numerals indicate the volume,
and the arabic numerals indicate the page. In turn, “AT” denotes the twelve-volume Adam and Tannery
revised edition, Oeuvres de Descartes.
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been readiest to accept as axiomatic; a cause, it has
been supposed, does not “account” for its effect,
unless the effect is a thing which the eye of reason
could somehow discern in the cause, upon a
sufficiently thorough analysis. (1962: 286)

And Spinoza says that he has

shown quite clearly (Pr. 16) that from God’s supreme
power or infinite nature an infinity of things in
infinite ways — that is, everything — have necessarily
flowed or are always following from that same
necessity, just as from the nature of a triangle it
follows from eternity to eternity that its three
angles are equal to two right angles.24
Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of
all things that can come within the scope of infinite
intellect.25

Accordingly, philosophers within the Image of God tradition
held that causation was thick.
Since human beings are made in God’s image, proponents
of the Image of God doctrine also suggested an important
epistemological implication. They held that since human
beings are made in God’s image, our cognitive capacities
must mirror or approximate the cognitive capacities of God.
Hence, Craig (1987: 18-27) claims that the epistemological

24
25

Ethics 1p17s.
Ethics 1p16c1. The preceding three quotations are taken from Dicker (1993: Ch. 3).
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implication of the Image of God doctrine inspired the
“Insight Ideal,” namely the view that

Human beings are, in principle, capable of attaining a
priori knowledge about the nature and structure of the
natural world.

In other words, the Image of God doctrine suggests
that the causal relation is thick, and the Insight Ideal
says that humans can in principle discern this relation.
As we shall see, however, the view that causal
connections are thick is diametrically opposed to Hume’s
own account of causation. Hume claims, for instance, that
our idea of causation is a complex idea consisting of at
least three elements:

A. The cause is spatiotemporally contiguous with the
effect,
B. the effect succeeds the cause in time, and
C. events like the cause are constantly conjoined with
events like the effect.
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By way of an example, consider bringing a pot of water
to a boil. In this case, the flame’s heating the water to a
temperature of 212°F at 1 atm causes the water to boil.
Heating the water causes it to boil, says Hume, because
heating the water at that temperature and in those
conditions occurs before and adjacent to the effect; and,
whenever water is heated to that temperature and in those
conditions, it boils.
This view is called the regularity theory of causation,
and it derives its name from the third condition mentioned
above: namely, that like causes are constantly conjoined
with like effects. Hume’s most explicit endorsement of this
view is presented in his first definition of a cause. In
this regard, Hume writes:

First Definition of a Cause
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and
contiguous to another, and where all the objects
resembling the former are plac’d in a like relation of
priority and contiguity to those objects, that
resemble the latter. (T 1.3.14.35)

Hume’s first definition of a cause omits the condition
of a necessary connection between the cause and its effect.
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Thus if we consider Hume’s first definition in isolation,
we discover that causes don’t necessitate their effects.
Hume insists, however, that even if the objects that
constitute the cause and the effect aren’t necessarily
connected, the concept of a necessary connection still
factors into our idea of a cause (T 1.3.2.11). Accordingly,
Hume addresses this issue with his second definition of a
cause, which reads:

Second Definition of a Cause
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and
contiguous to another, and so united with it in the
imagination, that the idea of the one determines the
mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression
of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. (T
1.3.14.35)

Hume claims, therefore, that the necessary connection
between a cause and its effect is solely a feature of our
minds, and not objects. It’s an impression of reflection —
a determination or disposition of the mind to believe that
the effect will occur, given the cause. Consequently, our
idea of necessary connection is copied from an impression
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of reflection, and thus is an “idea of reflection,”26 to use
a phrase of Harold Noonan’s (2007: 28).
On Hume’s conception, then, there’s nothing intrinsic
to the cause that necessitates its effect. It’s not the
case that causal relations contain the AP property. It’s
only after we’ve experienced a constant conjunction of
causes and effects that we entertain the idea of necessary
connection. To illustrate this, Hume provides the following
example. Suppose that Adam, upon first being created,
considers the causal relation between two billiard balls:

It would have been necessary, therefore, for Adam (if
he was not inspired) to have had experience of the
effect, which followed upon the impulse of these two
balls. He must have seen, in several instances, that
when the one ball struck upon the other, the second
always acquired motion. If he had seen a sufficient
number of instances of this kind, whenever he saw the
one ball moving towards the other, he would always
conclude without hesitation, that the second would
acquire motion. His understanding would anticipate his
sight, and form a conclusion suitable to his past
experience. (A 14)27

Thus, Hume claims that Adam requires experience to make any
non-arbitrary inference from the cause. Herein lies Hume’s
repudiation of the Insight Ideal. He writes that:
26

An idea of reflection is an idea derived from an impression of reflection.
The “A” abbreviates Hume’s An Abstract of a Book lately Published; Entitled, A Treatise of Human
Nature, followed by the paragraph number.
27
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Were a man, such as Adam, created in the full vigour
of understanding, without experience, he would never
be able to infer motion in the second ball from the
motion and impulse of the first. It is not any thing
that reason sees in the cause, which makes us infer
the effect. Such an inference, were it possible, would
amount to a demonstration, as being founded merely on
the comparison of ideas. But no inference from cause
to effect amounts to a demonstration. (A 11; cf. A 14
and T 1.3.14.13)

Adam can demonstrate the effect from the cause, apart
from experience, only if Adam can perceive something about
the cause that entails the effect. But, as we’ve seen, Hume
claims that there’s “not any thing that reason sees in the
cause” (ibid). Thus, as Beebee eloquently summarizes the
point, for Hume “the fundamental source of our empirical
beliefs is something more animal than divine, namely custom
or habit” (2006: 5).28
We’ve seen, then, that Hume endorses a thin rather
than a thick conception of causation. He claims that our
idea of causation includes the idea of a necessary
connection, but that our idea of necessary connection is
thin: it’s a determination of the mind that’s based on an
experience of the constant conjunction of causes and

28

Note that Hume includes a chapter on animal reasoning in both the Treatise and the first Enquiry.
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effects, and not anything that’s perceived to be the case
in objects.
In order to have an idea of thick causation, one needs
to have an idea of thick necessary connection, a necessary
connection of objects of the causation, a necessary
connection between cause and effect. But Hume, as we’ve
seen, denies we have any impression corresponding to this
idea. And thus Hume concludes that we lack an idea of thick
necessary connection. According to him,

[W]e deceive ourselves, when we imagine we are possest
of any idea of this kind, after the manner we commonly
understand it. All ideas are deriv’d from, and
represent impressions. We never have any impression,
that contains any power or efficacy. We never
therefore have any idea of power. (T 1.3.14.11)

And:

We wou’d not willingly stop before we are acquainted
with that energy in the cause, by which it operates on
its effect… And how must we be disappointed, when we
learn, that this connection, tie, or energy lies
merely in ourselves… Such a discovery not only cuts
off all hopes of ever attaining satisfaction, but even
prevents our very wishes; since it appears, that when
we say we desire to know the ultimate and operating
principle, as something, which resides in the external
object, we either contradict ourselves, or talk
without a meaning. (T 1.4.7.5)
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Such claims echo Hume’s earlier claim that “we have no
idea of substance” (T 1.1.6.1), which generated the nasty
problem above. Similarly, Hume claims that we “never… have
any idea of power” (T 1.3.14.11). Given Hume’s meaningempiricism, then, it seems to follow that an expression
like “thick causation” is meaningless.
The problem is that Hume frequently seems to refer to
thick causal connections, or at least their conceptual
blood relatives, powers and forces. For instance, he
writes:

[T]he powers and forces, by which the [course of
nature] is governed, [are] wholly unknown to us. (EHU
5.21)
[W]e are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which
[the] regular course and succession of objects totally
depends. (EHU 5.22)
[T]he scenes of the universe are continually shifting,
and one object follows another in an uninterrupted
succession; but the power or force, which actuates the
whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and
never discovers itself in any of the sensible
qualities of body. (EHU 7.8)

Even if Hume’s speaking ironically in these passages, if
his words are to have any meaning — if “the power or force,
which actuates the whole machine” isn’t pure gibberish —
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then these words must have associated ideas. Here, for
instance, is how Ken Clatterbaugh (1999: 204) puts the
point:

In Hume’s own theory of knowledge, when we talk of
ultimate principles, etc., we are literally speaking
nonsense; we are using words without ideas associated
with them… To take Hume’s talk about secret powers
seriously, even to think that such sentences are
meaningful, would mean that Hume would have to set
aside the entire epistemological framework of his
philosophy in the Treatise and the Enquiry.

Asher Jiang makes a similar point:

Hume frequently states that we are ignorant of genuine
power. There is a well-known internal difficulty
concerning this claim concerning ignorance. According
to Hume, we do not have an impression-based idea of
genuine power; on the other hand, every noun needs a
corresponding idea to be meaningful. Is his claim
concerning ignorance, which makes use of the noun
“power,” meaningless in light of his own criterion of
meaningfulness? (2015: 229)

In addition, Hume’s entire focus in T 1.3.14 is to
discern what our idea of necessary connection is, and to
explain why philosophers falsely believe in the existence
of thick necessary connections. For instance, Hume suggests
that we project our idea of thin necessary connection on to
objects. Famously, he writes:
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Thus, upon the whole, we may infer, that when we talk
of any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature,
as endowed with a power or force, proportioned to any
effect; when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt
objects, and suppose that this connexion depends upon
an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects
are endowed; in all these expression, so applied, we
have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of
common words, without any clear and determinate ideas.
But as it is more probable that these expressions do
here lose their true meaning by being wrong applied,
than that they never have any meaning; it will be
proper to bestow another consideration on this subject,
to see if possibly we can discover the nature and
origin of those ideas we annex to them. (T 1.3.14.14)

As Hume intimates in this passage, he intends to give an
explanation as to why we believe in the existence of thick
causal connections.29
Accordingly, Hume also seems to face the nasty problem
in relation to his discussion of causation. Substituting
“thick causation” for “T,” we can put the nasty problem
relative to Hume’s discussion of causation as follows:

10.

29

“Thick causation” is a meaningless expression.

Janet Broughton has emphasized that Hume admits a thick idea of necessary connection — what she
calls his “bare” idea of necessary connection (2007: 198) — which serves as Hume’s philosophical target.
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11.

Hume gives an explanation as to why we believe in

the existence of thick causal connections.

But, finally,

12.

Explanations as to why we believe in the

existence of thick causal connections presuppose that
“thick causation” is meaningful.

When conjoined with Hume’s meaning-empiricism, (10)(12) entail a contradiction: we both have and don’t have an
idea of thick causation.
This is the nasty problem relevant to Hume’s views on
causation. It’s a problem for all interpretations of Hume,
but it has appeared most frequently as a challenge to one
side in the so-called “New Hume debate.” In the next
section, therefore, I indicate what this more recent debate
is, and how the nasty problem is relevant to it.

The New Hume Debate

43
In recent years, a new interpretation of Hume — the
so-called “New Hume” — has emerged in the literature. The
manner in which one frames the various positions in this
debate is controversial. At present, therefore, I shall
stick to a fairly simple and intuitive formulation.
The traditional interpretation of Hume interprets Hume
as making a metaphysical claim about causation. According
to this account, Hume claims that causation, as it exists
in nature, is nothing more than regular succession. Saul
Kripke, for instance, expresses this view when he writes
that, “If Hume is right,” then “even if God were to look at
[two causally related] events, he would discern nothing
relating them other than that one succeeds the other”
(1982: 67). The main support for this interpretation of
Hume is the deflationary reading discussed above. Hume’s
typically understood to be a proto-positivist, and thus
it’s argued that the only idea of causation that Hume
admits is an idea of thin causation. Thus the “Old Hume,”
as he’s typically called, denies any idea of thick
causation.
In the early 1980s, however, a number of works on Hume
appeared in the literature that challenged this account of
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Hume’s views on causation.30 The leading proponent of this
interpretation is Galen Strawson (2014).
Strawson argues that Hume’s primary aim when
discussing causation (as when discussing other topics) is
epistemological, not metaphysical. Hume never doubts the
existence of thick causal connections. Thus Hume’s a causal
realist, but a realist of a certain sort. Strawson and
others argue that, while Hume’s a realist, he’s a skeptical
realist. In other words, Hume claims that we can’t know
anything about the nature of the thick causal connections
that exist in reality.
In contrast to the traditional interpretation of Hume,
then, New Humeans claim that there’s good evidence for
thinking that Hume admits an idea of thick causation, and
indeed believes in the existence of such connections.
Here, for instance, are two passages that New Humeans
sometimes offer as evidence for their position:

It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us
at a great distance from all her secrets, and has
afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial
qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those
powers and principles, on which the influence of these
objects entirely depends. (EHU 4.16)
30

These include John P. Wright (1983), Donald Livingston (1984), Edward Craig (1987), Janet Broughton
(1987), and Galen Strawson (2014).
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And:

The scenes of the universe are continually shifting,
and one object follows another in an uninterrupted
succession; but the power or force, which actuates the
whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and
never discovers itself in any of the sensible
qualities of body. (EHU 7.8)

Thus, according to the New Hume position, Hume admits
the existence of thick causal connections in nature; he
only means to claim that we can’t know anything about it.
As one might have anticipated, the main criticism of
the New Hume is that Hume’s meaning-empiricism precludes
the possibility of his believing in thick causation, for
one can’t believe in something that one can’t have an idea
of. Peter Kail, a proponent of the New Hume interpretation,
puts the criticism as follows:

[I]t appears Hume’s account of the derivation of the
idea of necessity implies that no thought at all can
be formed concerning genuine necessity and that the
‘true meaning’ of necessity is merely that it is a
feature of our psychology. Either way, the very
possibility of the barest thought concerning genuine
necessity is undercut, and with that any possibility
of realism. No content can be given to putative
thoughts with respect to objective causal necessity
and hence no question concerning its existence can be
intelligibly raised. For even to raise the question of
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whether there is genuine causal power requires content
for such thoughts. The only thought we can form with
regard to the objective component to causal relations
is, roughly, that they fall under a pattern of regular
succession, and that, therefore, is in what causation
consists. (2007: 81)

Thus, a central aspect of the nasty problem — Hume’s
dismissing metaphysical terms as meaningless — factors as a
major premise in the main criticism of the New Hume. But,
as has been hinted at, Old Humeans have to meet the nasty
problem no less than New Humeans, and many Old Humeans seem
to have overlooked this fact.
In this dissertation, I note the important role that
clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s philosophy,
and indicate how this helps us solve the nasty problem.
When applied to the New Hume debate, I argue — with Old
Humeans — that Hume doesn’t believe in thick causation.
Hume believes that the term is meaningless, or, when used
in a sense that’s meaningful, its meaning lacks a certain
pedigree. In every case, Hume considers the idea associated
with the term to be obscure and confused.

Conclusion
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In this chapter, I began by indicating the fundamental
principles of Hume’s science of human nature. In addition,
I explicated Hume’s meaning-empiricism, and the test for
meaning that he derives from it.
We also saw that Hume claims that we have no idea of
thick causation, and yet Hume explains why philosophers
come to believe in the existence of thick causation. This
is the nasty problem as applied to Hume’s discussion of
causation. Furthermore, I indicated how this problem has
implications for the New Hume debate, since it is part of
the main line of criticism leveled against the skeptical
realist position.
In the next chapter, I discuss a necessary preliminary
to my discussion of Hume’s views on causation.
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Chapter Two
Hume’s Fork
Introduction

In Chapter One, we saw that Hume faces a nasty problem
relevant to his discussion of causation. In this chapter, I
discuss an important distinction in Hume, what has come to
be known as “Hume’s Fork.” Hume’s Fork plays a central role
in Hume’s account of causation, and so elucidating it is a
necessary preliminary to Chapter Three.

Initial Characterization

Hume’s Fork is Hume’s distinction between relations of
ideas and matters of fact. Hume presents the distinction at
T 1.3.1.1 and at EHU 4. At EHU 4, for instance, he writes:

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may
naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations
of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are
the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and
in short, every affirmation, which is either
intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the
square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of
the two sides, is a proposition, which expresses a
relation between these figures. That three times five
is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation
between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are
discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without
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dependence on what is any where existent in the
universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle
in nature, the truths, demonstrated by EUCLID, would for
ever retain their certainty and evidence.
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of
human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner;
nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of
a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of
every matter of fact is still possible; because it can
never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the
mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if
ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not
rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition,
and implies no more contradiction, than the
affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain,
therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were
it demonstratively false, it would imply a
contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived
by the mind. (EHU 4.1-2)

In this passage, Hume claims that there are two kinds
of propositions: relations of ideas and matters of fact.
Relations of ideas, claims Hume, are propositions that
(i) can be known by intuition or by demonstration, and that
(ii) can be known a priori.1 Accordingly, Hume claims that:

1. A proposition p is a relation between ideas just in
case p can be intuitively or demonstratively known.2

1

Hume claims that (ii) follows from (i).
Since relations between ideas are known or certain propositions, there can’t be false relations of ideas.
Hence the proposition “2 + 2 = 5” is neither a relation between ideas nor a matter of fact, although “it’s
not the case that 2 + 2 = 5” is a relation between ideas. We can speak of “2 + 2 = 5” as a relation between
ideas in a derivative sense, inasmuch as it’s negation is a relation between ideas.
2
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Hume’s discussion of matters of fact, on the other
hand, proceeds from a slightly different angle. Hume claims,
for instance, that “the contrary of every matter of fact is
still possible” and “can never imply a contradiction” (EHU
4.2). Thus, Hume claims that:

2. A proposition p is a matter of fact just in case ~p
doesn’t entail a contradiction.3

Consequently, the condition that Hume identifies when
characterizing matters of fact isn’t the same condition, or
even the same spectrum of conditions, that he identifies
when characterizing relations of ideas. In the case of
relations of ideas, Hume asks whether the relevant
proposition can be intuitively or demonstratively known. In
the case of matters of fact, he asks whether the relevant
proposition’s denial entails a contradiction. But these two
conditions aren’t obviously mutually exclusive.
The chasm may be bridged, however, once we recognize
that Hume claims that matters of fact can’t be intuitively
3

But consider the proposition “red is yellow.” On (2), this counts as a matter of fact, since “red isn’t
yellow” doesn’t entail a contradiction. But wouldn’t Hume count “red is yellow” as a relation between
ideas, in the derivative sense outlined in the previous footnote? Hume would consider it a relation
between ideas, but he would insist that when “red” and “yellow” are clearly and distinctly perceived, one
will discern that they’re contradictory notions. It nonetheless may be the case that the equivalence in (2)
is too strong. Hume may intend only to identify a necessary condition of matters of fact.
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or demonstratively known because they have denials that
don’t imply a contradiction. For instance, Hume claims that
matters of fact aren’t “ascertained in the same manner”
(EHU 4.2) — that is, they aren’t intuitively or
demonstratively known — because the “contrary of every
matter of fact is still possible” (ibid.). This suggests,
therefore, that Hume’s presupposing the following
condition:

3. A proposition p can be intuitively or demonstratively
known only if ~p entails a contradiction.

Given (1) and (3), therefore, it follows that:

4. A proposition p is a relation between ideas only if
~p entails a contradiction.

Thus, relations of ideas are those propositions that
have denials that entail a contradiction, whereas matters
of fact are those propositions that have denials that don’t
entail a contradiction. So understood, Hume’s Fork amounts
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to a distinction between two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive kinds of propositions.
The preceding characterization may lead one to view
Hume’s Fork as the familiar distinction between the
logically necessary and the logically contingent.4 In modern
parlance, a proposition is (narrowly) logically necessary
just in case its denial entails a formal contradiction, and
a proposition is (narrowly) logically contingent just in
case it doesn’t entail a formal contradiction and its
denial doesn’t entail a formal contradiction. The truths of
logic, for instance, are necessary in this sense.
Consequently, a natural reading of Hume’s Fork is that Hume
intends to introduce the distinction between the narrowly
logically necessary and the narrowly logically contingent.
However, there’s another sense in which a proposition
may be said to be logically necessary or logically
contingent. It’s sometimes said that a proposition is
(broadly) logically necessary just in case it’s true in
every possible world, and that a proposition is (broadly)
logically contingent just in case it’s true in some
possible world but not true in every possible world. The
truths of metaphysics are said to be necessary in this

4

In what follows, I use the term “contingent” in the technical sense of possibly p and possibly not-p.
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sense — as in the fact that no person is a prime number or
that Hesperus is Phosphorus — and so this modality is
sometimes called metaphysical necessity or metaphysical
contingency, respectively. Accordingly, some may contend
that Hume’s Fork amounts to the distinction between the
metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically contingent.
These are natural readings of Hume’s Fork, but they’re
incorrect. In this chapter, I show why Hume’s Fork isn’t
the distinction between the narrowly logically necessary
and the narrowly logically contingent, and why it isn’t the
distinction between the metaphysically necessary and the
metaphysically contingent. In addition, I show that Hume’s
Fork doesn’t amount to the distinction between the
epistemically necessary and the epistemically contingent,
as has been recently suggested by Peter Kail. I also
criticize and reject a characterization of Hume’s Fork
introduced by Georges Dicker. I then put forward an
interpretation of my own. My conclusions in this chapter
will better enable us to see the nature of Hume’s views on
the causal relation. In order to get a proper handle on
Hume’s Fork, I begin with Hume’s conception of
demonstration.
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Owen on Demonstration

David Owen (1999) has convincingly argued that Hume
inherits his conception of logic largely from Descartes. In
the early modern period, “logic” was conceived as the study
of “the principles and operations of the reasoning faculty,
and the nature of our ideas” (T Intro. 5). In order,
therefore, to best appreciate Hume’s views on logic and
demonstration, we need to briefly discuss Descartes’s views
on the matter.
Owen argues that Descartes preferred a non-formal
conception of reasoning. On this conception, inferences
should be assessed by attending to the content of one’s
ideas, rather than to the logical form of one’s argument.
Owen claims that Descartes held to this conception because
he was primarily interested in the discovery of new truths,
as opposed to the mere preservation of truth. Hume’s
conception of demonstration descends from this tradition.
The dominant conception of inference and reasoning
during Descartes’s time was syllogistic or term logic. Term
logic assesses arguments by first identifying their logical
form, and then by distinguishing valid from invalid forms.
To give an example, consider this argument:
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(A)

Socrates runs.
Anything that runs, moves.
Therefore, Socrates moves.

In assessing the propriety of (A), Aristotelian logicians
begin by asking whether (A) has a valid or an invalid
argument form. For instance, they might note that the first
premise contains a singular term; that is, a proposition
about a specific individual, in this case Socrates. While
there’s some debate over how to handle singular
propositions in term logic, the standard approach is to
translate singular propositions into universal
propositions.5 Accordingly, “Socrates runs” would be
translated into “All things that are Socrates run.”
Having made this translation, we are now in a position
to identify the form of (A). According to the Aristotelian
tradition, the form of this inference is:

(B)

5

All S are R.

For instance, Kant writes that “Logicians are justified in saying that, in the employment of judgments in
Syllogisms, singular propositions can be treated like those that are universal” (A71/B96).
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All R are M.
Therefore, all S are M.

The scholastics called this argument form “Barbara,” and
noted that it’s valid. Since (A) is an instance of (B), (A)
is a valid argument. This is the manner in which a term
logician would assess an inference.
But now consider this argument:

(C)

Socrates runs.
Therefore, Socrates moves.

Taken as it is, Aristotelians wouldn’t recognize (C) as
instantiating a valid argument form. They might contend
that it’s an enthymeme, and that when the missing premise
is provided the argument may be shown to instantiate a
valid argument form. But the point to observe at this
juncture is that even if we don’t interpret (C) as an
enthymeme, Descartes would take (C) to be a perfectly
acceptable inference. For instance, Descartes was held to
have argued:
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(D)

I think.
Therefore, I exist.

Furthermore, Descartes was insistent that (D) shouldn’t be
interpreted as an enthymeme. Thus, he writes:

[W]hen we become aware that we are thinking things,
this is a primary notion which is not derived by means
of any syllogism. When someone says “I am thinking,
therefore I am, or I exist,” he does not deduce
existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but
recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple
intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact
that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism,
he would have to have had previous knowledge of the
major premise “Everything which thinks is, or exists”;
yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own
case that it is impossible that he should think
without existing. (Second Set of Replies: CSM II 100:
AT VII 140).

The reason that Descartes insists that (D) shouldn’t
be interpreted syllogistically is that he believes that
term logic is unhelpful — indeed, a positive hindrance —
toward the discovery of new truths or the better security
of old ones. Descartes writes that

on the basis of their method, dialecticians are unable
to formulate a syllogism with a true conclusion unless
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they are already in possession of the substance of the
conclusion, i.e. unless they have previous knowledge
of the very truth deduced in the syllogism. It is
obvious therefore that they themselves can learn
nothing new from such forms of reasoning, and hence
that ordinary dialectic is of no use whatever to those
who wish to investigate the truth of things. Its sole
advantage is that it sometimes enables us to explain
to others arguments which are already known. It should
therefore be transferred from philosophy to rhetoric.
(Rule Ten: CSM I 36: AT X 406)

In this passage, Descartes clearly takes issue with
the term logician’s focus on the preservation of truth:
when the premises are true the conclusion must be true. But
the preservation of truth, as such, says nothing about
whether the premises are in fact true; only when we know
that the premises are true are we warranted in taking the
conclusion to be true. But since the conclusion is already
“contained” in the premises, Descartes contends that we
never in fact learn anything new from syllogisms. Hence,
Descartes contends that formal conceptions of inference are
a positive hindrance to the discovery of new truths;
demonstrations in term logic merely present truths that are
already known.
In addition, Descartes argued that formal conceptions
of inference encourage us to blindly and dogmatically
follow rules without properly engaging our intellect or
reason. He, in turn, proposed rules of inference that would
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help us engage our reason by forcing us to attend to the
content of our ideas.
For instance, Descartes proposed the following method
of reasoning: inference should involve a chain of linked
intuitions. To make this clear, consider the following
schema:

K = M

(intuition)

M = L

(intuition)

K = L

(demonstration)

Descartes’s conception of demonstration involves four
elements: (i) demonstrations commence when the mind attends
to the content of some idea K. (ii) Upon clearly and
distinctly perceiving the content of K, one intuits that K
stands in relationship R to some intermediate idea M. (iii)
Having clearly and distinctly perceived the content of M,
one intuits that M stands in relationship R* to some third
idea L.6 Finally, (iv) one attentively runs through (i)(iii) until the whole chain approaches the strength of an
intuition. Here’s an example provided by Descartes:

6

R may be identical to R*. In the above schema, for instance, the relevant relation is “equality.”
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The self-evidence and certainty of intuition is
required not only for apprehending single propositions,
but also for any train of reasoning whatever. Take for
example, the inference 2 plus 2 equals 3 plus 1: not
only must we intuitively perceive that 2 plus 2 make 4,
and that 3 plus 1 make 4, but also that the original
proposition follows necessarily from the other two.
(Rule Three: CSM I 14-5: AT X 369)

Accordingly, when we fill out the above schema with
Descartes’s example, we arrive at the following:

2 + 2 = 4

(intuition)

4 = 3 + 1

(intuition)

2 + 2 = 3 + 1

(demonstration)

Descartes doesn’t wish to deny that demonstrations can
be represented in syllogistic form.7 But, as noted above,
the only benefit of doing so is the mere preservation of
truth:

[Dialecticians] prescribe certain forms of reasoning
in which the conclusions follow with such irresistible
necessity that if our reason relies on them, even
7

Descartes distinguishes between “analysis” and “synthesis.” Synthesis is putting arguments in syllogistic
form in the typical Aristotelian manner. Analysis, on the other hand, is Descartes’s preferred method of
attending to the content of one’s ideas.
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though it takes, as it were, a rest from considering a
particular inference clearly and attentively, it can
nevertheless draw a conclusion which is certain simply
in virtue of the form. But, as we have noticed, truth
often slips through these fetters, while those who
employ them are left entrapped in them. (Rule Ten: CSM
I 36: AT X 405-6)

Truth, therefore, often slips through the “fetters” of
syllogistic reasoning. In turn, Descartes’s proposed method
“guard[s] against our reason’s taking a holiday” (CSM I 36:
AT X 406), so that we may discover and appreciate new
truths.
We’ve seen, therefore, that Descartes adopts a nonformal conception of inference. Owen convincingly claims
that Hume falls within this tradition. For instance, in
explicating Hume’s example of a relation between ideas, the
Pythagorean Theorem, Owen writes:

[S]uppose we wanted to reason towards the proposition
“the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares
of the other two sides.” Hume says that this “cannot
be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined,
without a train of reasoning or enquiry”…. If I am
right, such a train would be constituted by a chain of
ideas the first of which is the idea whose content is
“the square of the hypotenuse” and the last of which
is “the squares of the other two sides”. Connecting
these ideas is a series of intermediate ideas. The
link between each pair of adjacent ideas is a relation
which must be seen to hold, and one that must enable
us to see that the first idea stands in the relation
of equality to the last idea. (1999: 2-3, cf. 19)
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Thus, for Hume, a demonstration isn’t about form, it’s
about intuiting the content of one’s ideas, and noting what
relations hold (or don’t hold) among them. A proposition is
intuitively known just in case it’s “discoverable at first
sight” (T 1.3.1.2) or “comprehended in an instant” (T
1.3.1.3), and a demonstration is simply a series of linked
intuitions. Indeed, Owen’s account nicely explains why Hume
uses the name “relations of ideas.”
An implication of this interpretation is that “Hume’s
distinction between demonstrative and probable inference is
quite unlike our distinction between deductive and
inductive inference” (1999: 5). Deduction is about the
preservation of truth, whereas a demonstration for Hume is
about the preservation of certainty (cf. 1999: 19). As Don
Garrett helpfully puts it: “[A]n argument with false or
weak premises may be deductively valid for us, although it
would not have been demonstrative for Hume” (1997: 94).
It’s helpful to keep this distinction in mind.
Hume doesn’t receive this conception of inference
directly from Descartes. Locke also preferred a non-formal
conception of inference (cf. Owen 1999: Ch. 3). But a
consequence of Locke’s empiricism was that the realm of
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knowledge, as compared to Descartes, was seriously reduced.
Knowledge for both Descartes and Locke consisted of those
propositions that can be known with certainty, and anything
that was less than certain was relegated to the domain of
belief or opinion. Locke consequently made use of the
notion of probability in his philosophy to account for the
domain of rational belief.
Probable reasoning for Locke also involves a chain of
ideas, but the links or relations among them are based on
experience rather than intuition. Hume follows Locke in
this regard: knowledge is provided by relations of ideas,
whereas matters of fact (as we shall see) culminate in
belief. Thus Hume admits two faculties of reason:
demonstrative and probable reason.
This, therefore, constitutes Hume’s conception of
intuition and demonstration. But let’s return now to the
sorts of propositions that Hume thinks can be intuitively
and demonstratively known. Hume’s examples will shed light
on whether or not we can understand Hume’s Fork as the
distinction between the narrowly logically necessary and
the narrowly logically contingent. For instance, Hume
writes:
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Three of these relations are discoverable at first
sight, and fall more properly under the province of
intuition than demonstration. When any objects
resemble each other, the resemblance will at first
strike the eye, or rather the mind; and seldom
requires a second examination. The case is the same
with contrariety, and with the degrees of any quality.
No one can once doubt but existence and non-existence
destroy each other, and are perfectly incompatible and
contrary. And though it be impossible to judge exactly
of the degrees of any quality, such as colour, taste,
heat, cold, when the difference betwixt them is very
small; yet it is easy to decide, that any of them is
superior or inferior to another, when their difference
is considerable. And this decision we always pronounce
at first sight, without any enquiry or reasoning. (T
1.3.1.2)

Consider, for instance, the proposition “nothing red
is green.” Hume claims that this can be intuitively known
because our idea of red is contrary to our idea of green.
Since it can be intuitively known, “nothing red is green”
is a relation between ideas for Hume, and not a matter of
fact.
But notice that this proposition isn’t logically
necessary in the narrow sense, and thus Hume’s Fork can’t
be the distinction between the narrowly logically necessary
and narrowly logically contingent. Indeed, Hume’s own
examples at EHU 4.1 — the Pythagorean Theorem and the claim
that 3 x 5 = 30 ÷ 2 — foreclose the possibility that Hume’s
distinction concerns narrow logical possibility, for
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mathematical propositions aren’t typically taken to be
logically necessary in the narrow sense.
Accordingly, this seems to lend support to the idea
that Hume’s Fork concerns logical necessity in the broad
sense. If this interpretation of Hume’s Fork is correct,
then it has important implications for our discussion of
causation. The reason is that if Hume’s Fork is the
distinction between the metaphysically necessary and the
metaphysically contingent, then skeptical realism is in
trouble. For on this interpretation matters of fact are
expressed as metaphysically possible propositions, but — as
we’ll see in the next chapter — Hume unequivocally takes
the causal relation to be a matter-of-fact relation. In
that case, the causal relation isn’t metaphysically
necessary, and so Hume must not believe in thick causation,
for thick causal connections are metaphysically necessary.
This argument has been thoroughly discussed by Peter
Kail, who, as an advocate of the skeptical realist
interpretation, aims to show that it’s misplaced. In the
course of doing so, Kail comes to view Hume’s Fork as the
distinction between the epistemically necessary and the
epistemically contingent. While I find Kail’s rejection of
the distinction in terms of metaphysical necessity correct,
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I find his own characterization in terms of the epistemic
misplaced. It’s worth considering this, then, as we aren’t
far off from the correct interpretation of Hume’s Fork.

Kail’s Lemma

Thus far, we’ve seen that Hume’s Fork doesn’t amount
to the distinction between the narrowly logically necessary
and the narrowly logically contingent. On the contrary, the
counterexamples of the previous section suggest that Hume’s
Fork may involve the distinction between the metaphysically
necessary and the metaphysically contingent. I explore this
interpretation in this section.
Understanding Hume’s Fork as the distinction between
the metaphysically necessary and metaphysically contingent
receives some support from Hume’s conceivability principle.
This principle makes the following claim:

Conceivability Principle
“Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct
idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence.”
(T 1.2.4.11)
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According to the conceivability principle, since I can
conceive of a golden mountain, a golden mountain can exist.
This of course isn’t to say that there is any such mountain,
only that its existence is possible.
In his Abstract to the Treatise, Hume explains the
conceivability principle in a manner that seems to lend
support to the view that the modality at issue here is
metaphysical possibility. For instance, Hume writes that:

The mind can always conceive any effect to follow from
any cause, and indeed any event to follow upon
another: whatever we conceive is possible, at least in
a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration
takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a
contradiction. (A 13)

Hume claims in this passage that if a proposition is
conceivable, then it’s possible, at least in a metaphysical
sense (ibid.). Thus Hume’s conceivability principle appears
to claim that if p is conceivable, then p is metaphysically
possible. This has implications for our understanding of
Hume’s Fork for the following reason.
First, matters of fact are those propositions that
have denials that don’t entail a contradiction. In other
words, the denials of matters of fact are conceivable, and
thus — by the conceivability principle — matters of fact
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are metaphysically possible propositions. Second, relations
of ideas are those propositions that have denials that
entail a contradiction, and thus are impossible (in some
sense).8 Thus, in light of Hume’s comments at A 13, it’s
natural to interpret Hume’s Fork as the distinction between
the metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically
contingent.
If Hume’s Fork does amount to the distinction between
the metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically
contingent, then, as I intimated above, the skeptical
realist interpretation is in trouble. Harold Noonan, for
instance, notes that the separability and conceivability
principles imply the denial of thick causal connections:

Together these principles imply that if any objects
are distinct they can exist separately — either can
exist without the other. And it is this consequence
Hume appeals to in rejecting the possibility of real
connections between distinct existences, which
rejection in turn underpins his rejection of necessary
connections between causes and effects. (2007: 5-6)9

8

The conceivability principle isn’t helpful in drawing the conclusion that the denials of relations of ideas
are metaphysically impossible. Instead, one needs to introduce an inconceivability principle: if p is
inconceivable, then p is metaphysically impossible. Whether Hume endorses the inconceivability principle
is controversial — cf. D. Tycerium Lightner (1997). In my view, Hume does endorse an inconceivability
principle, but not one in which the modality involved is metaphysical.
9
See also Peter Millican (2007).
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Peter Kail, however, has done the most to meet this
objection. We’ve seen that thick causation involves the AP
property, such that a knowledge of the cause enables one to
infer the effect a priori. Accordingly, Kail writes:

Hume takes acquaintance with necessary connection… to
entail certain conceptual-cum-epistemological
consequences. Roughly, acquaintance with necessary
connection would entail (a) the possibility of a
priori knowledge of the relevant cause’s effect and
(b) the impossibility of conceiving the cause without
its effect. (2003: 44)

But Hume claims that we can always conceive of the
cause without the effect (A 13). Thus, Kail claims that we
must face the following argument:

[Hume presents] a modal principle (MP) to the effect
that anything we can conceive is metaphysically
possible. Second, we have a claim to the effect that
we can always conceive some cause without its effect.
Since we can always conceive some cause A
independently of its effect B (and vice versa, and for
any substitution of A and B) it follows, by the MP,
that it is always metaphysically possible for A to
exist independently of B. The MP will then entitle us
to know that A and B are not necessarily connected (in
the sense in which we are working). (2003: 47)

We can put this argument as follows:
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1. If p is conceivable, then p is metaphysically possible.
2. We can always conceive a cause without its effect.
3. Hence, there’s no metaphysically necessary connection
between cause and effect.

There’s good reason, then, to think that Hume isn’t a
skeptical realist.
Kail responds by challenging (1). Kail doesn’t deny
that Hume’s conceivability principle concerns metaphysical
possibility. Rather, Kail questions whether Hume intended
the principle to apply to conceivability simpliciter. On
the contrary, Kail claims that the conceivability principle
applies only to “adequate” representations.10
Hume doesn’t say much about what renders a perception
“adequate,” and so Kail appeals to Locke in order to make
sense of the notion. He (2003: 49) notes that, for Locke,
an idea is adequate if it “perfectly represents those
archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from,”11
whereas inadequate ideas are “partial or incomplete.”12
Hence, for Locke, inadequate ideas are ideas of a thing’s
surface or sensible properties (what he calls the object’s
10

He also notes that Hume means “clear and distinct” by this expression, and so Kail at least goes further
than most commentators in recognizing clear and distinct perception in Hume.
11
Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xxxi.6.
12
Ibid., II.xxxi.1.
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“nominal essence”), whereas adequate ideas are ideas of the
object’s real essence.
As evidence that Hume employs the notion, Kail appeals
to the following passage:

Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects,
the relations, contradictions and agreements of ideas
are applicable to the objects; and this we may in
general observe to be the foundation of all human
knowledge…. The plain consequence is, that whatever
appears impossible and contradictory upon the
comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible
and contradictory, without any further excuse or
evasion. (T 1.2.2.1)

Despite the fact that the term “adequate” doesn’t occur
frequently in Hume, Kail has all the resources he needs to
meet the objection.
First, he notes that while some ideas may adequately
represent their source (impressions), it’s an open question
whether impressions adequately represent their source
(external objects). Hume, it’s commonly held, is agnostic
about whether or not external objects exist, “for the
examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists
and natural philosophers than to moral; and, therefore,
shall not at present be entered upon” (T 1.1.2.7). Thus the
question is open as to whether we have adequate impressions
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of external objects. Hume sometimes puts this in terms of
whether we can discern the “essence” of objects:

‘Tis easy to observe, that in tracing this relation,
the inference we draw from cause to effect, is not
deriv’d merely from a survey of these particular
objects, and from such a penetration into their
essences as may discover the dependence of the one
upon the other. (T 1.3.6.1, my emphasis)

And:

Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of
the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though
no human algebra can furnish a key, which solves the
difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of
natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we
penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we
should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible,
that they could ever admit of any other disposition.
(DNR 9.10, my emphasis)13

According to Kail, Hume holds that we don’t perceive
the essence of objects, and so we don’t have adequate ideas
of them. Since we don’t have adequate ideas of objects, the
conceivability principle doesn’t apply. Kail illustrates
this with the following example:

13

“DNR” abbreviates Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, and the number indicates the part
and respective paragraph.
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Suppose Edmund does not know that Hesperus is
identical to Phosphorus…. Edmund further thinks that
Hesperus has been destroyed, but Phosphorus survives.
Is he thereby conceiving the simultaneous existence of
Phosphorus and the non-existence of Hesperus. Well, if
the two “ideas” are separable in the imagination, we
can grant that such a possibility is conceivable but
any possibility revealed is not metaphysical
possibility. Instead, Edmund’s imagination reveals an
epistemic possibility, that is a possibility relative
to his limited information (and of course he is
unaware that his information is so limited). This
illustrates the point that it is only under situations
of adequate information about the relevant objects
that MP has a chance of being compelling. We need to
know enough about the objects of conception before we
can be sure of getting to a metaphysical possibility.
Edmund is merely separating his Hesperus idea apart
from his Phosphorus idea: he is not genuinely
conceiving Hesperus apart from Phosphorus because his
ideas of those objects are not adequate to the task.
(2003: 50)14

First, let me note that Kail’s suggestion that the
conceivability principle concerns epistemic possibility is
incorrect. Kail provides the following two interpretations:

4. If p is conceivable, then p is epistemically possible,

and

14

Kail isn’t attributing the view that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus to Hume. That of course would be
anachronistic. I take Kail to simply be using a common example — due to Kripke — to illustrate the
importance of adequate conception in drawing metaphysical conclusions.

74
5. If p is adequately conceivable, then p is
metaphysically possible.

Accordingly, if Kail’s interpretation is correct, then
since we don’t have adequate impressions of objects (or at
least we don’t know as much), Hume’s Fork, on Kail’s view,
is merely the distinction between the epistemically
necessary and the epistemically possible. Needless to say,
I wish to argue that Hume’s conceivability principle is
neither (4) nor (5). Let’s begin with (4).
Hume doesn’t understand his conceivability principle
as (4) because this would render Hume’s Fork subjectrelative. There’s no indication, however, that he so
understands his Fork. Suppose, as is the case, that both of
my brothers have college degrees, and I know as much. It
follows that the denial of this isn’t epistemically
possible for me, for I know that both of my brothers
graduated from college. Epistemic possibility is here
understood in the traditional sense, as that which is
possible given what I already know. This implies that the
proposition “both of my brothers have college degrees,”
does not express a matter of fact, but a relation between
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ideas, at least for me. However, for those who don’t know
this, it would count as a matter of fact.
But Hume clearly intends this to be a matter of fact
proposition, and one that isn’t subject-relative. Thus
Hume’s Fork — and the conceivability principle upon which
it relies — doesn’t concern epistemic possibility.
As for (5), I wish to argue that while Hume uses the
term “metaphysical,” he doesn’t mean it in the sense that
we use it today. Hume’s use is idiosyncratic. And here a
comparison with Descartes may again shed some helpful light
on Hume’s usage. In the Third Meditation of his Meditations
on First Philosophy, for instance, Descartes writes that

[S]ince I have no cause to think that there is a
deceiving God, and I do not yet even know for sure
whether there is a God at all, any reason for doubt
which depends simply on this supposition is a very
slight and, so to speak, metaphysical one. (Third
Meditation: CSM II 25: AT VII 36, emphasis mine)

In this passage Descartes claims that his most
powerful reason for skepticism — the mere possibility that
there’s an evil demon deceiving him — while a reason for
doubt, is farfetched and “metaphysical.” In other words,
it’s not impossible, and so by the parameters that he’s set
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for himself it needs to be addressed, but it’s far from a
serious matter.
This is the sense of “metaphysical” that Hume’s using
when he states his conceivability principle at A 13. If p
is conceivable, then p’s not “metaphysically” impossible.
Here Hume’s use actually approaches “logical possibility”
more than anything else, but the specific modality at issue
here remains to be elucidated, and I shall do so below.
This reading also explains Hume’s use of “at least” in the
passage under discussion, which is clearly employed to
denote a less stringent form of modality. And so, Hume’s
interest in the “metaphysical” isn’t the contemporary one,
as he so forcefully indicates:

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these
principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our
hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics,
for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract
reasons concerning quantity or number? No. Does it
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter
of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the
flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion. (EHU 12.34)

Thus, Hume’s Fork and his conceivability principle
don’t concern epistemic necessity and possibility. Moreover,
neither concerns metaphysical necessity or possibility.
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Before I provide my own interpretation of Hume’s Fork,
however, there’s one more prominent interpretation that
requires discussion. I turn to this in the next section.

Dicker’s Interpretation

In his book Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics: An
Introduction, Georges Dicker characterizes Hume’s Fork by
identifying two sets of contrasting features. With respect
to relations of ideas, for instance, Dicker (1998: 40)
claims that relations of ideas are:

C1. self-evident or demonstrable, and that they
C2. don’t assert or imply existence.

In contrast, Dicker claims that matters of fact

C3. do assert or imply existence, and that they
C4. are neither self-evident nor demonstrable.
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Dicker’s interpretation, then, characterizes Hume’s Fork as
two sets of two opposing prongs. In this way, Dicker paints
Hume’s Fork more in the fashion of a utensil, than in the
fashion of a road, as in Frost’s famous “yellow wood.”
But Hume never ate from this Fork, and for good reason.
In order to see why this characterization is inadequate,
it’s necessary that I first explain some of Dicker’s
terminology. In particular, I need to introduce his use of
the terms “assert” and “imply.” Accordingly, my focus in
this section will be on Dicker’s criteria (C2) and (C3).
A proposition “asserts” existence, claims Dicker, just
in case a non-abstract object must exist in order for the
proposition to be true. He counts “physical objects or
minds or physical or mental events or states” (1998: 36) as
non-abstract. As an example, consider the proposition
“Trump has a toupee.” In order for this proposition to be
true, Trump must exist.15 On the other hand, the Pythagorean
Theorem can be true no matter what non-abstract objects
happen to exist in the world. Dicker seeks to avoid
controversial metaphysical issues such as whether
mathematical objects exist, and so the question as to
whether or not the Pythagorean Theorem asserts the

15

It also must be the case that the toupee exists.
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existence of mathematical entities such as numbers is
bracketed. This is why he limits matters to non-abstract
objects. Accordingly, “Trump has a toupee” asserts
existence, whereas the Pythagorean Theorem doesn’t.
As Dicker emphasizes, Hume seems to claim that matters
of fact assert existence, whereas relations of ideas don’t.
For instance, Hume claims that relations of ideas don’t
depend “on what is any where existent in the universe,” and
“[t]hough there never were a circle or triangle in nature,
the truths, demonstrated by EUCLID, would for ever retain
their certainty and evidence” (EHU 4.1).
In addition, Hume’s example of a matter of fact — the
proposition “the sun will not rise tomorrow” (EHU 4.2) —
asserts existence, for it asserts the existence of the sun
and the earth. Moreover, throughout the first Enquiry, Hume
frequently employs expressions such as “matter of fact or
real existence” (EHU 5.1.8; cf. EHU 4.1.3, 4.2.19, 5.2.20).
Dicker reads this as Hume’s claim that matters of fact
assert existence.
However, a problem for Dicker’s interpretation is that
not all propositions that Hume regards as matters of fact
assert existence. An important example is the causal maxim:
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Causal Maxim
“[W]hatever begins to exist, must have a cause of
existence.” (T 1.3.3.1)16

Another is the uniformity principle:

Uniformity Principle
“[T]he course of nature continues always uniformly the
same.” (T 1.3.6.4)17

As will become apparent in Chapter Three, Hume regards
both principles as matters of fact. But notice that neither
asserts the existence of anything.
Dicker recognizes this, and so he argues that the
causal maxim and the uniformity principle are matters of
fact because they “imply” existence. It’s important to
realize that this is a sense of implication distinct from
logical entailment or material implication. Here’s Dicker’s
account of what the relevant notion of implication is:

This is any proposition that, taken together with a
proposition(s) reporting what is observed at a given
time t, or a set of times t1, t2,… tn, implies the
existence of some non-abstract entity which need not
16

As is common, I shall sometimes express the causal maxim as every event has a cause.
Hume sometimes describes this claim as “instances, of which we have had no experience, must
resemble those of which we have had experience” (T 1.3.6.4) or “the future will resemble the past” (EHU
4.2.36).
17
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be observed at t, or any of t1, t2,… tn. (Dicker 1998:
38)18

In other words, a proposition p impliesd another
proposition q just in case (i) there’s another proposition
r that reports an observation at a time (or set of times),
such that (ii) p and r logically imply q. A final condition
is that (iii) q must make an existential claim, and one
that need not be observed in order for p and r to logically
imply q. There are a number of things worth noting here.
First, Dicker refers to the proposition that implies
the existence of some non-abstract entity, when taken
together with a proposition or propositions reporting
what’s observed, as a bridging proposition. Here’s his
example (ibid.):

Every event has a cause (bridging proposition).
Event e was observed at t (observation).
_____________________________________
\ Event e had a cause, c (item that need not be
observed).

18

Dicker’s use of “implies” in this quotation is synonymous with “logically implies.” This isn’t to be
confused with the sense of “implies” for which the quotation constitutes a definiens.
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Second, in order for a proposition to be a bridging
proposition, it must be capable of factoring into an
argument, the conclusion of which must concern the
existence of some non-abstract entity. In the example that
Dicker provides, the entity appears to be an event, e, and
so Dicker must regard events as non-abstract.
Third, Dicker says that the state of affairs expressed
by the conclusion “need not be observed” (ibid.). What
Dicker intends by this is that the state of affairs may be
observed, but that its being observed isn’t required. In
this way Dicker can rule out propositions such as every
effect has a cause (1998: 58) as qualifying as a matter of
fact proposition. For consider this argument:

Every effect has a cause (bridging proposition).
Effect e is observed (observation).
_____________________________________
\ Effect e has a cause, c.

To know that e was an effect, and so to be able to
correctly assert the second premise, we’d have to observe
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that it has a cause. Thus Dicker’s condition that the
conclusion needn’t be observed enables him to rule out
every effect has a cause as a matter of fact proposition,
for Hume clearly wouldn’t regard it as one.
Fourth, the bridging proposition impliesd the existence
of some non-abstract entity only when taken together with
some other proposition about something observed, such that
the two logically imply the conclusion. Nonetheless,
Dicker’s explicit that it doesn’t always need to be a
single instance of observation, for he also offers this as
an example (1998: 39):

The future will resemble the past (bridging
proposition).
Past lightning flashes have been followed by
thunderclaps, and there is now a flash of lightning
(observations made at t1, t2,… tn).
_____________________________________
\ There will be a thunderclap (the as yet unobserved
event).
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In this case, there are many past observations of lightning
followed by observations of thunderclaps.
On Dicker’s interpretation, therefore, matters of fact
assert or implyd existence, whereas relations of ideas don’t.
Accordingly, for Dicker, assertion and implication are
characteristics that differentiate relations of ideas from
matters of fact (1998: 38).
But Dicker’s account of Hume’s Fork is incorrect, for
relations of ideas can also serve as bridging propositions.
Consider the following inference:

If a is taller than b, and b is taller than c, then a
is taller than c (bridging proposition).
a is taller than b (observation).
b is taller than c (observation).
_____________________________________
\ a is taller than c (unobserved).

Hume would classify the first premise of the above
argument as a relation between ideas, because it can be
known a priori by way of demonstration. And yet, given the
second and third premises, it impliesd the conclusion.
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Moreover, it may be the case that b is a tree at the
crest of a hill, and initially I happen to observe that
tree a is taller than tree b. Moving around the side of the
hill, such that tree c comes into view just as tree a moves
out of view, I may see that b is taller than c. In this
case, I can know that a is taller than c without actually
perceiving that a is taller than c. This shows that the
proposition that a is taller than c needn’t be observed.
Accordingly, some relations of ideas may serve as
bridging propositions, and so some relations of ideas implyd
existence. But in that case there’s no reason to classify
propositions like the causal maxim and the uniformity
principle as matters of fact, while excluding relations of
ideas — such as the one just provided — that may also serve
as bridging propositions. In other words, Dicker’s criteria
(C2) and (C3) can’t do the work they’re intended to do, and
so are irrelevant to understanding Hume’s Fork.
Put differently, Dicker claims that relations of ideas
satisfy (C2): they don’t assert or implyd existence. In
addition, Dicker claims that matters of fact satisfy (C3):
they assert or implyd existence. In this way, (C2) and (C3)
do some work for Dicker in differentiating relations of
ideas from matters of fact.
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But I’ve argued that (C2) is false: some relations of
ideas implyd existence. In addition, we’ve seen that some
matters of fact — for example, the causal maxim and the
uniformity principle — don’t assert existence. Thus,
whether a proposition asserts or impliesd existence isn’t
relevant to understanding Hume’s Fork.
We’ve seen, then, that Dicker’s interpretation of
Hume’s Fork does little to advance our understanding of it.
In the next section, I indicate the correct account of
Hume’s Fork.

Polishing Hume’s Fork

Thus far, we’ve seen that Hume’s Fork doesn’t amount
to the distinction between the logically necessary and the
logically contingent (narrowly or broadly construed), or
the distinction between the epistemically necessary and the
epistemically contingent. In addition, we saw that Hume’s
Fork doesn’t involve Dicker’s criteria of assertion and
implication. In this section, I indicate what Hume’s Fork
amounts to.
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In order to make some headway, it will be helpful to
consider Hume’s characterization of the distinction in the
Treatise. At T 1.3.1.1, Hume writes:

There are seven different kinds of philosophical
relation… These relations may be divided into two
classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas,
which we compare together, and such as may be chang’d
without any change in ideas. (T 1.3.1.1)19

Consider, first, Hume’s characterization of matters of
fact in the above passage. Hume claims that these are
relations that “may be chang’d without any change in [the]
ideas” (ibid.). Thus take, for example, one’s idea of the
Dalai Lama and one’s idea of the Pope, and suppose that the
Dalai Lama is ten feet from the Pope. The question that one
needs to ask oneself, at this point, is whether one can
coherently replace this relation — being at a distance of
ten feet — with an incompatible relation.20 Is it, for

19

I explain what Hume means by a “philosophical” relation in Chapter Three.
There are two important claims made here that might otherwise go unnoticed: First, the question is
whether one can coherently replace the relevant relation. Hume understands coherence in terms of
whether or not the proposition entails a contradiction. Second, the question concerns the possible
replacement of incompatible relations. For instance, the relation “being at a distance of less than twenty
feet” isn’t incompatible with the relation “being at a distance of ten feet,” and thus showing that the
latter can be replaced with the former would indicate that the proposition “the Dalai Lama is ten feet
from the Pope” is a matter of fact proposition. But this is too weak of a test, and, while Hume doesn’t
make this qualification explicit, it’s clear that he intends his test to apply only to incompatible relations.
For instance, the question should be framed in terms of whether one can replace “being at a distance of
ten feet” with “being at a distance of a thousand feet.” Indeed, given his characterization at EHU 4.1-2,
Hume likely intends that incompatible relation would constitute the proposition’s denial (for example,
“isn’t at a distance of ten feet”).
20
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instance, coherent to suppose that the Dalai Lama is at a
distance of a thousand feet from the Pope? Certainly. Thus,
in this case, the ideas involved stay the same — one’s idea
of the Dalai Lama and one’s idea of the Pope — and yet the
relation can be coherently changed. This means that the
relation “being at a distance of ten feet” and the relation
“being at a distance of a thousand feet” are matter of fact
relations, and thus the claim that the Dalai Lama is ten
feet from the Pope is a matter of fact proposition.
Let’s turn, then, to Hume’s characterization in the
Treatise of relations of ideas as those relations which
“depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together”
(ibid.). As an illustration, Hume provides the idea of a
triangle:

It is from the idea of a triangle, that we discover
the relation of equality, which its three angles bear
to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as
long as our idea remains the same. (T 1.3.1.1)

In fact, there are really two ideas involved here: one’s
idea of the three angles of a triangle and one’s idea of
two right angles.21 Hume claims here that, so long as we

21

It can’t just be one idea of a triangle because no triangle can have two right angles. Moreover, Hume’s
interest is with a relation and a comparison (which demands at least two objects).
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don’t alter either of these ideas, the relation — in this
case, equality22 — must remain the same. That is to say, we
can’t coherently replace this relation with an incompatible
relation, such as inequality. It’s on account of this that
Hume claims that relations of ideas are “unalterable” and
“invariable” (T 1.3.3.2, T 1.3.3.1, respectively).
What, then, does the distinction between relations of
ideas and matters of fact amount to? Hume’s Fork amounts to
the distinction between the conceptually necessary and the
conceptually contingent. Relations of ideas, claims Hume,
are conceptually necessary propositions, whereas matters of
fact are conceptually contingent propositions.
In modern parlance, Kit Fine describes the relevant
modality in this way:

Consider the case of conceptual necessity — the
necessity that holds in virtue of the identity of
concepts. It will be necessary in this sense that
nothing is both red and green, though not necessary
that I am a person. (2002: 254)

In Humean terms, concepts are ideas, and thus when
Hume claims that relations of ideas are relations that can
be changed only when one alters at least one of the
22

This is the philosophical relation of “proportion in quantity or number.”
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component ideas, he’s claiming that relations of ideas are
conceptually necessary truths. Matters of fact, then,
aren’t conceptually necessary truths; that is, they’re
conceptually contingent truths (if true at all).
We can now see why Hume sometimes describes matters of
fact propositions as a “real existence or matter of fact”
(EHU 5.8). Pace Dicker, Hume doesn’t claim that matters of
fact assert existence. He’s merely claiming that matters of
fact are conceptually contingent truths. That is to say,
they aren’t knowable solely on the basis of the concepts or
ideas involved. It’s for this reason, for instance, that
Hume can claim that the causal maxim is about a “real
existence,” even though it doesn’t entail the existence of
any non-abstract object. It’s a real existence because it’s
true but it could have been false. It’s a contingent fact
about the world, and our knowledge of its truth depends
upon our experience of the world.
Accordingly, Hume’s Fork is the distinction between
the conceptually necessary and the conceptually contingent.
A conceptually necessary proposition is a proposition
that’s true solely in virtue of the concepts or ideas
involved, and thus can be known solely on the basis of the
concepts involved. In turn, a conceptually contingent
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proposition is one that isn’t true (if true at all) solely
on the basis of the concepts or ideas involved. It
therefore can’t be known — or so Hume claims — solely on
the basis of the concepts involved; experience of its truth
is needed in order to know it.
But what, then, are we to make of Hume’s previous
characterization of relations of ideas as having denials
that entail a contradiction, and matters of fact as having
denials that don’t entail a contradiction?
Take, for instance, the proposition “nothing red is
green.” Is this a relation between ideas or a matter of
fact for Hume? Hume’s procedure is as follows. First,
consider it’s denial: “it’s not the case that nothing red
is green.” The proposition’s denial, by itself, doesn’t
logically entail a contradiction, and so it’s narrowly
logically possible.
But that’s no matter, for Hume’s interested in
attending to the concepts or ideas involved. Hume
associates an idea of red with the word “red,” and idea of
green with the word “green.” Thus, like Descartes and as
emphasized by Owen (1999), we shouldn’t be distracted by
the formal properties of the proposition, but should
instead attend to the concepts or ideas that factor into it.
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In this way, Hume claims that one can intuit that the
content of our idea of red isn’t identical to the content
of our idea of green, and thus that nothing can be both red
and green at the same time. Hume’s test, therefore, is
phenomenological or psychological, not formal.
This also explains why Hume’s Fork shouldn’t be
characterized as the distinction between the analytic and
the synthetic, as it’s traditionally understood. Hume, for
instance, would count a proposition such as my house
resembles your house as a relation between ideas (assuming
its truth), or a proposition such as the Winklevosses
resemble one another as a relation between ideas. This is
because I can’t change the relation — resemblance — without
also changing one of the ideas. But of course such claims
aren’t analytic.
Accordingly, the way to determine whether a
proposition is a relation between ideas or a matter of fact
is first to ask whether its denial entails a contradiction.
The way to discern whether or not its denial entails a
contradiction is to attend to the ideas involved, and if
one conceives of a contradiction, then one’s original
proposition is a relation between ideas. If one doesn’t
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conceive a contradiction, then one’s original proposition
is a matter of fact.
But more can be said about this process, and what more
is said is illuminating, for it reveals how central a role
the notion of clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s
philosophy. In order to indicate as much, however, I need
to anticipate some of the conclusions of this dissertation.
I turn to this in the next section.

Chalmers on Conceivability

David Chalmers (2002) has introduced terminology that
can help situate Hume’s Fork, and the procedure that Hume
recommends that distinguishes relations of ideas and
matters of fact. We’ve seen that central to Hume’s method
is the notion of conceivability. In particular, Hume first
asks us to conceive of the proposition’s denial. But what
is it to do this? Chalmers can help us answer this question,
because he has distinguished three sets of contrasting
kinds of conceivability.
Chalmers first distinguishes between what he calls
positive conceivability and negative conceivability. A
proposition is negatively conceivable, just in case it’s
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not ruled out a priori. The test for ruling out something a
priori is whether or not the proposition entails a
contradiction. Thus, Chalmers writes that “S is negatively
conceivable when S is not ruled out a priori, or when there
is no… contradiction in S” (2002: 149). The proposition
“there are two polar bears in my backyard” is negatively
conceivable, for no contradiction follows from this claim.
In turn, positive conceivability requires that one form
“some sort of positive conception of a situation in which S
is the case” (2002: 150). In other words, positive
conceivability involves imagining the relevant state of
affairs.23
At first sight, Hume’s characterization of his Fork
seems to suggest that he intends it to be understood in
terms of negative conceivability. He claims, as we saw at
the beginning of this chapter, that relations of ideas have
denials that entail a contradiction, whereas matters of
fact don’t. But in fact positive conceivability is more
fundamental to Hume. A few sections back, it was noted that
demonstration, for Hume, is non-formal, and that it
involves conceiving the content of one’s ideas and the
relations between them. Accordingly, for Hume, one
23

Chalmers distinguishes between perceptual imaginings and modal imaginings. The former involve a
perceptual mental image, whereas the latter doesn’t. In light of Hume’s copy principle, the relevant sense
for Hume is perceptual imagining, whereas Descartes would be concerned with modal imagining.
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ascertains that some proposition is negatively conceivable
by first positively conceiving the proposition’s
constituent ideas, and positively conceiving that no
contradiction follows. In this way, Hume builds claims
about negative conceivability on claims about positive
conceivability.
Chalmers’s second distinction is between prima facie
conceivability and ideal conceivability. He writes that “S
is prima facie conceivable for a subject when S is
conceivable for that subject on first appearances,” and
that “S is ideally conceivable when S is conceivable on
ideal rational reflection” (2002: 147). It may be the case,
for instance, that a proposition is prima facie conceivable
but not ideally conceivable. Chalmers provides the
following example:

An example is provided by any mathematical statement M
whose truth-value is currently unknown, but which will
later be proved to be true. Here ~M is prima facie
conceivable in the sense above (i.e., prima facie
negatively conceivable) at least for current subjects.
But it is not ideally conceivable, as ideal reflection
will rule out ~M a priori. (ibid.)

Goldbach’s conjecture, for instance — the claim that
every integer greater than two can be expressed as the sum
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of two primes — is either true or false. Moreover, since we
don’t know whether it’s true or false, its truth or falsity
is prima facie conceivable. Nonetheless, since it’s either
true or false, ideal rational reflection will come down on
only one side of the question of its truth or falsity.
Hume clearly intends ideal conceivability when putting
forward his Fork. For instance, “arguments that have the
form of denying the antecedent are fallacious” would itself
constitute a relation between ideas for Hume, but as logic
teachers are well aware, some logic students conceive such
arguments to be valid. Thus what interests Hume is ideal
conceivability, not prima facie conceivability.
But, as Chalmers notes, “the notion of ideal rational
reflection remains to be clarified” (2002: 148). What
renders something an instance of ideal conceivability?
Chalmers introduces — but doesn’t commit to — a number
of possible candidates. For instance, he writes that ideal
conceivability may be defined in terms of an ideal reasoner
or in terms of undefeatability by better reasoning. But my
interest at present isn’t how we should characterize it,
but how Hume characterizes ideal rational reflection. And
here we do have an answer.
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Hume’s criterion for ideal rational reflection hinges
on the notion of clear and distinct perception. For
instance, when presenting his Fork in the Enquiry, he
claims that p’s a matter of fact proposition just in case
~p “is conceived by the mind with the same facility and
distinctness,” and is such that it’s “no less intelligible”
(EHU 4.2, emphasis mine). In turn, p’s a relation between
ideas just in case ~p can’t be “distinctly conceived by the
mind” (ibid., emphasis mine). Thus, for Hume, a proposition
can be prima facie conceivable but not ideally conceivable,
for instance when it’s initially conceived obscurely or
confusedly. When it’s conceived clearly and distinctly, it
may turn out that the proposition isn’t conceivable after
all. Here, then, is one instance in which clear and
distinct perception factors into Hume’s philosophy. Indeed,
it’s central to understanding Hume’s conceivability
principle and the nature of Hume’s Fork.
Chalmers’s final distinction involves the distinction
between primary and secondary conceivability. A proposition
is primarily conceivable “when it is conceivable that S is
actually the case” (2002: 157) — that is, it’s conceivable
that S is the case in the actual world, as opposed to some
merely logically possible world. In turn, a proposition is
secondarily conceivable “when S conceivably might have been
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the case” (ibid.).24 In other words, the proposition is
conceived to be the case in some logically possible world
other than the actual world.
Chalmers provides the following example to illustrate
the distinction between primary/secondary conceivability:

Primary conceivability is grounded in the idea that,
for all we know a priori, there are many ways the
world might be. The oceans might contain H2O, or they
might contain XYZ; the evening star and the morning
star might be the same or distinct; and so on. We can
think of these ways the world might be as epistemic
possibilities, in a broad sense according to which it
is epistemically possible that S if the hypothesis
that S is not ruled out a priori. (ibid.)

As this passage suggests, the distinction between the
primary and secondarily conceivable is motivated by Saul
Kripke’s discussion of the necessary a posteriori. Let me
(very) briefly note Kripke’s claims in this regard.
Kripke (1972: 48) claims that proper names are rigid
designators. In other words, proper names pick out the same
object in every possible world in which they exist.25 Thus
the proper names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” each pick out
24

Chalmers also calls primary conceivability “epistemic conceivability,” and secondary conceivability
“subjunctive conceivability.” It’s worth noting that if this is the sense of epistemic possibility that Kail has
in mind in our discussion above, then our accounts don’t differ. But Kail nowhere indicates that he intends
Chalmers’s idiosyncratic sense of epistemic possibility.
25
Kripke also thinks that some descriptions can serve as rigid designators — for example, “The Holy
Roman Empire” — but we needn’t worry about this complication here.
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Venus, and they do so in every possible world in which the
object — Venus — exists. Consequently, Kripke claims that
the identity claim “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is necessarily
true.26 But, as Kripke notes, the fact that Hesperus and
Phosphorus are one and the same was something that we
discovered to be true, and thus is known a posteriori.
Kripke concludes that certain identity statements are
necessary a posteriori.
The point that Chalmers is making — see also Kripke
(1972: 100-105) — is that there’s some sense in which it’s
conceivable that Hesperus isn’t identical to Phosphorus.
For most people in the past believed that Hesperus wasn’t
identical to Phosphorus, and thus in some sense conceived
them to be nonidentical. Chalmers claims that the sense of
“conceivable” at work here is primary conceivability. The
ancients conceived Hesperus and Phosphorus to be actually
distinct, not distinct in some logically possible world
other than the actual world.
When it comes to secondary conceivability, however,
Chalmers presents the following example:

26

More rigorously put, Kripke claims that “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is weakly necessary — that is, it’s true
in every possible world in which the object (Venus) exists.
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Take an imagined situation in which the morning star
is distinct from the evening star. Along with Kripke,
we can say that if this situation had obtained, it
would not have been the case that Hesperus was not
Phosphorus. So when this situation is considered as
counterfactual, it is revealed not as a situation in
which Hesperus is not Phosphorus, but rather, as a
situation in which at least one of the objects is
distinct from both Hesperus and Phosphorus (at least
if we take for granted the actual-world knowledge that
Hesperus is Phosphorus, and if we accept Kripke’s
intuitions). The reason is that (if Kripke is right)
the application of a term like “Hesperus” to a
counterfactual situation depends on whether the actual
Hesperus (i.e., the planet Venus) is present within
that situation, and of course the actual Hesperus and
the actual Phosphorus are one and the same. So, when
considered as counterfactual, this conceivable
situation does not verify “Hesperus is not Phosphorus.”
More generally (if Kripke is right), there is no
coherently imaginable situation, considered as a
counterfactual, that verifies “Hesperus is not
Phosphorus.” If so, “Hesperus is not Phosphorus” is
not secondarily positively conceivable. (2002: 158-9)

Thus Chalmers claims that the proposition “Hesperus
isn’t Phosphorus” isn’t secondarily conceivable. Since both
“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” refer to the same object, Venus,
I can’t imagine a world in which Hesperus isn’t Phosphorus.
When I conceive of a logically possible world and claim
that “Hesperus isn’t Phosphorus,” I must be conceiving of a
situation in which one of the objects isn’t Venus, or so
Chalmers and Kripke claim.
Whatever the merits of Kripke’s account, the point to
observe is that, if correct, then necessarily false
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propositions for Kripke aren’t secondarily conceivable.
Thus, if Hume intends the denials of matters of fact — say,
the denial of “the fire caused the water to boil” — to be
secondarily conceivable, then the connection between the
cause and the effect can’t be necessary. In other words, if
Hume intends secondary conceivability, then the skeptical
realist interpretation is incorrect.
But there’s no reason to think that Hume intends
secondary conceivability. Indeed, everything Hume says
suggests that he intends primary conceivability, and to
read Kripke’s views on naming into Hume would be
anachronistic. Nonetheless, Chalmers’s distinctions are
helpful in situating how Hume understands his Fork and the
conceivability principle implicit in it. We may say that
Hume’s sense of conceivability is primary positive
conceivability. The negations of matters of fact are
primarily positively conceivable, whereas the negations of
relations of ideas aren’t primarily positively conceivable.
In brief, I’ve claimed that Hume’s Fork maps on to the
distinction between the conceptually necessary and the
conceptually possible.

Conclusion
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In this chapter, I initially characterized Hume’s Fork
as follows: (i) relations of ideas are propositions that
have denials that entail a contradiction and (ii) are
propositions that can be known a priori. In turn, matters
of fact have (i) denials that don’t entail a contradiction
and (ii) are knowable only a posteriori. This means that
relations of ideas are known by intuition or by
demonstration, and that matters of fact aren’t known in
either of these ways.
Hume’s Fork, I’ve argued, isn’t the distinction
between the narrowly logically necessary and the narrowly
logically contingent, and isn’t the distinction between the
metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically contingent.
Moreover, I’ve argued that it’s not the distinction between
the epistemically necessary and the epistemically
contingent, nor should it be understood in terms of
Dicker’s criteria of assertion and implication.
Having dispensed with these accounts, I argued that
Hume’s Fork amounts to the distinction between the
conceptually necessary and the conceptually contingent.
This fits nicely with Hume’s understanding of demonstration
as conceptually based, as Owen has shown. In addition, I
indicated the role that clear and distinct perception plays
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in Hume’s characterization of relations of ideas and
matters of fact: the denials of relations of ideas aren’t
primarily positively ideally conceivable, in that ideal
conception is a matter of clearly and distinctly perceiving
whether a contradiction follows from their denials. Matters
of fact, on the other hand, have denials that are clearly
and distinctly primarily positively conceivable.
All of this has important implications for the New
Hume debate, for it leaves room for the thesis that Hume
believes in metaphysically necessary causal connections.
The reason is that it leaves room for an account in the
spirit of Kripke, such that our conceptual conclusions
don’t always match up with the metaphysics involved.
Reading this into Hume would of course be anachronistic,
but perhaps Hume himself presents some indication that he
conceives of matters in this way. More on this in
subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Three
Thin Causation
Introduction

In the previous chapter, we saw that Hume divides all
of human knowledge into two distinct kinds: matters of fact
and relations of ideas. Hume claims that relations of ideas
are conceptual truths, whereas matters of fact aren’t. In
addition, Hume claims that relations of ideas can be known
a priori, whereas matters of fact can only be known a
posteriori.
It’s easy to see how Hume could justify the truth of
relations of ideas, for relations of ideas are knowable
solely on the basis of the concepts involved. It’s less
clear, however, how Hume could justify the truth of matters
of fact, for these are propositions that can’t be known
solely on the basis of the concepts involved. It’s these
very considerations that lead Hume to entertain the causal
relation, for he claims that the justification of matters
of fact is based on causation.
Hume claims that inferences concerning matters of fact
require a knowledge of the various causal relationships
that exist in the world. For instance, he writes that:
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‘Tis evident, that all reasonings concerning matter of
fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect,
and that we can never infer the existence of one
object from another, unless they be connected together,
either mediately or immediately. In order therefore to
understand these reasonings, we must be perfectly
acquainted with the idea of a cause. (A 8)

Hume provides a helpful illustration to make his point.
Suppose that Jim stumbles upon a watch while walking across
some deserted island. Upon picking up the watch and having
a look, Jim exclaims, “There had once been humans beings on
this island” (EHU 4.4). In this way, Jim infers that there
must have been humans on the island on the basis of his
seeing the watch.
Notice that Jim’s conclusion — that at some point in
time there were humans on this island — is a matter of fact
proposition. It’s denial doesn’t entail a contradiction,
and consequently it’s neither intuitively nor
demonstratively known. According to Hume, then, in order
for Jim to adequately reason to this conclusion, Jim must
be implicitly asserting some causal connection between the
existence of watches and the existence of human beings. The
connection between watches and human beings isn’t a
conceptual link: simply attending to the qualities
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contained in the idea of a watch won’t lead Jim to the idea
of a specific cause (or vice versa). Thus, in order to be
justified, inferences about matters of fact must assume
some causal connection, and so Hume turns his attention to
the nature of our idea of a cause.
This indicates, therefore, that the causal relation
does important work for Hume. All nonconceptual knowledge
depends upon a knowledge of various causal connections.1
This raises the interesting question as to whether Hume’s
discussion of causation actually indicates that he’s more
interested in epistemology than metaphysics, for here his
interest is in how we know, and less about what there is.
In this chapter, however, I shall spell out Hume’s
account of causation. We shall see that Hume claims that
our idea of causation is an idea of thin causation — that
is, a knowledge of the cause isn’t sufficient to infer, a
priori, the effect. These considerations lead us into some
familiar territory, such as Hume’s infamous problem of
induction and Hume’s two definitions of a cause. I say what
I can with respect to each of these topics.

1

The only exception for Hume is substantive knowledge based on perception or memory — for example,
my knowing that a crane is flying past my window because I’m seeing it fly past my window, or because I
remember that it flew past my window (T 1.3.2.2).
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Single Instances of Causation

Hume commences his analysis of the causal relation by
reiterating his test for meaning:

To begin regularly, we must consider the idea of
causation, and see from what origin it is deriv’d.
‘Tis impossible to reason justly, without
understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we
reason; and ‘tis impossible perfectly to understand
any idea, without tracing it up to its origin, and
examining that primary impression, from which it
arises. (T 1.3.2.4)

As we saw in the case of substance in Chapter One,
Hume seeks to find the impression associated with the word
“cause.” He begins by picking out a particular instance of
causation, such as:

billiard ball A’s striking billiard ball B, and
causing B to move.

By proceeding in this way, Hume begins his analysis of
causation by considering it as a philosophical relation. In
order to understand Hume’s procedure, therefore, I need to
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say a few words on Hume’s distinction between natural and
philosophical relations.
Hume introduces this distinction by noting the
following:

The word relation is commonly us’d in two senses
considerably different from each other. Either for
that quality, by which two ideas are connected
together in the imagination, and the one naturally
introduces the other… or for that particular
circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union
of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to
compare them. In common language the former is always
the sense, in which we use the word, relation; and
‘tis only in philosophy, that we extend it to mean any
particular subject of comparison, without a connecting
principle. (T 1.1.5.1)

The first sense of “relation” that Hume identifies in
this passage is what he calls a natural relation. Natural
relations are relations that involve some kind of
psychological association. As one might expect, therefore,
such relations are “natural” to the extent that they
involve ideas that are naturally related — that is,
spontaneously and without reflection — on account of some
observed quality. Hume famously refers to these relations
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as “principles of the association of ideas,” and considers
this concept to be one of his chief contributions (A 31).2
As an example, Hume mentions the relation of
resemblance. “The imagination,” he writes, “runs easily
from one idea to any other that resembles it,” and “this
quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and
association” (T 1.1.4.2). Nonetheless, Hume’s quick to
point out that this bond or association isn’t an
“inseparable” bond or association. Rather, the association
is nothing more than a commonly prevailing “gentle force”
(T 1.1.4.1), one that introduces ideas “with a certain
degree of method and regularity” (EHU 3.1). Betraying his
affinity for Newton, Hume goes on to put the matter as
follows:

Here is a kind of attraction, which in the mental
world will be found to have as extraordinary effects
as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and
as various forms. Its effects are every where
conspicuous; but, as to its causes, they are mostly
unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities
of human nature, which I pretend not to explain. (T
1.1.4.6)

2

Hume often describes natural and philosophical relations as relations between ideas; but as Hume’s
views on belief make evident, he also conceives of these relations as extending to impressions.
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Philosophical relations, on the other hand, are those
relations that lack a psychological association. These are
called “philosophical” because they’re relations that occur
to someone who is engaged in philosophical reflection.3 Put
differently, philosophical relations are “comparisons” or
“arbitrary unions” in the imagination (T 1.1.5.1, emphasis
mine).
By way of an example, imagine a unicorn. The mere fact
that you’re entertaining the idea of a unicorn doesn’t lead
you to think of an antelope. If it does, then you probably
have some odd fascination with unicorns and antelopes, such
that, for you, these two ideas are naturally related. But
in all likelihood this isn’t the case. In other words, it’s
safe to say that your idea of a unicorn and your idea of an
antelope aren’t naturally related. Nonetheless, now that
you’re considering both unicorns and antelopes (now that
you have both ideas before your mind), you may notice some
similarities between them — for example, the fact that both
unicorns and antelopes have (or usually have) horns. This
aspect of similarity or resemblance is a philosophical
relation, for it’s based on a reflective comparison, one
that’s not grounded merely in a psychological association.

3

Presumably one needn’t actually be engaged in philosophical reflection. All that Hume intends here is
that, as in philosophy, philosophical relations are the product of reflection.
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At this point it’s worth recognizing an important
corollary of this distinction. I have used the relation of
resemblance as an example of both a natural and a
philosophical relation. This is because Hume believes that
natural relations also sometimes function as philosophical
relations, although not all philosophical relations
function as natural relations. For instance, Hume
identifies the following as philosophical relations:
resemblance, contiguity, causation, proportion in quantity
or number, degree in quality, identity, and contrariety (T
1.1.5). However, the first three relations — resemblance,
contiguity, and causation — can also function as natural
relations (T 1.1.4). Indeed, Hume claims that resemblance,
contiguity, and causation are the only natural relations.
Thus, to return to our singular case of causation,
Hume initially considers this as a philosophical relation.
What sort of comparison or arbitrary relations can we
discern about some particular cause and effect? Hume
writes:

Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects,
which we call cause and effect, and turn them on all
sides, in order to find that impression, which
produces an idea of such prodigious consequence. (T
1.3.2.5)
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In considering this single instance of causation
(recall billiard ball A and billiard ball B), Hume claims
that there’s no discernible quality that makes A the cause
and B the effect. He writes:

At first sight I perceive, that I must not search for
[our impression of cause and effect] in any of the
particular qualities of the objects; since, which-ever
of these qualities I pitch on, I find some object,
that is not possest of it, and yet falls under the
denomination of cause or effect. And indeed there is
nothing existent, either externally or internally,
which is not to be consider’d either as a cause or an
effect; tho’ ‘tis plain there is no one quality, which
universally belongs to all beings, and gives them a
title to that denomination. (T 1.3.2.5)

Hume thus claims that there’s no simple perceptual
property that renders something a cause or an effect.
Instead, Hume claims that causation consists in a relation
between objects, and thus it’s this “relation that we must
now endeavor to discover” (T 1.3.2.6).
In considering a single instance of causation, Hume
manages to identify two essential relations that constitute
our idea of causation: these are the relations of
contiguity and temporal succession. As for contiguity:
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I find in the first place, that whatever objects are
consider’d as causes or effects, are contiguous; and
that nothing can operate in a time or place, which is
ever so little remov’d from those of its existence….
We may therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as
essential to that of causation. (T 1.3.2.6)

Causes, therefore, must be contiguous in time and
place with their effects. Hume’s condition of contiguity,
however, has come under some scrutiny. Barry Stroud (1977:
43-44), for instance, claims that Hume isn’t entitled to
make this claim, for Hume also admits that:

Tho’ distant objects may sometimes seem productive of
each other, they are commonly found upon examination
to be link’d by a chain of causes, which are
contiguous among themselves, and to the distant
objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot
discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist.
(T 1.3.2.6)

Stroud correctly argues that, given that Hume admits
that we sometimes perceive instances of causation in which
contiguity isn’t perceived, Hume can’t infer that all
causation involves contiguity. But, as J. L. Mackie (1980:
19) correctly retorts, Stroud mistakes Hume’s intentions.
Mackie claims that Hume isn’t making a claim about
causation as it exists in the objects; he’s merely making a
claim about our idea of causation. Since we presume a
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contiguity to exist when we don’t perceive one, we take
contiguity to be an essential element in our idea of
causation. And it’s our idea of causation that interests
Hume at this point.
Hume’s second essential element that factors into our
idea of causation is temporal succession. This holds that
the cause must precede the effect in time. Hume recognizes
that this condition is controversial:

The second relation I shall observe as essential to
causes and effects, is not so universally acknowledg’d,
but is liable to some controversy. ‘Tis that of
priority of time in the cause before the effect. Some
pretend that ‘tis not absolutely necessary a cause
shou’d precede its effect; but that any object or
action, in the very first moment of its existence, may
exert its productive quality, and give rise to another
object or action, perfectly co-temporary with itself.
(T 1.3.2.7)

In short, Hume recognizes that some philosophers
accept the possibility of co-temporaneous causation, that
is, causation in which the cause is co-temporaneous with
the effect. Despite the opinion of these philosophers,
however, Hume thinks that temporal succession should be
included in our idea of causation. Considering Hume’s
argument for this claim would take us too far afield, but
in brief Hume argues that co-temporaneous causation would
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imply the nonexistence of time. Since time clearly exists,
Hume argues that co-temporaneous causation isn’t possible.
Thus, temporal succession should be included among our idea
of a cause.
So far, Hume’s identified two essential components of
our idea of causation — contiguity and temporal succession.
When we confine ourselves to single instances of causation,
Hume claims that this is as far as we can go (T 1.3.2.9).
Nothing else is relevant to our search when we consider a
single case of causation.
But contiguity and temporal succession don’t furnish a
complete idea of causation. A complete idea for Hume is an
idea that contains all of its component ideas. There’s some
other element, Hume contends, that “enters into our idea of
cause and effect” (T 1.3.2.13). This missing element is
none other than the idea of necessary connection. We
suppose, that is, that there’s a necessary connection
between cause and effect. Thus, Hume writes:

Shall we then rest contented with these two relations
of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete
idea of causation? By no means. An object may be
contiguous and prior to another, without being
considered as its cause. There is a necessary
connexion to be taken into consideration; and that
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relation is of much greater importance, than any of
the other two above mentioned. (T 1.3.2.11)

In order to discern the nature of our idea of
necessary connection, Hume believes that we must take an
oblique or circuitous route. We must “beat about all the
neighboring fields, without any certain view of design” (T
1.3.2.13). The “neighboring fields” that Hume considers are
the causal maxim — that every event must have a cause — and
the nature of causal inference. In the end, Hume asks why
it is that we suppose that the causal maxim is
demonstrable: Why do we think that what exists must have a
cause? In order to answer this question, Hume proceeds to
study the nature of our causal inferences, which eventually
leads him to our idea of a necessary connection.
Accordingly, I turn to the nature of our causal inferences
in the next section.

Multiple Instances of Causation

Hume has identified three essential elements to our
idea of causation: (i) spatial and temporal contiguity,
(ii) temporal succession, and (iii) necessary connection.
But Hume doesn’t know what to make of our idea of necessary
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connection. For this reason, Hume doesn’t immediately
proceed to an analysis of this idea; instead, he intends to
“beat about all the neighbouring fields, without any
certain view or design” (T 1.3.2.13), in the hope of
discovering the nature of this idea. The neighboring field
that’s most relevant is his discussion of causal inference
and his attendant discussion of belief, which is the result
of our causal inferences.
Hume’s account of belief involves three elements:
First, belief always involves a perception of an
impression-like force — namely, a sensation or a memory.
Second, this force is transferred to an idea that’s
conjoined to it, such that, third, belief is the having of
a vivacious idea. Thus Hume defines a belief as “a lively
idea related to or associated with a present impression” (T
1.3.7.5).
Since all causal inferences result in belief, Hume
contends that all causal inferences must begin with a
perception of impression-like force: an impression or an
idea of memory (T 1.3.4.1). If the inference doesn’t begin
with a perception of impression-like force, then the
inference is merely hypothetical, and thus can’t culminate
in belief (T 1.3.4.2). For ease of exposition, I shall
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refer to the impression-like content that factors into
causal inference as an “impression.”
In a causal inference, the mind undergoes a transition
from an impression to the idea believed. Hume first
reiterates a point he made above, that the transition or
inference isn’t due to a “penetration into their essences”
(T 1.3.6.1). That is, we don’t infer the effect because of
some discernible quality about the case (or vice versa).
Hume thinks that this can be easily shown. The idea of
a cause is distinct from the idea of its effect, and so, by
the separability principle, cause and effect are separable.
No contradiction follows from our supposing that the effect
doesn’t follow from the cause. Hume’s claiming that cause
and effect aren’t related in the manner of relations of
ideas, and thus the inference involved is one of
probability and not knowledge.
The transition, then, must be based on experience. We
remember past experiences of regularity — that is, we
perceive that like causes are contiguous and successive
with respect to like effects. Moreover, we observe that
these conjunctions are constant (T 1.3.6.2). Hume therefore
identifies this as an additional essential element of our
concept of a cause: namely, a constant conjunction between
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cause and effect. We delineate something as a cause or an
effect only if the two relations of contiguity and
succession are preserved in several instances (T 1.3.6.3).
But on what basis does the mind move from a knowledge
of constant conjunction to belief in the unobserved, that
is, a necessary connection? Hume puts this question in
terms of whether causal inference is founded on reason or
the imagination. He argues that reason can’t be the source
of this inference, and this leads to his infamous problem
of induction. I turn to an explication of this argument in
the next section.

The Problem of Induction

Hume claims that inferences based on sense experience
aren’t based on reason, for this leads to a circularity.
This, in short, is Hume’s infamous problem of induction.
Because he thinks they’re not based on reason, they must be
based on the imagination (T 1.3.6.12).
Hume summarizes his contentions about inferences
concerning matters of fact as follows:
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When it is asked, What is the nature of all our
reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper
answer seems to be, that they are founded on the
relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked,
What is the foundation of all our reasonings and
conclusions concerning that relation? it may be
replied in one word, EXPERIENCE. But if we still carry on
our sifting humour, and ask, What is the foundation of
all conclusions from experience? this implies a new
question, which may be of more difficult solution and
explication. (EHU 4.14)

Hume asserts that claims about matters of fact are
founded on the relation of cause and effect. As we saw
above, Jim finds a watch on some deserted island, and
claims, “There had once been human beings on this island”
(EHU 4.1.4).4 In order for Jim to reason to this claim from
his observation of the watch, he must implicitly assert
some causal connection between the existence of watches and
human beings.
Second, Hume observes that the relation of cause and
effect depends upon experience (EHU 4.7). Simply attending
to the qualities contained in the idea of “watch,” or “this
watch,” will not lead your thought to a specific cause; nor
will simply dwelling on the qualities of the idea of “human
being” lead you to an idea of “this watch,” and so Jim must
4

Some of Hume’s examples in this section of the Enquiry suggest that, in speaking in terms of how cause
and effect factor into inductive reasoning, the notions of cause and effect are quite broad. The claim “My
friend is in France” is said to be the effect of “My friends (trustworthy) testimony of this claim.” Obviously,
claiming one will be in France does not cause one to be in France, properly speaking, though we do
sometimes speak loosely and say something like, “My friends (trustworthy) testimony to this effect.”
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have had some previous experience that connected the two.
What this leads to is the natural idea that our idea of a
causal connection emerges when we witness a constant
conjunction of events of two types, and some degree of
contiguity and priority between the cause and effect, and
are thus propelled by custom into belief about a necessary
connection.
The relevant notion for our current purposes, however,
is constant conjunction. Consider the following cases:

A. a1 strikes b1 in circumstances c1, and b1 moves in
manner k;
B. a2 strikes b2 in circumstances c1, and b2 moves in
manner k;
C. a3 strikes b3 in circumstances c1, and b3 moves in
manner k.

Here we have a case of constant conjunction (assuming that
there are no other cases of a’s striking b’s in
circumstances c1 that fail to react in manner k). Suppose
someone were to conclude, based on A, B, and C, that, if a4
strikes b4 in circumstances c1, then b4 will move in manner
k. This is a case of inductive reasoning, or reasoning
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concerning a matter of fact. But such a conclusion, on
Hume’s understanding, involves an inference of the
following kind: from “I have found that such an object has
always been attended with such an effect” to “I foresee,
that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will
be attended with similar effects” (EHU 4.16). In short, the
implicit premise is that the future will resemble the past,
or, better, that nature is uniform. For Hume our
experiential conclusions, our inductive reasoning about
matters of fact, all function in this way.
Where’s the problem? Let’s call the implicit premise
that factors into inductive reasoning — namely that objects
similar in appearance will be attended with similar effects
(and vice versa) — H. Can we be certain of the truth of H?
Given the distinctions noted above, one can only possibly
justify H by way of intuition, demonstration, or
probability. Since it’s conceivable that similar causes
will not always have similar effects, intuition and
demonstration are not possible forms of justification.

When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a
straight line towards another; even suppose motion in
the second ball should by accident be suggested to me,
as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not
conceive, that a hundred different events might as
well follow from that cause? May not both these balls
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remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return
in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any
line or direction? All these suppositions are
consistent and conceivable. (EHU 4.10)

Since probability is itself a species of inductive
reasoning, justifying H by way of probability would entail
one’s employing H in justifying H, which is clearly
circular.5 This is the problem of induction, and it’s quite
formidable.
But is this really a problem, as Hume thinks? Nelson
Goodman doesn’t think so. Indeed, Goodman claims to
“dissolve” Hume’s problem. But Goodman’s mistaken. As it
happens, Goodman’s dissolution is very much similar to
Hume’s solution. It will therefore benefit us to consider
Goodman’s dissolution.

Goodman’s Dissolution

Nelson Goodman claims that Hume’s problem of induction
— what he calls “the old problem of induction” — has been
solved, or rather “dissolved” (1979: 59). Goodman observes
that Hume’s problem of induction is the problem of
5

“But you must confess, that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it
then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as
their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with
similar sensible qualities” (EHU 4.21).
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justifying judgments about unobserved cases. The problem,
as Goodman puts it, is that “such judgments are neither
reports of experience nor logical consequences of it”
(ibid.). Goodman primarily focuses on predictions — that is,
inferences to future cases — and so I shall also limit my
discussion to prediction. Thus:

Predictions, of course, pertain to what has not yet
been observed. And they cannot be logically inferred
from what has been observed; for what has happened
imposes no logical restrictions on what will happen.
(ibid.)

The question, then, becomes: Why prefer one prediction
over rival predictions? Suppose that I predict that my
youngest son will spill his drink sometime tomorrow, but a
soothsayer predicts that he won’t. Do we have any grounds
for supposing that my prediction is more probable than the
soothsayer’s? After all, the soothsayer has never met my
son and merely makes his or her prediction by looking into
a crystal ball, which is hardly a reliable belief forming
process. Moreover, I have experienced for nearly two years
of his existence, my youngest son spilling the overwhelming
majority of the drinks that have been handed to him. Indeed,
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he’s likely doing just that right now. Certainly my
prediction is more probable than the soothsayer’s, right?
Goodman believes, however, that this way of putting
things confuses matters. He claims that Hume’s description
of what occurs in induction also answers the justificatory
problem. Indeed, the latter isn’t really a problem to be
solved, and so Goodman takes himself to have “dissolved”
the problem. In short, Goodman claims that once we see how
induction works (a descriptive claim), we will see that no
further justification is needed (a normative claim).
Goodman’s dissolution of the old problem of induction
begins with an analogy to the justification of deduction.
He explains:

How do we justify a deduction? Plainly, by showing
that it conforms to the general rules of deductive
inference. An argument that so conforms is justified
or valid, even if its conclusion happens to be false.
An argument that violates a rule is fallacious even if
its conclusions happens to be true. To justify a
deductive conclusion therefore requires no knowledge
of the facts it pertains to. Moreover, when a
deductive argument has been shown to conform to the
rules of logical inference, we usually consider it
justified without going on to ask what justifies the
rules. Analogously, the basic task in justifying an
inductive inference is to show that it conforms to the
general rules of induction. Once we have recognized
this, we have gone a long way towards clarifying our
problem. (1979: 63)
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Thus Goodman claims that particular deductions are
justified because they conform to the general rules of
deduction. Suppose, then, that we have a particular
deductive argument, A. Goodman claims that:

1. A is justified

because

2. A conforms to the (justified) rules, R, of deductive
inference.

He recognizes that in order for R to justify A, R must
itself be justified. Thus, he writes:

Yet, of course, the rules themselves must eventually
be justified. The validity of a deduction depends not
upon conformity to any purely arbitrary rules we may
contrive, but upon conformity to valid rules. When we
speak of the rules of inference we mean the valid
rules — or better, some valid rules, since there may
be alternative sets of equally valid rules. But how is
the validity of rules to be determined? (ibid.)

His answer to this last question is:
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Principles of deductive inference are justified by
conformity with accepted deductive practice. Their
validity depends upon accordance with the particular
deductive inferences we actually make and sanction. If
a rule yields unacceptable inferences, we drop it as
invalid. Justification of general rules thus derives
from judgments rejecting or accepting particular
deductive inferences. (1979: 63-4)

Thus the rules of deduction are justified by not
yielding any unacceptable inferences.

I have said that deductive inferences are justified by
their conformity to valid general rules, and that
general rules are justified by their conformity to
valid inferences. But this circle is a virtuous one.
The point is that rules and particular inferences
alike are justified by being brought into agreement
with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an
inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is
rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to
amend. The process of justification is the delicate
one of making mutual adjustments between rules and
accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved
lies the only justification needed for either. (1979:
64)

This is Goodman’s method of reflective equilibrium,
later appropriated by John Rawls. Goodman claims that the
circularity exhibited here is a virtuous one.
Naturally, Goodman claims that what holds for
deduction also holds for induction.
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All this applies equally well to induction. An
inductive inference, too, is justified by conformity
to general rules, and a general rule by conformity to
accepted inductive inferences. Predictions are
justified if they conform to valid canons of
induction;6 and the canons are valid if they accurately
codify accepted inductive practice. (ibid.)

This is Goodman’s dissolution of the problem. A particular
inductive inference is justified if it conforms to the
inductive canon, and the inductive canon is justified if it
doesn’t yield any unacceptable inferences.
Hume’s problem remains, however. It’s easiest to see
why if we discuss matters in terms of deduction. Goodman
offers us the following picture:

3. A is justified

because

4. A conforms to rules of deductive inference R.

6

Goodman (1979: 65) recognizes that, unlike deduction, there aren’t any well-established principles or
canons of inductive inference.
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And

5. R is justified

because

6. R conforms to accepted deductive practice P.

The idea is that P contains many different argument
forms — modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), disjunctive
syllogism (DS), hypothetical syllogism (HS), and so on —
and that none of these forms leads to “unacceptable
inferences.” In other words, no form has a counterexample
(or widely recognized counterexample). Consider MP:

(MP)
(i)

p É q

(ii)

p

(iii)

Therefore, q
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To say that (MP) lacks a counterexample is to say that
there’s no substitution instance in which its premises are
true and its conclusion false. Over the course of human
history, we’ve never found an “unacceptable” inference that
had this form. In light of this, we exalt it to the status
of a rule of deductive inference.
Things are rather different, of course, with something
like the fallacy of denying the antecedent. That is:

(DA)
(i)

p É q

(ii)

~p

(iii)

Therefore, ~q

This is no less a candidate as a rule of deductive
inference, but we don’t accept it as one because it has
counterexamples. For instance, a counterexample to (DA) is:

(i)

If 1 + 1 = 3, then I’m not God.

(ii)

It’s not the case that 1 + 1 = 3

(iii)

Therefore, I’m God.
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Although I myself believe this conclusion, the inference,
unfortunately, isn’t acceptable. Thus (MP) constitutes a
valid rule of deductive inference — alongside (MT), (DS),
(HS), and so forth — but (DA) doesn’t.
But notice that the move from (5) to (6) stipulates
that R is justified because R conforms to accepted
deductive practice P. In other words, when we take (MP) as
the relevant rule,

7. (MP) is justified

because

8. (MP) conforms to accepted deductive practice.

(8) implies that (MP) has no counterexamples, and thus that
all (MP) instantiations are valid (or that all [MP]
instantiations so far observed have been valid).
But notice that here we must rely on induction. Thus,
on Goodman’s account, we have:
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9. All (MP) instantiations are valid (or all [MP]
instantiations so far observed have been valid).

is justified because

10.

Some past argument, B, has form MP and doesn’t

have true premises and a false conclusion, and
11.

Some past argument, C, has form MP and doesn’t

have true premises and a false conclusion, and
12.

Some past argument, n, for any number of n, has

form MP and doesn’t have true premises and a false
conclusion.7

Clearly, the inference from (10)-(12) to (9) is an
inductive argument. Thus Goodman’s dissolution requires
that argument forms be justified on account of accepted
practice, and yet the way that they are justified by
accepted practices relies on induction.
Thus, if Goodman were right, deduction would rely on
induction, and induction itself is justified by reflective
equilibrium. The justification of induction involves a
7

And there’s no argument that we have observed that has form MP that has true premises and a false
conclusion.
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circularity, but one that Goodman regards as virtuous. In
short, we observe that certain inductive principles of
inference work — that is, they lack counterexamples or
common occurrences of counterexamples. This is the
pragmatist strand in Goodman. Since they work, we can then
use them to make further inferences.
According to Helen Beebee (2006: 66-74), Hume isn’t an
inductive skeptic, for the problem of induction is intended
to show only that inductive inferences aren’t justified by
our reason. Rather, induction is “more animal than divine”
(2006: 11), and thus Hume’s interest has more to do with
the source of justification than with its existence.
Consider, for instance, Hume’s remarks on the causal maxim,
which is a proposition he takes to be inductively grounded:

I only maintain’d, that our certainty of the falsehood
of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition
nor demonstration; but from another source. That
Caesar existed, that there is such an island as
Sicily; for these propositions, I affirm, we have no
demonstrative nor intuitive proof. Wou’d you infer
that I deny their truth, or even their certainty?
There are many different kinds of certainty; and some
of them as satisfactory to the mind, tho perhaps not
so regular, as the demonstrative kind. (L 1.91)8

8

“L” refers to the volume containing Hume’s letters, and the numbers indicate the volume and the letter,
respectively.
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Hume doesn’t deny that everything that exists has a cause;
he merely denies that our knowledge or certainty of this
truth is demonstrative or intuitive.
The same point is reiterated in A Letter to a
Gentleman, where, again, he’s responding to critics. There
he writes:

The author is charged with opinions leading to
downright atheism, chiefly by denying this principle,
that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of
existence. To give you a notion of the extravagance of
this charge, I must enter into a little detail. It is
common for philosophers to distinguish the kinds of
evidence into intuitive, demonstrative, sensible, and
moral; by which they intend only to mark a difference
betwixt them, not to denote a superiority of one above
another. Moral certainty may reach as high a degree of
assurance as mathematical; and our senses are surely
to be comprised amongst the clearest and most
convincing of all evidences. Now, it being the
author’s purpose, in the pages cited in the specimen,
to examine the grounds of that proposition; he used
the freedom of disputing the common opinion, that it
was founded on demonstrative or intuitive certainty;
but asserts, that it is supported by moral evidence,
and is followed by a conviction of the same kind with
these truths, that all men must die, and that the sun
will rise tomorrow. (LG 21)9

Hume’s point is that the causal maxim is known with moral
certainty, not any other species of certainty. Indeed, “a

9

“LG” abbreviates Hume’s A Letter to a Gentleman, the numbers indicating the paragraph.
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man must have lost all common sense to doubt” the causal
maxim, claims Hume (ibid.).
According to Beebee, then, Hume believes that the
uniformity principle is justified because it’s reliable —
“causal reasoning tracks the truth” (2006: 73). Accordingly,
the problem of induction, while a bit of an aside to our
aims here, is merely intended by Hume to show that
induction is based on the imagination, not reason.

Thin Necessary Connection

Thus, to return to our idea of necessary connection,
Hume claims that the essential elements in our idea of
causation are the following: (i) spatial and temporal
contiguity, (ii) temporal succession, (iii) necessary
connection, and (iv) constant conjunction. But we still
don’t know what our idea of necessary connection consists
in, and Hume claims that the transition from an impression
to belief isn’t founded on reason.
Thus, at this point, we merely perceive a constant
conjunction of like causes and like effects. Hume claims,
however, that the world “can never produce any new quality
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in the object, which can be the model of our idea of
necessary connection” (T 1.3.14.20). In other words:

There is, then, nothing new either discover’d or
produc’d in any objects by their constant conjunction,
and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their
relations of succession and contiguity. (T 1.3.14.19)

Nonetheless, Hume claims that the observation of these
constant conjunctions “produces a new impression in the
mind, which is its real model” (T 1.3.14.20).

For after we have observ’d the resemblance in a
sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a
determination of the mind to pass from one object to
its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger
light upon account of that relation…. Necessity, then,
is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but
an internal impression of the mind, or a determination
to carry our thoughts from one object to another.
Without considering it in this view, we can never
arrive at the most distant notion of it, or be able to
attribute it either to external or internal objects,
to spirit or body, to causes or effects. (ibid.)

Hume claims, in other words, that our perceiving a
constant conjunction between like causes and like effects
produces a new impression — a felt determination or
propensity of the mind. This is an impression of reflection
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(T 1.3.14.22). It’s the feeling that like effects will be
followed by like causes.
Accordingly, our causal inferences are based on our
experience of past constant conjunctions of contiguity and
succession. Our idea of necessary connection is copied from
an impression of reflection, which is produced on account
of our experiencing these past constant conjunctions.
For Hume, then, our idea of necessary connection is an
outcome of our causal inferences, rather than vice versa. I
perceive a constant conjunction of like objects, and this
forms the “customary transition” of inferring similar
objects from similar causes.
Hume summarizes his conclusions pertaining to his
discussion of causation with his two definitions, which I
briefly detailed in Chapter One. These two definitions are:

First Definition of a Cause
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and
contiguous to another, and where all the objects
resembling the former are plac’d in a like relation of
priority and contiguity to those objects, that
resemble the latter. (T 1.3.14.35)

Second Definition of a Cause
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and
contiguous to another, and so united with it in the
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imagination, that the idea of the one determines the
mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression
of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. (T
1.3.14.35)

There has been considerable debate over Hume’s two
definitions of a cause. One common charge is that Hume’s
definitions aren’t extensionally equivalent, and thus as
definitions they’re suspect.
But Hume’s procedure here isn’t all that surprising.
Recall that Hume takes the term “relation” to be ambiguous.
This may refer either to natural relations or philosophical
relations. Philosophical relations are arbitrary
comparisons that don’t rely on any psychological
association, whereas natural relations are principles of
association within the imagination (T 1.3.6.13).
Moreover, causation functions both as a philosophical
and a natural relation. And thus the term “causation” is
itself ambiguous, depending upon which kind of relation —
philosophical or natural — one intends. Thus it’s not
surprising that Hume offers two definitions.
Thus, taken as a philosophical relation, and
considering only that which is pertinent to the objects,
causation is simply spatial contiguity and temporal
succession, as per the first definition. When we speak of a

139
cause in this sense, nothing pertaining to the imagination
is relevant. On the other hand, when we consider it as a
natural relation, we see that the customary transition of
the mind needs to come into play, which is made explicit in
the second definition.
Strictly speaking, then, there’s no necessary
connection in objects. However, the second definition more
accurately reflects our idea of causation, for our idea of
causation includes the idea of necessary connection. This
idea of a necessary connection is based on an impression of
reflection, not an impression of sensation. It seems
evident, therefore, that Hume endorses a thin idea of
necessary connection, as it’s a feature of our minds and
not objects, grounded as it is in our experience, not the
world.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined Hume’s account of our
idea of causation. Hume claims that our idea of causation
is composed of three elements: (i) contiguity in time and
place, (ii) temporal succession, and (iii) necessary
connection, and that the latter results from the constant
conjunction of the former two.
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His account of necessary connection is thin: that is,
our idea of necessary connection is based on no more than
an impression of reflection, and thus is produced by our
minds rather than an impression of sensation. The idea of a
necessary connection is ultimately grounded in us, in
particular in the operations of our minds. It is not
ultimately grounded in the world of objects.
This account is very much the standard one. It’s what
Old Humeans appeal to in defending their position. In the
next chapter, I consider how Old Humeans rely on Hume’s
account to argue against the New Hume interpretation, and
consider the various responses on the part of New Humeans.
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Chapter Four
Thick Causation
Introduction

In Chapter Three, we saw that Hume claims that our
idea of necessary connection is copied from an impression
of reflection — namely, a felt determination of the mind.
Since this impression is the product of our experiencing a
constant conjunction of like events, Hume takes our idea of
necessary connection to be thin.
Hume’s account of necessary connection constitutes the
basis for the most forceful and persistent criticism of the
New Hume interpretation. Briefly put, the objection is that
Hume can’t believe in thick causation, for one can believe
in thick causation only if one can have an idea of thick
causation. But, the argument goes, Hume denies that we have
any idea of thick causation. Hume, as we’ve seen, takes the
idea of necessary connection that factors into our idea of
causation to be thin, not thick. Thus Hume can’t believe in
thick causation. In this chapter, I consider the main lines
of argument in this debate.

The Criticism Stated
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Ken Winkler (1991) has argued that Hume’s theory of
ideas — the view that all ideas originate in experience —
forecloses on the possibility of any idea of thick
causation.1 Since Hume can’t have an idea of thick causation,
he can’t believe in thick causation. Winkler explains:

Every thought or perception must be derived from
impressions, and although Hume is vague about the
constraints on derivation — the creative power of the
mind amounts… “to no more than the faculty of
compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing
the materials afforded us by the senses and experience”
— a “thought” or “perception” whose derivation fails
to satisfy those constraints is not a thought or
perception at all. (1991: 560)

This reading gains support from the observation that the
“scope of the theory [of ideas] seems to be universal, and
its force unforgiving: it seems to say that any alleged
thought or conception lacking an appropriate pedigree is
unintelligible or meaningless” (1991: 552).
Accepting the gauntlet, Galen Strawson (2014: 14), a
New Humean, has formulated the challenge to New Humeans in
terms of three fundamental interpretative claims, epistemic,
semantic, and ontological:

1

Winkler’s article is what gave rise to the name “The New Hume.”
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E. All we can ever know of causation is regular
succession.
S. All we can legitimately manage to mean by expressions
like “causation in the objects” is regular succession.
O. All that causation actually is, in the objects, is
regular succession.

Strawson contends that proponents of the Old Hume
argue from (E) to (S), and then from (S) to (O). He puts
the argument as follows (2014: 15):

1. E.
2. If E is true, then S is true.
3. If S is true, then O is true.
4. Therefore, O.

First, Old Humeans interpret Hume as claiming that all
that we can know about causation is that it consists of
regular succession. This is the account of causation that I
attributed to Hume in Chapter Three. From it, I concluded
that Hume’s view of causation is thin.
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In addition, Old Humeans argue that (2) follows from
Hume’s meaning-empiricism: if the only idea we can have of
causation is an idea of thin causation, then that’s all
that we can ever manage to mean by the term. The reason is
that on Hume’s meaning-empiricism, the meaning of a term is
provided by its associated idea.
This brings us to the third premise. As (3) indicates,
proponents of the Old Hume contend that the semantic claim
has ontological implications. Here, for instance, is how
Strawson puts the point:

Why does (O) follow from (S)? Because, given (S), when
the phrase “causation in the objects” comes out of our
mouths or pens, or occurs in our thought, it
inevitably just means regular succession. So (O)
causation in the objects — here is the phrase, meaning
“regular succession” — just is regular succession.
After all, regular succession is regular succession.
(2007: 34)

The idea is that, given (S), the phrase “causation in the
objects” is synonymous with the phrase “regular succession
in the objects.” Thus (O), the claim that “causation in the
objects is regular succession,” turns out to be trivial.
For if we replace “causation in the objects” with “regular
succession in the objects” in (O), then we get “regular
succession is regular succession.”
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Thus Old Humeans claim that Hume can’t even think
about or contemplate thick causation. Helen Beebee puts the
point this way:

If we hold [Hume] to the doctrine that the impressionsource of an idea provides its meaning, and put it
together with the thesis that the impression-source of
the idea of necessary connection is the “feeling” we
get when we infer effects from causes, we appear to
rule out the possibility of our even being able to
contemplate the possibility that there are real
necessary connections in nature. We have no idea that
corresponds to the expression “real necessary
connection in nature,” since the alleged idea does not
have its source in any sensory impression. Rather,
when we say or think that one event is necessarily
connected to another, and hence that the first caused
the second, what we really turn out to mean by that
claim must have something to do with the transition of
the mind from the observation of the first event to
the expectation that the second event will follow, and
nothing to do with any alleged real connection between
the two events. (2006: 9)

Likewise, Peter Kail calls this the “semantic threat” to
causal realism, and notes that “if we cannot detect power —
have an impression of it — it seems as if we cannot form
any thought at all and so uses of the word ‘power’ are mere
noise” (2007a: 31).
Consequently, New Humeans have devoted much of their
attention to showing how Hume can make room within his
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theory of ideas for an idea of thick causation. In the next
section, I turn to these considerations.

Strawson’s Case for Skeptical Realism

Strawson’s 1989 book, The Secret Connexion: Causation,
Realism, and David Hume, has arguably done more than anyone
else to generate interest in the New Hume.2 Accordingly, I
shall primarily focus on the main line of response offered
by Strawson. Strawson explains and defends the skeptical
realist position.
Strawson commences his case for skeptical realism by
noting the well-known fact that Hume was dissatisfied with
the reception of the Treatise. Upon its first publication,
it received very little attention, and what attention it
did receive was largely hostile. Thus, when Hume
essentially rewrote the material of Book One of the
Treatise, and then published it as his first Enquiry, he
asked his publisher to include the following disclaimer:

Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in
this volume, were published in a work in three volumes,
called A Treatise of Human Nature: a work which the
author projected before he left college, and which he
2

In addition, see John Wright’s 1983 book, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume.
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wrote and published not long after. But not finding it
successful, he was sensible of his error in going to
the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the
following pieces, where some negligences in his former
reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes,
corrected. Yet several writers, who have honoured the
author’s philosophy with answers, have taken care to
direct all their batteries against the juvenile work,
which the author never acknowledged, and have affected
to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined,
they had obtained over it: a practice very contrary to
all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong
instance of those polemical artifices, which a bigoted
zeal thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth,
the author desires, that the following pieces may
alone be regarded as containing his philosophical
sentiments and principles. (EHU Advertisement)

Strawson takes Hume’s denouncement of the Treatise in
this Advertisement very seriously, and consequently derives
an exegetical or interpretative principle from it:

Strawson’s Exegetical Principle
We have an obligation to read the Enquiry back into
the Treatise, and not vice versa.

Accordingly, Strawson claims that, if a passage in the
Treatise appears incompatible with a passage in the Enquiry,
it is to be discarded. He claims that only if (i) the
passage in the Enquiry is unclear, and (ii) the passage in
the Treatise isn’t incompatible with something else in the
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Enquiry that’s in dispute — only then can we rely on the
Treatise.
Accordingly, Strawson claims that the “negligences in…
expression” (ibid.) that Hume mentions in the Advertisement
are “doubtless his phrasings of epistemological points in a
dramatically ontological idiom” (2007: 49, fn. 4). Consider,
for instance, Hume’s use of the term “external.” His use
seems to suggest that, when he writes of “external objects”
he’s referring to objects that exist in the natural world,
independent from the mind. This, however, is at odds with
his relegating questions of external existence to the realm
of the natural philosophers. Instead, he likely intends to
use the term to refer to objects that we regard as external,
and wishes to say nothing about whether such objects really
are externally existing objects. Accordingly, this would be
a case in which Hume’s language misleads; for his point is
epistemological, not ontological. Consequently, Strawson
notes that “Hume deserves [our] sympathy, for it is bad to
be attacked for views one never held, and worse to be
praised and famous for holding them” (2014: 11).
Strawson claims that the criticism of the New Hume
presented above rests on this very misunderstanding. That
is to say, it mistakes an epistemological claim for an
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ontological claim. According to Strawson, Winkler’s
argument stipulates that an idea of thick causation is
unintelligible for Hume. But Strawson argues that there are
two relevant senses of the terms “intelligible” and
“unintelligible.” These, says Strawson, are as follows.
In the modern sense, Strawson says, something is
unintelligible just in case it’s incoherent or doesn’t make
sense. Thus, anything unintelligible in this sense can’t
exist, for, like a square a circle, it lacks consistency.
But Strawson argues that Hume intends “unintelligible” in a
sense distinct from this, one that doesn’t prevent us from
having an idea of thick causation. Hume “means that we
cannot form an idea of it… that has any positive
descriptive content on the terms of the theory of ideas. To
say this, however, is not to say that we cannot refer to it,
or that the notion of it is incoherent” (2007: 35). Thick
causation is unintelligible, but not in the sense of its
being incoherent. Rather, it’s unintelligible in the sense
that it can’t be adequately understood, or understood in a
particular way. This is the second sense of
“unintelligible.” In order to understand the way in which
our idea of thick causation is unintelligible, we need to
turn to the eighteenth-century distinction between positive
and relative ideas.
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Proponents of the New Hume point to the distinction
between positive/direct and relative ideas in order to make
room within Hume’s meaning-empiricism for an idea of thick
causation. This distinction is also sometimes described as
the distinction between conceiving and supposing an idea,
and it has been most fully articulated by Daniel Flage.3
To see this distinction at work, consider Thomas
Reid’s distinction between direct and relative conceptions
in his Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Reid
writes:

Of some things, we know what they are in themselves;
our conception of such things I call direct. Of other
things, we know not what they are in themselves, but
only that they have certain properties or attributes,
or certain relations to other things; of these our
conception is only relative.4

An example that Reid provides is the following:

[I]n the university library, I call for the book,
press L, shelf 10, No. 10; the library keeper must
have such a conception of the book I want, as to be
able to distinguish it from ten thousand that are
under his care. But what conception does he form of it
from my words? They inform him neither of the author,
nor the subject, nor the language, nor the size, nor
3
4

See Daniel Flage (1981), (1982), and (2007).
Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, 1.1, p. 9.
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the binding, but only of its mark and place. His
conception of it is merely relative to these
circumstances; yet this relative notion enables him to
distinguish it from every other book in the library.5

In this passage, Reid tells the librarian the book he
desires by noting certain properties of it — it’s the book
that has the attributes of “press L, shelf 10, No. 10.” In
specifying the book in this way, the librarian doesn’t have
any “picture” of the book before his or her mind. But, as
Reid notes, the librarian must still have some “conception
of the book I want” (ibid.). In short, Reid claims that the
librarian lacks a direct idea of the book, although he or
she does have a relative idea of it.
Flage notes that Reid wasn’t the first to employ this
distinction in early modern thought. Locke, Flage says, and
Berkeley, made use of it, and Descartes and Spinoza likely
did as well (2007: 139-140).
In addition, Flage contends that the direct/relative
idea distinction is analogous to Bertrand Russell’s later
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge
by description.6 A relative idea, claims Flage, is the
“cognitive analogue of a definite description,” and thus he
describes his account as the describing model of relative
5
6

Ibid., pp. 9-10.
See Bertrand Russell (1912).
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ideas (2007: 138). As for Hume, Flage argues that while
“positive ideas are nothing more than copies of impressions
or compilations of simple ideas copied from impressions,
relative ideas allow one to single out ideational or
nonideational objects on the basis of putative relations to
positive impressions or ideas” (ibid.).
There are three passages in Hume that constitute
evidence for thinking that Hume recognized and employed the
distinction between positive and relative ideas. Toward the
end of his brief discussion of our idea of existence and of
external objects in Part Two of the Treatise, Hume writes:

The farthest we can go towards a conception of
external objects, when suppos’d specifically different
from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of
them, without pretending to comprehend the related
objects. (T 1.2.6.9)

In this passage, Hume claims that when conceived as
something different in kind from our perceptions, we can’t
form a positive idea of external objects.7 But, Hume claims,
we can form a relative idea of them. In this case, a
candidate correlate description of our relative idea of

7

Cf. Berkeley’s “Master Argument” in his Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I, 22-3.

153
external objects would be something on the order of, “the
resembling cause of our perceptions.”8
A second piece of evidence that Hume recognizes and
employs the positive/relative idea distinction is based on
the following passage:

To make this evident, let us remember, that as every
idea is deriv’d from a preceding perception, ‘tis
impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an
object or external existence can ever represent what
are specifically different from each other. Whatever
difference we may suppose betwixt them, ‘tis still
incomprehensible to us; and we are oblig’d either to
conceive an external object merely as a relation
without a relative, or to make it the very same with a
perception or impression. (T 1.4.5.19)

Hume’s claim that we can conceive of an external
object as a “relation without a relative” seems to indicate
that he permits relative ideas. The relation in this case
would be something like “causing our perceptions,” and “the
relative[s]” would be the objects that satisfy this
relation. Thus we can only conceive of the object in terms
of how it’s related to our perceptions, as opposed to our
conceiving of it in itself.
Finally, a third piece of evidence that Hume endorses
the positive/relative idea distinction is the passage:
8

Cf. Kail (2007a: 60).
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According to these explications and definitions, the
idea of power is relative as much as that of cause;
and both have a reference to an effect, or some other
event constantly conjoined with the former. When we
consider the unknown circumstance of an object, by
which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed
and determined, we call that its power: And
accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that
the effect is the measure of the power. But if they
had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could
not they measure it in itself? The dispute whether the
force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the
square of its velocity; this dispute, I say, need not
be decided by comparing its effects in equal or
unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and
comparison. (EHU 7.2.29, fn. 17)

These passages are the only places in which Hume
seemingly mentions relative ideas. In them, he seems to
grant their legitimacy.
New Humeans emphasize this distinction and claim that
Hume has the resources to avoid the criticism of their
position advanced above. Thus Strawson claims that Hume’s
belief in thick causal connections is based on a relative
idea of causal power. While we can’t positively conceive of
causal power — and thus it’s not “intelligible” in this
sense — we can still suppose its existence on the basis of
what we do perceive: the regular, constant connections,
between like causes and like effects.
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Accordingly, Strawson claims that our relative idea of
thick causation is expressed in the description “that in
reality in virtue of which reality is regular in the way
that it is” (2007: 37).
As evidence, Strawson notes numerous cases in which
Hume seems to refer to both secret powers and hidden
connections, and our “profound ignorance” with respect to
these secret powers and hidden connections. Hume speaks,
for example, of “the power or force, which actuates the
whole machine” (EHU 7.8), of “that very circumstance in the
cause, by which it is enabled to produce the effect” (EHU
7.17), and of various “secret springs and principles” (EHU
1.15). Accordingly, Strawson claims that

Anything that is to count as a genuine conception of
something must be descriptively contentful on the
terms of the theory of ideas: it must have directly
impression-based, impression-copy content. By contrast,
a supposition that something exists or is the case can
be a genuine supposition, genuinely about something,
and hence intelligible in our present-day sense,
without being contentful (or meaningful or
intelligible) on the terms of the theory of ideas.”
(2007: 37)

Thus, Strawson claims that there’s room within Hume’s
theory of ideas for an idea of thick causal power. Indeed,
Hume supposes — that is, assumes and believes that there
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are such powers — “not only in common life but also as a
philosopher” (2014: 3). Thick causal power is
unintelligible in the sense that we can’t have a positive
idea of it and can’t understand how it operates, although
it’s intelligible in the sense that we can still refer to
it. This, in the main, is Strawson’s response to the
criticism of Old Humeans.

Kail’s Nuanced Realism

Peter Kail has put forward a more nuanced skeptical
realism than that of Strawson. According to Kail, realism
can be understood only when contrasted with some specified
kind of anti-realism (and vice versa). The contrasting
anti-realism that Kail has in mind when discussing Hume’s
realism is the view that Hume’s theory of ideas debars us
from having any coherent thought about thick causation.
Realism, accordingly, is the view that Hume’s theory of
ideas does permit a coherent thought about thick causation.
As Kail explains:

At a minimum, realism holds that we can form thoughts
that reach beyond the deliverances of impressions and
thereby allow for the possibility of an ontology that
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includes genuine causal power and external objects.
(2007b: 255)

Accordingly, Kail’s realism is more nuanced than
Strawson’s, for realism on Kail’s interpretation isn’t
necessarily about Hume’s assuming the existence of thick
causal connections, let alone his believing or justifiably
believing in them. Thus, for Kail, as long as Hume
countenances a coherent thought about thick causation, he’s
a realist. This is compatible with his being an error
theorist, Kail claims, or his being agnostic about thick
causal powers, or his assuming such powers (2007b: 255-6).
How does Kail account for thought — coherent,
contentful thought — about thick causal power? He begins
with the following concept:

Reference-Fixer for “Power” (RFP)
That which, were we to grasp it, would furnish the
capacity to (a) “read off” what effect some object
must have and (b) find it impossible to conceive of
the cause without its effect.

Kail explains the notion as follows:

The RFP is not an idea of necessity or a relative idea
of necessity. We have no understanding of what feature
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it is that would yield those consequences. It does not
“represent” if by that one takes it to be a copy of
genuine necessity… The RFP tells us that power is that
which would yield such and such consequences while
giving us no conception of what that might be….
Nevertheless, the formal specification of the RFP
allows us to form thoughts precisely about that of
which we can have no conception. (2007b: 256)

Thus Kail claims that a “thought of a certain kind”
fixes the reference of thick causal power, but this thought
isn’t an idea of causal power, since it isn’t copied from
an impression.
Accordingly, Kail distinguishes between an “idea” and
a “thought” in Hume’s philosophy. He claims that Hume’s
copy principle is primarily a genetic claim — about how
ideas arrive in the mind — and not necessarily a semantic
claim. Thus, it’s a mistake to attribute some kind of
meaning-empiricism to Hume. While ideas are copies of
impressions, Kail admits, his interpretation of Hume leaves
room for thoughts that outrun ideas. Consequently, “the RFP
is… a way of capturing that of which we have no idea so
that a ‘thought of a certain kind’ can be had concerning it”
(2007: 268, fn. 14).
But the claim that Hume lacks a theory of meaning is
misleading. It’s true that Hume doesn’t devote as much
attention — say, as Locke — to spelling out his theory of
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meaning. But Hume clearly does suggest a strongly Lockean
conception of meaning, for instance in his discussion of
abstract ideas canvassed in Chapter One. In addition, at T
1.1.1.1, Hume claims that we think and reason with ideas,
suggesting that all thoughts involve ideas, and thus that
there can’t be “thoughts of a certain kind” that outrun our
ideas, as Kail suggests. Needless to say, in Chapter Six I
will be able to make sense of a distinction that Kail seems
to be aiming at with his distinction between ideas and
thoughts, but one that can be understood solely in terms of
Hume’s theory of ideas.
Returning to Kail’s discussion of the RFP, Kail notes
that the felt determination of the mind is the clue to
understanding our thought of thick causal power. He notes
that the determination of the mind “effects an immediate
and non-reasoned transition from cause to effect” (2007b:
258). For instance, when we see a brick rapidly approaching
a window, we immediately think that the window will break,
and this “phenomenological immediacy of the inference
mimics that of simply reading the effect from its cause”
(ibid.). Accordingly, Kail claims that the determination of
the mind can account for condition (a) of the RFP, namely
that we can “read off” the effect from the cause.
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With respect to condition (b) — that we be incapable
of conceiving the cause without the effect — Kail notes
that Hume provides a psychological explanation. He quotes
the following passage:

‘Tis natural for men, in their common and careless way
of thinking, to imagine they perceive a connexion
betwixt such objects as they have constantly found
together; and because custom has render’d it difficult
to separate the ideas, they are apt to fancy such a
separation to be in itself impossible and absurd. (T
1.4.3.9)

In this passage, Hume seems to suggest that conceiving of
the cause without the effect is psychologically impossible.
Kail claims that this satisfies condition (b) of the RFP,
that we be incapable of conceiving the cause without the
effect. Hence, conditions (a) and (b) of RTF are fulfilled,
and so Kail contends that Hume does have room within his
meaning-empiricism for a thought of thick causal power.
The problem with Kail’s interpretation is that the
thought of thick causal power isn’t about the cause and
effect being psychologically impossible to separate, but
that they be conceptually impossible. Even if it’s
psychologically impossible, this doesn’t mean that it’s
conceptually impossible. And indeed Hume denies that it’s
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conceptually impossible to separate the cause from the
effect. Thus, while Kail is correct to note that the
determination of the mind “mimics” a thought of thick
causation, such mimicking doesn’t amount to a necessary
connection. Thus, Kail hasn’t provided reasons for thinking
that Hume has room within his theory of ideas for a thought
about thick causation.

Retrospective Reinterpretation

Thus far, we’ve seen that proponents of the New Hume —
most notably, Strawson — appeal to a number of passages in
which Hume seemingly refers to “secret powers” and “hidden
connections” as evidence of their interpretation. Winkler
(1991), in turn, claims that these seeming avowals of
causal realism aren’t as unambiguous as one might think.
For instance, he (1991: 544) claims that most of these
seeming avowals occur prior to Hume’s two definitions of a
cause at EHU 7. Accordingly, Winkler suggests that these
avowals need to be retrospectively reinterpreted in light
of Hume’s later two definitions. Thus, at EHU 8, Hume
writes that:
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It is universally allowed that matter, in all its
operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that
every natural effect is so precisely determined by the
energy of its cause that no other effect, in such
particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted
from it. (EHU 8.4)

But, Winkler notes, now that Hume’s two definitions
are behind us, Hume’s quick to note his meaning in making
this claim. He writes:

Our idea… of necessity and causation arises entirely
from the uniformity observable in the operations of
nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined
together, and the mind is determined by custom to
infer the one from the appearance of the other. These
two circumstances form the whole of that necessity,
which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant
conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent
reference from one to the other, we have no notion of
any necessity or connexions. (EHU 8.6)

As further evidence that Hume wants his seeming
avowals retrospectively reinterpreted, Winkler points to an
informative footnote. At EHU 4, and thus prior to his two
definitions, Hume writes:

[N]otwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and
principles, we always presume, when we see like
sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers,
and expect that effects, similar to those which we
have experienced, will follow from them. (EHU 4.16)
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Hume addends the following footnote to this passage:

The word, power, is here used in a loose and popular
sense. The more accurate explication of it would give
additional evidence to this argument. See Section 7.
(EHU 4.16, fn. 7)9

Thus Winkler contends that when we see putative
avowals of causal realism — when we see references to
hidden powers and secret connections — we need to read
Hume’s later account of causation back into these passages.
When we reinterpret Hume’s seeming avowals in this way,
Winkler contends that the evidence for causal realism
disappears. Consider, for instance, the following passage:

As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without
giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by
which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an
instinct, which carries forward the thought in a
correspondent course to that which she has established
among external objects; though we are ignorant of
those powers and forces, on which this regular course
and succession of objects totally depends. (EHU 5.22)

Strawson claims that this counts as “decisive”
evidence that Hume believes in thick causation (2014: 185),
9

See also Kenneth Winkler, “Causal Realism and Hume’s Revisions of the Enquiry,” unpublished.
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as he appears to suggest that he’s assuming secret powers
which explain the regularities we observe. But Winkler
contends that when this passage is reinterpreted in light
of Hume’s settled position, we get a very different picture.
According to Winkler, this passage “can be read as
saying that we are ignorant of certain objects whose
behavior is constantly conjoined with the behavior of the
objects we observe” (1991: 547). In short, Hume isn’t
claiming that there’s some power X, in the natural world.
He’s only claiming that there’s some X that, if we could
discover it, we would see that it’s constantly conjoined to
the effects that we do perceive. Thus, for Winkler, Hume’s
merely claiming that our knowledge of what the cause is may
become more sophisticated, although what constitutes a
cause remains the same.
Consider, for a second example, Hume’s claims about a
“secret opposition of contrary causes”:

A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping
of any clock or watch than to say that it does not
commonly go right: But an artist easily perceives,
that the same force in the spring or pendulum has
always the same influence on the wheels; but fails of
its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust,
which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the
observation of several parallel instances,
philosophers form a maxim, that the connexion between

165
all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that
its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds
from the secret opposition of contrary causes. (EHU
8.13)

In speaking of a “secret opposition of contrary
causes,” in this passage, Hume’s referring to something in
the cause that we currently can’t discern. In addition, his
point is that if we could observe it, we would see that
it’s constantly conjoined with the regularities that we do
observe.
Thus, Winkler seems to be right in many cases. When we
retrospectively reinterpret Hume’s seeming avowals, he
isn’t referring to thick causal connections. However, while
Winkler’s reinterpretation seems to work in some instances,
perhaps most instances, it doesn’t seem to work with all
passages. At times, Hume does seem to be referring to
secret powers or connections. Consider, for instance, the
following passages, in the Dialogues concerning Natural
Religion:

Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, sceptical or
religious. Everything is surely governed by steady,
inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things
laid open to us, we should then discover the scene, of
which, at present, we can have no idea. Instead of
admiring the order of natural beings, we should
clearly see, that it was absolutely impossible for
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them, in the smallest article, ever to admit of any
other disposition. (DNR 6.12)

and

It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of
9 compose always 9 or some lesser product of 9, if you
add together all the characters, of which any of the
former products are composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36,
which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8,
2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of nine;
and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser
product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful
a regularity may be admir’d as the effect either of
chance, or design; but a skillful algebraist
immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity,
and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from
the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask,
that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by
a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish
a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of
admiring the order of natural beings, may it not
happen that, could we penetrate into the intimate
nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was
absolutely impossible, they could ever admit of any
other disposition? (DNR 9.10)

These passages clearly indicate that Hume isn’t merely
referring to some X that, when discovered, will be seen to
be constantly conjoined to the regularities that we observe.
Rather, he’s referring to some X that, if discovered, would
reveal the conceptual necessities that exist between causes
and effects. Thus, while Winkler’s reinterpretation of
Hume’s putative avowals of secret powers and hidden
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connections correctly interprets some of the passages in
Hume as not expressing belief in thick causation, his
interpretation isn’t sufficient to interpret all seeming
“thick causation” passages as not really such.

A Footnote

A second objection, also advanced by Winkler, is that
at one point Hume seems to deny that we can have a relative
idea of power. The relevant passage is:

The “By Which” Passage (BWP)
[I]f a cause be defined, that which produces any
thing; it is easy to observe, that producing is
synonymous to causing. In like manner, if a cause be
defined, that by which any thing exists; this is
liable to the same objection. For what is meant by
these words, by which? (EHU 8.25, fn. 19)

Here Hume seems to identify a relative idea similar to
Strawson’s: “that which produces anything” or “that by
which any thing exists” (ibid.). But he claims that the “by
which” — or Strawson’s “in virtue of” — relation is
meaningless, and thus one can’t form a relative idea of
thick causal power.
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Hume’s point in this passage echoes a criticism put
forward by Berkeley in connection with his discussion of
“notions.” With respect to material substance, Berkeley
writes:

But let us examine a little the received opinion. It
is said extension is a mode or accident of matter, and
that matter is a substratum that supports it. Now I
desire that you would explain what is meant by
matter’s supporting extension: say you, I have no idea
of matter, and therefore cannot explain it. I answer
that you have no positive idea, yet if you have any
meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea
of matter.10

Thus, it’s argued that Hume can’t admit a relative idea of
thick causation, because a relative idea is a “relation
without a relative,” and Hume denies any such relation in
the case of thick causal connections. This is a serious
objection that New Humeans – or at least those that rely on
a relative idea of causal power — haven’t adequately
addressed. I shall have more to say about this aspect in
Chapter Six.
In recent years, however, a new objection to the New
Hume interpretation has emerged in the literature. I turn
to this in the next section.

10

A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I, 16.
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Liberty and Necessity

In recent years, Peter Millican (2009) has put forward
an argument in defense of the Old Hume.11 His argument
relies on Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity — that
is, on Hume’s discussion surrounding the issue of free will.
In this section, I consider Millican’s argument.
Hume discusses the issue of free will at T 2.3.1, EHU
8, and briefly in the Abstract. For ease of exposition, I
will focus largely on the Enquiry. There are no noteworthy
differences between the three accounts.
Hume begins his discussion by noting that, in disputes
that have persisted for a long time, we should expect some
agreement on the meaning of our terms, and so be able to
“pass from words to the true and real subject of the
controversy” (EHU 8.1). He explains:

For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of
the terms employed in our reasoning, and make these
definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object
of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider
the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a
quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance
alone, that a controversy has long been kept a foot,
and remains still undecided, we may presume, that
11

Cf. Millican (2007).
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there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that
the disputants affix different ideas to the terms
employed in the controversy… [N]othing, one would
think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided,
but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the
antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from
grappling with each other. (ibid.)

Thus Hume claims that the dispute over free will has
persisted because the terms are ambiguous. The various
sides have been talking past one another.
But then Hume seems to make a contrary claim. He soon
claims that in fact we’re all “of the same opinion” on this
matter (EHU 8.2), and that the dispute has “hitherto turned
merely upon words” (EHU 8.3).

[A]ll mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always
been of the same opinion with regard to this subject,
and that few intelligible definitions would have
immediately put an end to the whole controversy…. I
hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have
ever agreed in the doctrines both of necessity and of
liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can
be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy
has hitherto turned merely upon words. (EHU 8.2-3)

Hume appears to be making contrary claims. First, he
seems to claim that disputants in this debate are talking
past one another; the words we employ are ambiguous. On the
other hand, Hume claims that we’re all “of the same opinion”
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on the matter (ibid.). But if the terms are ambiguous, how
can we all be of the same opinion? This is a problem that
needs to be addressed, but I won’t be in a position to do
so until Chapter Six.
Hume continues his discussion by noting what necessity
in nature is commonly thought to consist in.

It is universally allowed, that matter, in all its
operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that
every natural effect is so precisely determined by the
energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such
particular circumstances, could possible have resulted
from it. (EHU 8.4)

But he quickly observes that this isn’t the correct account
of necessity. Instead, he presents his regularity theory of
causation and his account of causal inference. In short,
Hume provides his two definitions of a cause. Thus, beyond
“the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the
consequent inference from one to the other, we have no
notion of any necessity, or connexions” (EHU 8.5).
Having done so, Hume spends a number of pages showing
how human volition satisfies these two definitions. Indeed,
he claims that everyone acknowledges that voluntary human
actions satisfy these two conditions. Thus he writes:
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It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great
uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations
and ages, and that human nature remains still the same,
in its principles and operations. The same motives
always produce the same actions: The same events
follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, selflove, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit;
these passions, mixed in various degrees, and
distributes through society, have been, from the
beginning of the world, and still are, the source of
all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been
observed among mankind. (EHU 8.7)12

His point is that everyone agrees that there’s a constant
conjunction between our motives and actions, and that these
constant conjunctions lead us to predict things about our
behavior and mental states. Thus, in addition to causation
in nature, there’s causation in human nature.
Despite this universal agreement that voluntary human
actions are necessary, Hume wonders why this hasn’t settled
the matter. He writes:

I have frequently considered, what could possibly be
the reason, why all mankind, though they have ever,
without hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine of
necessity, in their whole practice and reasoning, have
yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in
words, and have rather shown a propensity, in all ages,
to profess the contrary opinion. (EHU 8.21)
12

He presents his account of how voluntary human actions are explicable in terms of constant
conjunction at EHU 7-17, and how voluntary human actions ground a customary inference at EHU 17-20.
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In other words, despite the fact that everyone agrees
on the doctrine of necessity, Hume wonders why some have
argued against it. His explanation is that a stronger
conception of necessity has entrapped them — thick
necessity.

[M]en still entertain a strong propensity to believe,
that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature,
and perceive something like a necessary connexions
between the cause and the effect. When again they turn
their reflections towards the operations of their own
minds, and feel no such connexions of the motive and
the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there
is a difference between the effects, which result from
material force, and those which arise from thought and
intelligence. (ibid.)

In other words, Hume claims that since people associate
necessity with thick necessity, when they introspect and
find that they appear to have the power of contrary choice,
they claim that voluntary human actions aren’t governed by
necessities. Instead, they claim to be free.
But Hume then seeks to show that, in fact, advocates
of liberty actually have nothing else in mind than his own
account of causation in terms of constant conjunction and a
customary transition.
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[W]hat is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary
actions? We cannot surely mean, that actions have so
little connexions with motives, inclinations, and
circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain
degree of uniformity from the other, and that one
affords no inference by which we can conclude the
existence of the other. [T]hese are plain and
acknowledged matters of fact. (EHU 8.23)

In addition, he claims that the alternative to his view of
necessity is mere chance, and that no one thinks that
freedom consists in mere chance.13 Accordingly, he claims
that

all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of
liberty as well as in necessity, and that the whole
dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto
merely verbal. (ibid.)

This is Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity. He
claims, therefore, that the dispute is “merely verbal,” and
that in fact all have agreed that voluntary human actions
are just a matter of constant conjunction and a customary
transition of the mind.

13

Hume thus endorses compatibilism. He advocates for a “hypothetical liberty” (EHU 8.23) according to
which we are free if we can act on our wishes, so long as we’re “not a prisoner and in chains” (ibid.).
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Accordingly, Millican contends that Hume’s discussion
on this topic presents a problem for the New Hume
interpretation:

For the New Humean position is clearly that of Hume’s
opponent, who claims that there is something more to
“genuine necessity” than is captured by Hume’s two
definitions (namely an AP power or whatever). Hume
takes himself to have a quick and decisive answer to
this claim, in denying that there can be any such
conception. (2009: 698)

Thus Millican argues that, if the New Hume interpretation
is correct, then the debate over liberty and necessity
can’t be “merely verbal.” But Hume of course claims that it
is. So Hume doesn’t think that there’s any idea of thick
causation.

Thus Hume’s main argument concerning “liberty and
necessity” utterly explodes the New Humeans’ position.
For Hume is here denying exactly what they assert,
namely, that we can coherently ascribe to things some
kind of “upper-case” Causation or “thick” necessity
that goes beyond his two definitions. If we could
indeed do this, then his imagined opponent would be
able to ascribe that thick necessity to matter but not
to minds, and thus undermine Hume’s claim of
equivalence between the necessities of the two domains,
which is the entire point of his argument. (2009: 699)
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I concur with Millican that Hume’s discussion of free
will and necessity is problematic for the New Humeans. In
Chapter Six, I shall revisit the above issue.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I noted the main lines of discussion
surrounding our putative idea of thick causation. The
traditional interpretation is that Hume’s theory of ideas
has no room for such an idea, whereas more recently some
commentators have argued the opposite.
Most notable in this regard is Strawson, who claims
that Hume admits a relative idea of thick causation. In
this way Hume can refer to thick causal connections, the
nature of which we can’t adequately grasp. I presented
numerous objections to this view, and assessed them.
In addition, I presented Kail’s weaker version of
skeptical realism. And, finally, I discussed Hume on the
debate over liberty and necessity, and presented Millican’s
criticism of skeptical realism, which is based on Hume’s
discussion.
In the next chapter, I begin the journey toward a
solution to the nasty problem, and an overall assessment of

177
the New Hume debate. As we shall see, central to adequately
understanding Hume is an appreciation of the role of clear
and distinct perception in his thought.
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Chapter Five
Clear and Distinct Perception in Hume
Introduction

In Chapter One, we saw that Hume faces a nasty problem
relevant to his discussion of causation. We saw, for
instance, that Hume’s committed to our having and our
lacking an idea of thick causation. In this chapter, I
argue that a fully adequate answer to this problem requires
a proper grasp of the role of clear and distinct perception
in Hume’s philosophy.
It’s a striking fact that no one, no commentary on or
critic of Hume, addresses the role of clear and distinct
perception in his philosophy. At most one will find rare,
isolated remarks; remarks that merely intimate some latent
use of the distinction in Hume.1 Nonspecialists on Hume may
not find this surprising, as the notion of clear and
distinct perception seems as far removed from Hume as the
principle of utility is from the categorical imperative.
But my inclination is that this is more a matter of neglect
than ignorance, on the specialists’ part.

1

Examples include Galen Strawson (2014: xi), D. Tycerium Lightner (1997: 114), Daniel Flage (2007: 146),
and P. J. E. Kail (2003: 49). A more focused analysis is provided in Kenneth Winkler, “Causal Realism and
Hume’s Revisions in the Enquiry,” unpublished, particularly in relation to Hume’s growing dissatisfaction
with the obscurity of Locke. This list is by no means exhaustive.
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My aim in this chapter is to show the important role
that clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s
philosophy. I argue that Hume takes our impressions to be
clear and distinct, whereas our ideas are obscure and
confused. Hume’s modus operandi, moreover, is to render our
ideas clear and distinct by discerning the impressions from
which they’re copied. This interpretation, therefore,
attributes prime of place to Hume’s copy principle.
So characterized, Hume appears to reverse the
rationalist project proposed by Descartes. Descartes wants
to turn away from the senses (which he regards as obscure
and confused) and toward the ideas of the intellect (which
he considers to be clear and distinct). This contrast
between Hume and Descartes, however, is only partly
accurate. In the remainder of the chapter, I shall explain
the extent to which Hume rejects the project inaugurated by
Descartes: it may come as a surprise that Hume isn’t as far
off from Descartes as one might initially think. For these
reasons, I begin with Descartes.

Descartes’s Meditations
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Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy contains
six Meditations, each written from the perspective of a
fictional meditator. This work constitutes a nice summary
of Descartes’s overall project. Since Meditations I and II
are the most important for our purposes, I shall confine my
main line of discussion to them.
In Meditation I, the meditator begins by noting the
many falsehoods he’s believed since childhood. As a result,
he expresses his desire to place his beliefs on a stable,
indeed unshakeable, foundation, and so he adopts the method
of assuming everything to be false that isn’t known with
certainty. If a proposition can be doubted, he says, then
belief in it should be suspended (CSM II 12: AT VII 18). In
this way, the meditator hopes to find some indubitable
Archimedean starting point, upon which he can securely
hoist his subsequent beliefs (CSM II 16: AT VII 24).
In an effort to discern what can be known indubitably,
the meditator introduces three reasons for doubt. The first
reason for doubt is that “from time to time I have found
that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust
completely those who have deceived us even once” (CSM II
12: AT VII 18). It sometimes happens, for instance, that
when viewed at a distance, round buildings look square, or
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sticks look bent when submerged in water. Thus the fact
that the senses are fallible constitutes the meditator’s
first reason for doubt.
The meditator doesn’t think this form of skepticism
sweeps away large portions of his belief system, however.
For while the senses may deceive us occasionally “with
respect to objects which are very small or in the distance”
(ibid.), there are numerous instances in which doubt about
the senses doesn’t arise. Such examples include “that I am
here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown,
holding this piece of paper in my hands” (CSM II 13: AT VII
18). Only mad people would doubt such things, claims the
meditator, and “I would be thought equally mad if I took
anything from them [that is, mad people] as a model for
myself” (CSM II 13: AT VII 19). Thus, while the fallibility
of the senses provides some reason for doubt, such grounds
aren’t devastating.
This brings the meditator to his second and more
troublesome reason for doubt:

As if I were not a man who sleeps at night, and
regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as
madmen do when awake — indeed sometimes even more
improbable ones. How often, asleep at night, am I
convinced of just such familiar events — that I am
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here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire — when
in fact I am lying undressed in bed! […] As I think
about this more carefully, I see plainly that there
are never any sure signs by means of which being awake
can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is
that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only
reinforces the notion that I may be asleep. (ibid.)

While the first reason for doubt isn’t reason enough
to doubt that “I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by
the fire,” such claims don’t survive the Dream Argument.
There appears to be no criterion by which one can
distinguish dream-perceptions from wakeful-perceptions, and
so the meditator can’t be certain that he’s in his
dressing-gown, sitting by the fire.
But again, the doubt occasioned by the Dream Argument
has its limitations, for the meditator observes that “it
must be admitted that certain… simpler and more universal
things are real” (CSM II 14: AT VII 20). These simpler and
more general things include “arithmetic, geometry and other
subjects of this kind, which deal only with the simplest
and most general things, regardless of whether they really
exist in nature or not” (ibid.). Indeed, the meditator
holds that the simpler and more universal things are real
even in the midst of a dream. Thus a square has no more
than four sides, and two plus three equals five, “whether I
am awake or asleep” (ibid.).
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Consequently, the meditator has found a means of
escape from the skeptics initial two reasons for doubt. But
problems come to a head when the meditator considers the
third and most devastating ground for doubt:

[F]irmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing
opinion that there is an omnipotent God who made me
the kind of creature that I am. How do I know that he
has not brought it about that there is no earth, no
sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place,
while at the same time ensuring that all these things
appear to me to exist just as they do now? What is
more, since I sometimes believe that others go astray
in cases where they think they have the most perfect
knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I
add two and three or count the sides of a square, or
in some even simpler matter, if that is imaginable?
(CSM II 14: AT VII 21).

This third argument — the Deceiving God Argument —
challenges the credentials of what’s taken to be our most
secure and perfect knowledge. Not even mathematical
knowledge is immune from doubt. By the end of Meditation I,
then, the meditator has been reduced to a state of
indecision, uncertainty, and universal doubt.
Charles Larmore has observed that the skeptical
arguments introduced by Descartes in Meditation I aren’t
original to him, and that the significance of these
arguments has more to do with the “manner in which they are

184
deployed” (2006: 18). As he emphasizes, Descartes’s aim is
to place pressure on the contention that the senses are
sources of certainty and knowledge. According to Larmore
(2006: 19), Descartes’s aim is to challenge the
Aristotelian empiricism prevalent at the time, by showing
that it leads to skepticism; and thus it’s the Aristotelian
who is ultimately reduced to uncertainty.2
As evidence of this reading, consider that prior to
offering his three reasons for doubt, the meditator
observes that “[w]hatever I have up till now accepted as
most true I have acquired either from the senses or through
the senses” (CSM II 17: AT VII 18). In addition, in the
Synopsis that precedes Meditation I, Descartes writes that:

Although the usefulness of such extensive doubt is not
apparent at first sight, its greatest benefit lies in
freeing us from all our preconceived opinions, and
providing the easiest route by which the mind may be
led away from the senses. (CSM II 9: AT VII 12)

Thus Descartes believes that the senses distract the
mind from attaining truth and certainty, and thus the aim
of his method of doubt is to force his readers away from

2

Larmore (2006: 19) cites Aristotle’s De Anima, “[S]ince no one can ever learn anything without the use of
perception, it is necessary even in speculative thought to have some mental image to contemplate”
(432a7). It’s just such reliance on sense perception that Descartes takes issue with.
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the senses. In addition, and while Larmore doesn’t make
this explicit, it’s clear that Descartes more generally
intends to stop us from relying on images, whether they are
presented via sensation or the imagination.3
Having done so, Descartes proceeds in Meditation II to
show how certainty and knowledge can be attained. This is
achieved via the perceptions of the intellect. Thus,
famously, Descartes writes:

I have convinced myself that there is absolutely
nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no
bodies. Does it not follow that I too do not exist?
No: if I convinced myself of something then I
certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme
power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly
deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if
he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as
he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing
so long as I think that I am something. So after
considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally
conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or
conceived in my mind. (CSM II 17: AT VII 25)

The meditator claims, therefore, that he clearly and
distinctly perceives his own existence — that is, he
clearly and distinctly perceives that he’s a thinking thing.

3

This explains, for instance, the purpose of Descartes’s Dream and Deceiving God Arguments. Descartes’s
turn away from the imagination is of course significant in light of Hume’s later use of the imagination.
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Accordingly, Descartes initiates a line of rationalist
thought (in the early period) that privileges the
perceptions of the intellect over the perceptions of the
senses and the imagination. For Descartes, clear and
distinct perceptions are provided by the intellect, whereas
the ideas of the senses and the imagination are obscure and
confused. Consider, in light of this, the meditator’s
discussion of a piece of wax in Meditation II.
The meditator has us “consider the things which people
commonly think they understand most distinctly of all,”
namely “the bodies which we touch and see” (CSM II 20: AT
VII 30). In the case of a piece of wax, we perceive its
color, shape, and smell, alongside its other sensible
properties, and falsely take ourselves to be perceiving
these clearly and distinctly. When the wax is moved towards
the fire and begins to melt, however, its color, shape, and
smell begin to change. Nonetheless, we still regard the
melted wax as the same piece of wax, and thus hold that the
wax must not be identical to any of its sensible properties.
The conclusion that the meditator draws from this simple
example is the following:

[T]he perception I have of it is a case not of vision
or touch or imagination — nor has it ever been,

187
despite previous appearances — but of purely mental
scrutiny; and this can be imperfect or confused, as it
was before, or clear and distinct as it is now,
depending on how carefully I concentrate on what wax
consists in. (CSM II 21: AT VII 31)

Thus Descartes privileges the intellect over the
senses and the imagination. The latter, of course, serve
their respective roles for Descartes, but in the main it’s
the intellect that furnishes clear and distinct perceptions.
As we shall see soon, however, Hume dispenses with the
intellect as a faculty of the mind, and instead claims that
clarity and distinctness reside in the senses.
However, while it’s clear that Descartes believes that
the senses generate confused and obscure perceptions and
that the intellect provides clear and distinct perceptions,
we haven’t yet discussed what clarity and distinctness are
for Descartes. I address this question in the next section.

Clear and Distinct Perception in Descartes

The only definition of clear and distinct perception
that Descartes offers is presented in his Principles of
Philosophy.
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I call a perception “clear” when it is present and
accessible to the attentive mind — just as we say that
we see something clearly when it is present to the
eye’s gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree
of strength and accessibility. I call a perception
“distinct” if, as well as being clear, it is so
sharply separated from all other perceptions that it
contains within itself only what is clear. (CSM I 2079: AT IIIA 22)

In other words, a perception is clear just in case it’s
“present and accessible to the attentive mind,” and
distinct just in case it’s (a) clear and (b) “sharply
separated” from all other perceptions. It follows, then,
that while distinctness entails clarity, clarity doesn’t
entail distinctness.4
As an example of a clear but confused perception,
Descartes provides the following case:

[W]hen someone feels an intense pain, the perception
he has of it is indeed very clear, but is not always
distinct. For people commonly confuse this perception
with an obscure judgment they make concerning the
nature of something which they think exists in the
painful spot and which they suppose to resemble the
sensation of pain; but in fact it is the sensation
alone which they perceive clearly. Hence a perception
can be clear without being distinct, but not distinct
without being clear. (CSM I 208: AT VIIIA 22)

4

Perceptions which aren’t clear are obscure, and perceptions which aren’t distinct are confused.
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In this case, one’s perception of pain is clear, but when
one judges it (or supposes it) as existing in the body, its
confused.
While Descartes presents this helpful example to
illustrate distinctness, his discussion of clarity is, so
to speak, less than clear. In the Fifth Set of Objections,
for instance, Gassendi argues that Descartes lacks a
suitable criterion for distinguishing clear and distinct
ideas from those that only appear to be clear and distinct.
Descartes admitted, after all, that there was a time when
he regarded sensory ideas to be clear and distinct, when in
fact they weren’t.
James Humber (1989), however, has convincingly argued
that Descartes’s criterion of clear and distinct perception
is none other than his method for producing such
perceptions.5 In Meditation II and The Search for Truth, for
instance, Descartes seeks to get clear on what the term “I”
denotes. His initial response in both works is that “I”
denotes a man, but he then contends that this answer is
obscure. Moreover, Descartes claims that the obscurity of
this answer stems from an inattentive mind. But a clear
perception, Descartes explicitly states, is one that’s
5

This is plausible in light of the fact that Descartes was preoccupied with the importance of method. See
his Rules for the Direction of the Mind and Discourse on Method.
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present and accessible to an attentive mind. And again, in
The Search for Truth, Eudoxus asks Polyander what he is,
and Polyander replies that he’s a man. Eudoxus, however,
responds:

You are not paying attention to my question, and the
reply you give me, however simple it may seem to you,
would plunge you into very difficult and complicated
problems, were I to press you even a little. If, for
example, I were to ask even Epistemon himself what a
man is, and he gave the stock reply of the scholastics,
that a man is a “rational animal,” and if, in order to
explain these two terms (which are just as obscure as
the former), he were to take us further, through all
the levels which are called “metaphysical,” we should
be dragged into a maze from which it would be
impossible to escape. (CSM II 410: AT X 515-6)6

Thus, to say that “I” denotes a man, or to provide the
answer of “rational animal” to the question, “What is man?”
is to give the “stock reply of the scholastics.” Such
responses, Descartes says, drag us into a philosophical
maze, one that’s “impossible to escape.” In short, Eudoxus
(and by implication Descartes) is arguing that the standard
response of the scholastics isn’t conducive to ascertaining
the truth; indeed, Eudoxus thinks it prevents us from
attaining that end.7

6
7

Emphasis mine.
The importance of discerning new truths was discussed in Chapter Two.
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Accordingly, an attentive mind is a mind that doesn’t
give the conditioned response, but rather considers and
attends to the content of one’s ideas. As Humber (1989:
488) notes, Polyander is inattentive because he’s attending
solely to the words or terms, and not to the meanings of
such terms. His response is thus superficial, for “when
Polyander says that he is a man he is not thinking about
what he is saying, i.e., he is not paying attention to
content. Rather, he is merely hearing words and responding
as he had been trained from youth to reply” (ibid). Since
Polyander has no clear understanding of what he’s saying,
he can have no assurance that what he’s claiming is true.
As Descartes puts it:

[B]ecause of the use of language, we tie all our
concepts to the words used to express them; and when
we store the concepts in our memory we always
simultaneously store the corresponding words. Later on
we find the words easier to recall than the things;
and because of this it is very seldom that our concept
of a thing is so distinct that we can separate it
totally from our concept of the words involved. The
thoughts of almost all people are more concerned with
words than with things; and as a result people very
often give their assent to words they do not
understand, thinking they once understood them, or
that they got them from others who did understand them
correctly…. [W]hat has been said appears to be
sufficiently intelligible to help us distinguish those
of our concepts which are clear and distinct from
those which are obscure and confused. (CSM I 221: AT
VIIIA 38)
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For Descartes, then, an attentive mind is a mind that
attends to its ideas, and not merely to the words that are
employed.
This, in fact, is a recurrent theme among early modern
philosophers. Berkeley, for instance, frequently emphasizes
the distracting nature of words. He writes:

Unless we take care to clear the first principles of
knowledge, from the embarrass and delusion of words,
we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no
purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences,
and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall
only lose our selves the more irrecoverably, and be
the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes.
Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets,
I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own
thinking, and endeavor to attain the same train of
thoughts in reading, that I had in writing them. By
this means it will be easy for him to discover the
truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all
danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see
how he can be led into an error by considering his own
naked, undisguised ideas.8

Thus Berkeley, like Descartes, warns us of the danger of
words, and calls us to consider our own “naked” ideas.
In sum, Descartes claims that perceptions are clear to
the extent that they are present and accessible to the

8

Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction 25.
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attentive mind — in other words, the ideas are perspicuous
to those who aren’t led astray by the words associated with
them. In the next section I indicate the importance of this
notion for Hume.

Hume’s Microscope of the Moral Sciences

In the previous two sections, I indicated the role
that clear and distinct perception plays in Descartes’s
philosophy. In this section, I indicate the important role
that clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s
philosophy.
In order to make clear that the notion is of moment in
Hume, I turn to his conceivability principle. Hume
sometimes states this principle in a loose way, and
sometimes in a rigorous way. Thus, at one point, he
describes it as follows: “whatever we can imagine, is
possible” (T 1.4.6.35). It’s important to recognize,
however, that this is a loose formulation of the
conceivability principle. When Hume states it more
rigorously, he explicitly applies it only to clear and
distinct perceptions.
Consider a more rigorous formulation of the principle:
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“’Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that
whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea
of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing
we imagine is absolutely impossible.” (T 1.2.2.8)

In this formulation, Hume limits the scope of the principle
to clear perceptions: everything that’s clearly conceivable
is possible. This, however, isn’t his final word on the
principle. He soon further qualifies it, adding a condition
of distinctness. I take the following to be his settled
account: “Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct
idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence” (T
1.2.4.11).9
These different formulations of his conceivability
principle indicate that Hume sometimes writes loosely, and
that in the background is the caveat that his principle
applies only to clear and distinct perceptions. It’s
important to keep this in mind, for Hume doesn’t always
state his views as rigorously as a referee of a journal of
philosophy in the twenty-first century would insist on.10

9

Hume even extends this principle to manners of perception: “Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist;
and whatever is clearly conceiv’d, after any manner, may exist after the same manner. This is one
principle, which has been already acknowledg’d” (T 1.4.5.5).
10
Hume also sometimes uses terms that are synonymous with “clear” and “distinct,” but which aren’t
always recognized as such. In this he’s following Locke. For instance, Locke uses words like “exact,”
“precise,” or “determinate” to indicate that a perception is clear and distinct. In his Epistle to the Reader
(added to the fourth edition of his Essay concerning Human Understanding), Locke’s explicit that his use
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There is clear evidence, then, that Hume recognizes
and employs the concept of clear and distinct perception.
But how central is the notion to his project? In order to
guage its importance for Hume, the Introduction to the
Treatise needs to be considered.
Hume opens the Introduction by noting the “present
imperfect condition of the sciences” (T Intro. 2). Indeed,
even a casual observer “may judge from the noise and
clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within”
(ibid.). Thus Hume claims that the present state of
philosophy is in disarray. He offers a litany of charges
against the status quo.

Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely
deduc’d from them, want of coherence in the parts, and
of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be
met with in the systems of the most eminent
philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon
philosophy itself…. There is nothing which is not the
subject of debate, and in which men of learning are
not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question
escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous
we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes
are multiply’d, as if every thing was uncertain; and
these disputes are manag’d with the greatest warmth,
as if every thing was certain. (T Intro. 1-2)

of “determinate” is synonymous with “clear and distinct.” Hume, too, often uses terms like “exact,”
“precise,” and “determinate.” It’s not clear whether he always uses these as synonyms of “clear and
distinct,” but at times he seems to.
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Hume echoes this assessment in the first Enquiry. In
its very first section, for instance, he contrasts an
“abstruse” or speculative kind of philosophy with a more
practical and down-to-earth kind of philosophy. His aim in
the section is to discern whether it’s worth the time to
pursue more speculative philosophy. He notes that many
people decry the speculative philosophy because it’s
“painful and fatiguing” (EHU 1.10); indeed, it’s painful
and fatiguing because it’s immersed in obscurity. Hume
explains that the “chief obstacle, therefore, to our
improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the
obscurity of the ideas, and the ambiguity of the terms”
(EHU 7.2). Elsewhere, Hume claims that “moral ideas are apt,
without extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion”
(EHU 7.2),11 and that “[f]ew men can think long without
running into a confusion of ideas, and mistaking one for
another” (EHU 9.5, fn. 20). His aim, therefore, is “to
bring light from obscurity” (EHU 1.10).
Hume then opens the Enquiry by noting that the aim of
his project is to bring clarity to our metaphysical
discourse. In addition, for Hume, the most obscure and
uncertain of concepts in metaphysics is our idea of
causation. Thus, he writes:
11

By “moral ideas” Hume means ideas about moral beings, such as human beings.
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There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more
obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force,
energy, or necessary connection, of which it is every
moment necessary for us to treat in all our
disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this
section, to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of
these terms, and thereby remove some part of that
obscurity, which is so much complained of in this
species of philosophy. (EHU 7.3)12

Since the idea of causal power is obscure, the meaning of
the term must be more precisely determined. But the meaning
of a word is supplied by its associated idea, and thus to
render “causation” more precise is to more clearly perceive
the associated idea. In addition, Hume suggests that
there’s a division between two kinds of meaning: precise
and imprecise meaning. As we shall see, Hume also calls
this distinct or indistinct meaning, depending on the
distinctness of the associated idea.
How, then, is this to be done? How are we to render
our meaning more precise? Just as the new concepts and
instruments of science employed by Newton enables advances
in the realm of the natural world, the empirical realm, so
new conceptual instruments and principles employed by Hume
can be used with the aim of making advances in the newfound

12

This “species” of philosophy, of course, is the speculative philosophy mentioned at EHU 1.
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science of human nature. What Hume calls his “microscope of
the moral sciences” is simply his copy principle, and Hume
claims that this principle can help render our ideas clear
and distinct.

[W]hen we have pushed up definitions to the most
simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and
obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By
what invention can we throw light upon these ideas,
and render them altogether precise and determinate to
our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or
original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied.
These impressions are all strong and sensible. They
admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a
full light themselves, but may throw light on their
correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by
this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope
or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences,
the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so
enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension,
and be equally known with the grossest and most
sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry.
(EHU 7.4; cf. EHU 2.9 and EHU 8.25)

By applying his “microscope” to obscure ideas, we can more
clearly and distinctly discern their exact nature. In other
words, progress can be made.
In the background here is Hume’s belief that
impressions are all clear and distinct, whereas ideas are
“naturally faint and obscure” (EHU 2.9). But, since ideas
are copies of impressions, if we apply the microscope and
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discern their origin in experience, we can render our ideas
clear and distinct.
Thus, “since all impressions are clear and precise,
the ideas, which are copy’d from them, must be of the same
nature, and can never but from our fault, contain any thing
so dark and intricate” (T 1.3.1.7). Indeed, “[t]he
examination of the impression bestows a like clearness on
the idea; and the examination of the idea bestows a like
clearness on all our reasoning” (T 1.3.2.4). This is the
basis of Hume’s methodology in a nutshell.
So not only does Hume have a role for the notion of
clear and distinct perception in his thought, it’s central
to his most pivotal empiricist principle: the copy
principle. In the next section, I indicate how the role of
clear and distinct perception helps us understand his test
for meaning.

Impression Hunts

In Chapter One it was noted that Hume’s meaningempiricism — the view that the meaning of a term is its
associated idea, which is grounded in experience — led to
Hume’s well-known test for meaning:
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When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a
philosophical term is employed without any meaning or
idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire,
from what impression is that supposed idea derived?
(EHU 2.21)

Hume claims here that the way to tell whether a word
lacks an associated idea is to determine whether it has an
associated impression. In other words, in order to know
whether some term has an associated idea, we need to go on
an impression hunt.
The notion of clear and distinct perception can help
us grasp the nature of these impression hunts. Consider,
for example, Hume’s impression hunt for our idea of
necessary connection. In general, commentators have
understood an impression hunt as an examination of the
contexts in which the associated term’s employed. These
contexts constitute “neighboring fields.” Thus Hume
considers the causal maxim and causal inference, because,
as far as “necessary connection” is concerned, they reside
in neighboring fields.
This procedure is as fine as it goes, but Hume needn’t
regard an impression hunt as restricted to contexts in
which the word is used. Since Hume recognizes and employs a
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clear and distinct/obscure and confused perception
distinction, we can also understand impression hunts as
informed with this distinction. In short, if for some word
we have an obscure or confused idea of its meaning, our
obscure or confused idea serves as our analysandum, and the
impression hunt aims to reduce this obscurity and confusion.
The impression hunts help to more clearly understand and
demarcate the concept.
As an example, consider Hume’s discussion of substance.
Locke, as we’ve seen, admitted a relative idea of substancet.
But he also held that substancet was something “we know not
what”13 and of which “we have no clear” or “distinct Idea.”14
At most, we have only an “obscure and relative Idea of
Substance in general.”15 Hume’s view is similar. He notes
that philosophers who believe in the existence of substancet
deny that it’s a color, or a sound, or a taste, and so on.
But they must have some idea of what a substancet is. Hume’s
point isn’t to deny an idea of substancet. His point is to
claim that the only distinct idea of substance is an idea
of substanceb.
Some commentators have suggested that Hume must have
some “bare” idea of necessary connection, one that serves
13

An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xxiii.2.
Ibid., II.xxiii.4.
15
Ibid., II.xxiii.3.
14
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as the object of his polemic. Janet Broughton (2007), for
instance, claims that Hume admits a bare idea of necessary
connection — which isn’t identical to the thin idea of
necessary connection that he settles on — which is the aim
of all of our studies. She cites this passage from Hume:

We wou’d not willingly stop before we are acquainted
with that energy in the cause, by which it operates on
its effect; that tie, which connects them together;
and that efficacious quality, on which the tie depends.
This is our aim in all our studies and reflections… (T
1.4.7.5)

Based on such remarks, Broughton claims that Hume admits an
idea of thick causation. It’s this idea that serves as his
philosophical target. Likewise Peter Kail observes that
“Hume’s negative arguments… actually imply a certain anemic
grasp of causal powers” (2007: xxxiii).
The point to observe is that the clear and
distinct/obscure and confused perception distinction can
help us make sense of these claims. Hume wishes to render
our obscure and confused ideas clear and distinct.

Complicating the Picture
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In the previous section, I argued that Hume puts clear
and distinct perception to considerable use. Impressions —
which are our sensations, passions, and emotions — are
clear and distinct; and our ideas are rendered clear and
distinct by discerning the impressions from which they’re
copied. In this way, Hume reverses the rationalist project
of Descartes, who held that the ideas of the intellect
provide clear and distinct perceptions, whereas the senses
provide obscure and confused perceptions.
However, this characterization is too simplistic.16 As
it happens, Descartes has a place for clear and distinct
sensations, and in this respect Hume isn’t as far removed
from Descartes as one might think.
Marleen Rozemund (2006), for instance, contends that
Descartes both broadens and narrows the conception of the
mind prevalent in the Aristotelianism of his time.
According to Rozemund, the scholastics believed that the
intellect and the will alone belong to the soul or mind,
and that the senses and the imagination inhere in the soulbody composite (2006: 50). In support of this, consider
this passage from Aquinas:

16

See Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1992: 371) for a similar point.
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Certain powers are related to the soul alone as their
subject, such as the intellect and the will. And such
powers necessarily remain in the soul when the body is
destroyed. But other powers inhere in the composite as
their subject, such as all the powers of the sensitive
and nutritive parts.17

Thus, for Aquinas, only the intellect and the will
properly belong to the soul alone, whereas the sensitive
and the nutritive powers reside in the composite of body
and soul. Aquinas, of course, is working with the
Aristotelian conception of the soul as consisting of three
“parts.” “The soul,” Rozemund explains, is the principle of
life, and life is manifested in a range of activities:
nutrition and growth in plants; in animals, also motion and
sense perception; in humans, intellectual activity and will”
(2006: 49).
There are times at which Descartes seems to embrace
this conception. In Meditation II, the meditator emerges
from doubt by identifying himself with his intellect, and
explicitly omits nutrition, movement, the imagination, and
sensation as features of the mental. For instance, the
meditator writes:

17

Summa Theologicae, I.77.8.
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Nutrition or movement? But I do not now have a body,
these things are nothing but imaginings. Sensation?
This also does not happen without a body, and I seem
to sense many things in dreams that later I notice I
did not really sense. Thinking? I have found it: it is
thinking; this alone cannot be taken away from me. I
am, I exist, that is certain. But for how long? For as
long as I think, for certainly it could happen that if
I cease to think, I thereby entirely cease to be. I
now do not admit anything unless it is necessarily
true; I am then strictly speaking only a thinking
thing, that is, a mind, spirit, intellect or reason,
words whose meaning was previously unknown to me. I am
real thing, and really exist, but what of kind thing?
I have said it, a thinking thing. (CSM II 18: AT VII
27)

While it’s tempting to interpret Descartes’s claim that
he’s a thinking thing “in light of the broad list of mental
states that includes sense perception and imagination,” in
fact the meditator only identifies himself with “the
intellectual aspect of the scholastic soul” (2006: 51).
Accordingly, Descartes seems to concede the better part of
the scholastic conception, claiming that he is only an
intellect; sensation, imagination, nutrition, movement,
etc., are all features of the body.
But matters become more complicated once we recognize
Descartes’s broadening of the scholastic picture. For while
sensations, imagination, movement, etc., aren’t mental for
Descartes, he soon backpedals:
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But I am also the same who imagines; for although
perhaps, as I have supposed, no imagined things are at
all real, the very power of imagination does, however,
really exist and is part of my thinking. And again I
am the same who senses, or who notices corporeal
things as if through the senses; for instance, I see
light, I hear noise, I feel heat. These things are
false, for I am asleep. But certain I seem to see,
hear, become warm. This cannot be false, and this
properly what is called sensing in me, and this
strictly speaking is nothing other than thinking. (CSM
II 19: AT VII 29)

It seems, then, that Descartes does include the senses and
the imagination as features of the mind. Indeed, a mind for
Descartes is a res cogitans, a thing that thinks. But
elsewhere Descartes defines thought as “everything that is
in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it.
Thus all operations of the will, intellect, imagination,
and the senses are thoughts” (CSM II 113: AT VII 160). In
this passage, Descartes includes the senses and the
imagination as features of mind, in addition to the will
and the intellect. Properly speaking, then, sensation
involves the ideas I have of seeming to see, or hear, or
feel, etc. What I seem to see may be false — the object may
not exist — for I may be dreaming, but I still sense.
Moreover, Descartes claims that these ideas are clear and
distinct.
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How can we make sense of this? On one hand, I’ve
claimed that Descartes takes the senses to be confused, and
indeed this is the standard interpretation of his view:
Meditation I is intended to take us away from the senses.
On the other hand, Descartes claims that, properly speaking,
the senses are clear and distinct. The resolution requires
that we recognize that Descartes introduces three “grades”
of sensation.

If we are to get a clear view of what sort of
certainty attaches to the senses, we must distinguish
three grades of sensory response. The first is limited
to the immediate stimulation of the bodily organs by
external objects; this can consist in nothing but the
motion of particles of the organs, and any change of
shape and position resulting from this motion. The
second grade comprises all the immediate effects
produced in the mind as a result of its being united
with a bodily organ which is affected in this way.
Such effects include the perceptions of pain, pleasure,
thirst, hunger, colours, sounds, taste, smell, heat,
cold and the like, which arise from the union and as
it were the intermingling of mind and body… The third
grade includes all the judgments about things outside
us which we have been accustomed to make from our
earliest years — judgments which are occasioned by the
movements of these bodily organs. (CSM II 294-5: AT
VII 437)

The second grade concerns the union of soul and body. It
therefore has a mental and a physical part. The mental
counterpart of this union includes the seemings mentioned
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above, and this is sensation properly speaking. It’s this
grade of sensation that Descartes regards as clear and
distinct.
Confusion only emerges in grade three. In short, it’s
not the seemings that are confused, but rather the third
grade that introduces the possibility of confusion. Sensory
perceptions are confused because they’re being intermingled
with body. Thus, for instance, Descartes writes that
“sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing
but confused modes of thinking which arise from the union
and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body”
(CSM II 56: AT VII 81:”).
Back to Hume: Hume doesn’t totally upend Descartes,
but merely abstains from any discussion of the causes of
our impressions. In essence, Hume begins with the mental
aspect of Descartes’s second grade — the senses proper. But
Descartes thinks these are clear and distinct no less than
Hume, for confusion emerges only when we make a judgment.
For Descartes, the confusion and error is first and
foremost applicable to common empirical judgments, such as
“that’s a cat.” For Hume, the confusion and error is first
and foremost applicable to metaphysical judgments, or how
they “infect” common empirical judgments. Thus, Descartes
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would agree that what Hume characterizes as “impressions”
are, in fact, clear and distinct.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I indicated that Hume takes
impressions to be clear and distinct, and that ideas can be
rendered clear and distinct by discerning the impressions
from which they’re copied. Hume’s copy principle is the
basis of the latter claim. And, in fact, the copy principle
is Hume’s microscope; it’s the means by which we can make
progress in the moral sciences and thus elucidate the
nature of our knowledge about the world and ourselves.
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Chapter Six
The Real Hume
Introduction

In Chapter One, we saw that Hume’s seemingly committed
to a contradiction, that we both have and lack an idea of
thick causation. In addition, New Humeans claim that Hume
has room within his theory of ideas for an idea of thick
causation, whereas Old Humeans contest this claim. In this
chapter, I show how Hume isn’t committed to a contradiction,
and why the skeptical realist interpretation is incorrect.
To recap, thick causation involves a causal connection
between cause and effect that has the AP property; that is,
a property such that, one can infer the effect from the
cause, a priori. Hume, as we’ve seen, denies that we have
any impression-based source for this idea. In this chapter,
I analyze Hume’s discussion of our causal talk, in order to
discern what Hume takes us to be thinking about when we
putatively speak about thick causation. This will help us
solve the nasty problem and see whether the New Humean
interpretation is viable.
I shall argue that Hume provides — whether implicitly
or explicitly — three accounts of the ideas we employ when
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putatively speaking about thick causation. In the course of
doing so, I indicate how the notion of clear and distinct
perception factors into these three accounts.
It may prove helpful, however, to give a broad outline
of what these three accounts are. Hume’s first account of
what we’re thinking about when we are putatively thinking
about thick causation is an obscure perception of the words
that factor into our causal talk.1 In contrast, his second
and third accounts involve confused perceptions. In general,
Hume claims that we mistakenly project our idea of the felt
determination of the mind onto objects. In this case, when
one speaks about a cause determining its effect, one
misunderstands one’s meaning in saying so. Finally, Hume
claims that we’re involved in confusion when we conceive of
the relation of causation as a relation between ideas.

First Account: Words

Hume’s initial account hasn’t received much, if any,
attention. It’s an extremely interesting account, and it
can help us solve a number of interpretative problems.

1

I hope it goes without saying that my interest isn’t solely with causal speech. I’m using “causal talk”
loosely, as Hume’s interest is in causal thought more generally.
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When considering the nature of our causal talk, Hume
writes:

Thus upon the whole we may infer, that when we talk of
any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature,
as endow’d with a power or force, proportion’d to any
effect; when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt
objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon
an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects
are endow’d; in all these expressions, so apply’d, we
have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of
common words, without any clear and determinate ideas.
(T 1.3.14.14)

In this well-known passage, Hume claims that when we talk
about an object as endowed with a power or force, we (i)
“have really no distinct meaning,” (ii) “make use only of
common words,” and (iii) do so without “any clear and
determinate ideas” (ibid.). This, I hope, sounds familiar.
In the previous chapter it was noted that for
Descartes, a perception is clear and distinct when it’s
perceived by an attentive mind; and that an attentive mind
is a mind that attends to its ideas rather than to the
words it employs. Thus, in the Search for Truth, Eudoxus
asks Polyander what he is, and Polyander answers that he’s
a man. But Eudoxus responds that this is merely to “assent
to words,” as it’s “very seldom that our concept of a thing
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is so distinct that we can separate it totally from the
concept of the words involved” (CSM I 221: AT VIIIA 38).
Hume’s making a similar claim at T 1.3.14.14. He’s
claiming that when people attribute some power to an object,
they’re often merely making use of “common words,” words
without any associated ideas. He mentions, for instance, a
number of cases in which we think we have an idea
associated with a word, but in fact are merely substituting
a synonymous word:

I begin with observing that the terms efficacy, agency,
power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and
productive quality, are all nearly synonymous; and
therefore ‘tis an absurdity to employ any of them in
defining the rest. By this observation we reject at
once all the vulgar definitions, which philosophers
have given of power and efficacy; and instead of
searching for an idea in these definitions, must look
for it in impressions, from which it is originally
deriv’d. (T 1.3.14.4)2

In this passage, Hume clearly claims that many people
— philosophers among them — don’t explain or clarify their
terms, but merely redefine them by means of synonymous
terms. It’s no use searching for the idea of necessary
connection “in these definitions” (ibid.), for there’s no
idea there to be had.
2

Hume charges Locke with making this mistake (T 1.3.14.5).
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Consider, in light of this, Hume’s remarks:

The “By Which” Passage (BWP)
Thus, if a cause be defined, that which produces any
thing; it is easy to observe, that producing is
synonymous to causing. In like manner, if a cause be
defined, that by which any thing exists; this is
liable to the same objection. For what is meant by
these words, by which? (EHU 8.25, fn. 19)

and

Shou’d any one… pretend to define a cause, by saying
it is something productive of another, ‘tis evident he
wou’d say nothing. For what does he mean by
production? Can he give any definition of it, that
will not be the same with that of causation? If he
can; I desire it may be produc’d. If he cannot; he
here runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term
instead of a definition. (T 1.3.2.10)

Thus Hume claims that, when people speak of a cause as
endowed with a power, they’re saying something without any
content — they repeat the words without knowing that they
lack associated ideas. In Descartes’s terms, they do so
inattentively.
This creates a problem for New Hume interpretations
that depend upon relative ideas. Unless we can have some
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impression-based idea of the relation, Hume would consider
the idea to be inattentive and preoccupied with words. Thus
when Strawson contends thick causal connections are “that
in virtue of which reality is regular in the way that it
is,” he must have impression-based source for the “in
virtue of” relation, or else his words are meaningless. And
it’s just such an impression-based source that his words
seem to lack.
Accordingly, Hume’s initial account of causal talk
seems to suggest that it is empty because merely circular
verbiage. So as to illustrate Hume’s first account of
causal talk, consider the following example:

K: The moon has the power to move the tides.

Suppose that someone defines the word “power,” in K, in the
following manner:

L: “Power” is that by which the movement of the tides
is constantly conjoined with the location of the moon.
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This provides a synonymous definition of the term “power,”
as suggested by BWP. But does it give “power” a meaning?
The answer is no. The first thing to note is that Hume
frequently makes claims on the order of: “we have no idea
of connexion or power at all,” and that “power” and “energy”
are words “absolutely without any meaning” (EHU 7.26). The
way to read Hume — at least at this stage of the argument —
is to note that Hume admits that one can have an idea of K.
K is a complex idea that contains one’s idea of the moon,
one’s idea of the tides, and one’s idea of motion, etc., as
component ideas.
However, Hume also claims that a component idea that
factors into K is the word “power,” and not an idea simply
annexed to this word. Thus we can have an idea of K — an
idea which contains what people take to be an idea of thick
causation — but it’s an obscure idea, because it depends
merely upon one’s idea of a word. This isn’t an idea of
thick causation — one doesn’t, for instance, conceive the
effect following a priori from the cause. It’s nothing more
than an obscure idea of what one takes to be thick
causation. Thus, when Hume claims that “we have no idea of
power at all,” and that “these words are absolutely without
any meaning” (EHU 7.26), he’s claiming that we have no
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impression-based idea associated with the word “power,” not
that we lack an idea of K.
This discussion also helps us see why Hume considers
the debate over liberty and necessity to be “merely verbal.”
Hume’s point is that proponents of necessity and proponents
of liberty have the very same ideas of both necessity and
liberty, and thus they agree. In short, the only idea of
necessity and liberty that both camps can clearly and
distinctly conceive — and which both camps recognize in
their “practice and reasoning” (EHU 8.21) — is one which
resolves the dispute between those who affirm and those who
deny freedom. Thus, they “dissent to [this] in words only,
not in their real sentiment,” and consequently merely show
“a reluctance to acknowledge it in words” (ibid.).
Accordingly, as far as causation is concerned, Hume’s
first account of what we take to be our idea of thick
causation is an obscure perception of words rather than
content. Once we apply Hume’s microscope of the moral
sciences and attend to our ideas, we clearly and distinctly
perceive that we have no idea of power.
While Hume clearly believes that such obscurity
sometimes affects our causal talk, he doesn’t believe that
pointing out such obscurity solves all the problems. In
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other words, he doesn’t believe that the word “power” is
actually meaningless. This takes us to his second account
of our causal talk.

Second Account: Projection

Hume has thus far argued that people sometimes employ
words without any meaning, and thus only obscurely take
themselves to conceive of thick causation. Having noted as
much, he moves on to what he thinks is a more common
problem.

But as ’tis more probable, that these expressions do
here lose their true meaning by being wrong apply’d,
than that they never have any meaning; ’twill be
proper to bestow another consideration on this subject,
to see if possibly we can discover the nature and
origin of those ideas, we annex to them. (T 1.3.14.14)

Here, Hume seems to admit that we do mean something by
“power,” but he believes that this meaning is “wrongly
applied,” basically, misunderstood. We think we mean one
thing when we really mean another. In other words, Hume
thinks that our idea is confused.
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Here again there’s a parallel with Descartes. Recall
that Descartes, when providing an example of a clear but
confused idea, notes that

[W]hen someone feels an intense pain, the perception
he has of it is indeed very clear, but is not always
distinct. For people commonly confuse this perception
with an obscure judgment they make concerning the
nature of something which they think exists in the
painful spot and which they suppose to resemble the
sensation of pain; but in fact it is the sensation
alone which they perceive clearly. Hence a perception
can be clear without being distinct, but not distinct
without being clear. (CSM I 208: AT VIIIA 22)

Hume’s projective account of causation — in which we “gild
and stain” natural objects with “the colours borrowed from
internal sentiment” (EPM Appendix 1, 19)3 — is very similar
to the kind of account that Descartes offers in this
passage.
Descartes claims that we clearly perceive the nature
of pain, but that we perceive it in a confused way when we
apply or attribute it to body. Similarly, Hume claims that
we clearly perceive the nature of power — as the internal
impression or determination of the mind — but that we
perceive it in a confused way because we wrongly apply it
to natural objects. This, says Hume, is a confused idea of
3

“EPM” refers to An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and the number indicates the paragraph.
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power. The extent of the error is brought out forcefully in
the following passage:

[T]he case is here much the same, as if a blind man
shou’d pretend to find a great many absurdities in the
supposition, that the colour of scarlet is not the
same with the sound of a trumpet, nor light the same
with solidity. If we have really no idea of power or
efficacy in any object, or of any real connexions
betwixt causes and effects, ‘twill be to little
purpose to prove, that an efficacy is necessary in all
operations. We do not understand our meaning in
talking so, but ignorantly confound ideas, which are
entirely distinct from each other… [W]hen, instead of
meaning these unknown qualities, we make the terms
power and efficacy signify something, of which we have
a clear idea, and which is incompatible with those
objects, to which we apply it, obscurity and error
begin then to take place, and we are led astray by a
false philosophy. This is the case, when we transfer
the determination of the thought to external objects,
and suppose a real intelligible connexion betwixt
them; that being a quality, which can only belong to
the mind that considers them. (T 1.3.14.27)

Thus, Hume claims that the idea that we associate with
thick causation is a confused perception: it’s a clear idea
of an internal impression that’s wrongly applied to natural
objects. Hume applies his microscope to this confused idea
— which enlarges the simple ideas — and discovers that our
idea of necessity exists in the mind.
Thus Hume claims that there are two kinds of necessity,
and both exist in the understanding. He writes:
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Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two equal
to four, or three angles of a triangle to two right
ones, lies only in the act of the understanding, by
which we consider and compare these ideas; in like
manner the necessity or power, which unites causes and
effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass
from the one to the other. The efficacy or energy of
causes is neither plac’d in the causes themselves, nor
in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two
principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which
considers the union of two or more objects in all past
instances. ‘Tis here that the real power of causes is
plac’d, along with their connexions and necessity. (T
1.3.14.23)

It’s here that the “real power of causes” is placed —
not in “the causes themselves” or “in the deity” — contrary
to what New Humeans wish to claim.
Nonetheless, there’s an additional account of our idea
of thick causation that hasn’t been adequately addressed. I
turn to this account in the next section.

Third Account: Necessitation

It may be that when we engage in causal talk and take
ourselves to be speaking of thick causal power, we aren’t
attending solely to the words or projecting the internal
impression of the mind.
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The third account of necessitation is as follows.
First, the mind has an idea of the cause and an idea of the
effect. These ideas, of course, originate in experience and
thus have impression-based sources. Second, the mind has an
idea of relations between ideas. This idea, too, has an
impression-based source, since our ideas of various
relations of ideas — the Pythagorean Theorem, that the
Winklevoss’s resemble one another, and so on — consist of
ideas that originate in experience.
Accordingly, the idea that we take to be an idea of
thick causation emerges when the mind asserts or judges
that the cause and the effect are relations between ideas.
This, of course, is a confused perception, because as Hume
repeatedly emphasizes, causes and effects aren’t relations
between ideas.
Hume doesn’t provide this as his explicit account of
our idea of thick causation, but it’s clearly implicit in a
number of his remarks. Consider, for instance, his comments
at T 1.3.14.13, in which he first expounds and then
responds to the following conception of a cause:

[W]e must be able to place this power in some
particular being, and conceive that being as endow’d
with a real force and energy, by which such a
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particular effect necessarily results from its
operation. We must distinctly and particularly
conceive the connexions betwixt the cause and effect,
and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the
one, that it must be follow’d or preceded by the other.
This is the true manner of conceiving a particular
power in a particular body… Now nothing is more
evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an
idea of two objects, as to conceive any connexion
betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power of
efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connexion
wou’d amount to a demonstration, and wou’d imply the
absolute impossibility for the one object not to
follow, or to be conceiv’d not to follow upon the
other: Which kind of connexion we have rejected in all
cases. (T 1.3.14.13)

In this passage, Hume claims that such a connection
“wou’d amount to a demonstration” (ibid.) — that is, this
conception of causation considers it in terms of a relation
between ideas. Thus one of the ideas that we have when we
take ourselves to be thinking about thick causation is when
we conceive causation as a relation between ideas; but Hume
of course claims that we can never “distinctly comprehend
that power or efficacy” (ibid., emphasis mine). Nonetheless,
we can have a confused or indistinct idea of it, and the
component ideas in this confused perception all have their
origin in an impression-based source.
There’s a corollary to this necessitation conception
of our causal talk, one discussed by Kail and that’s
suggested by his RFP. The RFP is:
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Reference-Fixer for “Power” (RFP)
That which, were we to grasp it, would furnish the
capacity to (a) “read off” what effect some object
must have and (b) find it impossible to conceive of
the cause without its effect.

This is distinct from the necessitation conception
that I considered immediately above, in that Kail’s RFP
concerns only “that which” — that is, some unknown feature
in the cause — necessitates the effect. In Chapter Four, I
took issue with Kail’s taking the RFP to concern the felt
determination of the mind. But perhaps that’s because the
RFP expresses a thick idea of necessary connection, an idea
that Hume admits.
The truth is, Hume considers the RFP to express an
incoherent notion, and thus a confused one. To see why,
consider the following passage in the Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion. The passage concerns God’s essence and
his purported necessary existence. Cleanthes says:

It is pretended, that the deity is a necessarily
existent being, and this necessity of his existence is
attempted to be explained by asserting, that, if we
knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive
it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for
twice two not to be four. But it is evident, that this
can never happen, while our faculties remain the same
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as at present. It will still be possible for us, at
any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we
formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie
under a necessity of supposing any object to remain
always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a
necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four.
The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no
meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is
consistent. (DNR 9.6)

This passage centers around an unknown feature of
God’s nature which, if known, would render his nonexistence
inconceivable. But Hume seems to claim here that the very
notion of such a feature is incoherent, and thus such talk
has no meaning.
Kail responds to this, however, and claims that this
notion can’t be incoherent for Hume. He provides two
reasons for this claim. First, if correct, then the
argument turns out “a little short, given what else happens
in the text” (2007a: 100). Indeed, if Hume does in fact
regard the notion of necessary existence to be incoherent,
then “Hume lets a stone-dead horse suffer a few pages of
unnecessary flogging” (ibid.).
These unclear remarks become clearer if we consider
what follows next in Hume’s text, for the discussion soon
turns to whether matter could be a necessarily existent
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entity (as opposed to God’s being such). Thus, in response
to Cleanthes, Philo says:

To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity
[in algebra] may be admired as the effect either of
chance or design; but a skillful algebraist
immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity,
and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from
the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask,
that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by
a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish
a key, which solves the difficulty? And instead of
admiring the order of natural bodies, may it not
happen, that, could we but penetrate into the intimate
nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was
absolutely impossible, they could ever admit of any
other disposition. (DNR 9.10)

But, argues Kail, Philo’s entire response is pointless if
the notion of necessary existence is incoherent. Thus Hume
must not regard the notion as incoherent.
There are two things that can be said in response.
First, if Kail is correct, then Hume’s discussion turns out,
at worst, to be a little too long. Sometimes arguments
don’t convince,4 and thus one must resort to further
arguments.
Kail’s second reason for thinking that Hume doesn’t
endorse the incoherence of the RFP, is that when Cleanthes
4

I’m reminded of Robert Nozick: “Perhaps philosophers need arguments so powerful they set up
reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the conclusion, he dies. How’s that for a
powerful argument?” (1983: 4).
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first suggests the incoherence of necessary existence, he
qualifies it with “while our faculties remain the same as
at present” (DNR 9.6). Thus, “it is not that necessity so
characterized is incoherent, but rather as we presently are
we cannot grasp any such feature” (2007a: 100).
But Kail fails to note that our faculties at present
demarcate what can be coherently thought and said. In
addition, as I’ve argued, that alone is a sufficient
rebuttal to his response, Hume distinguishes clear and
distinct perceptions from obscure and confused ones. The
meaning of our pronouncements is either distinct or
confused (cf. T 1.3.14.13) depending upon whether the ideas
associated with our terms are distinct or confused. Thus,
just as the idea that results from our projecting an
internal impression on to objects is confused (and
incoherent), so too the idea of necessary existence is
confused (and incoherent). To say that the determination of
the mind exists in the objects, or that the existence of
some object is necessary, is of a par with “honesty weighs
ten pounds” or that “persons are prime numbers.” Such
remarks are incoherent.
Accordingly, Hume denies that we have an idea of thick
causation, conceived as a connection that possesses the AP
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property. Indeed, Hume would claim that when I utter or
write these words, I don’t have any idea distinct from the
words employed, or distinct from the idea that results from
my projecting the internal impression of the mind, and so
on.
This is important. In the next section, I indicate how
this helps solve the nasty problem.

Sticking with Hume through Thick and Thin

The nasty problem is that for some term “T,” say
“substancet” or “thick causation,” Hume claims that:

1. “T”’s a meaningless expression.

In addition,

2. There’s an explanation as to why we believe in the
existence of entities denoted by “T”.

and
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3. Explanations as to why we believe in the existence of
entities denoted by “T” presuppose that “T”’s
meaningful.

However, on Hume’s meaning-empiricism:

4. “T”’s meaningful º “T” has an associated idea.

But (1)-(3) entail:

5. “T” has and doesn’t have an associated idea.

The solution to the nasty problem is to recognize that
Hume distinguishes between two kinds of ideas: ideas that
are obscure and confused, and ideas that are clear and
distinct. Thus Hume would reframe (5) as:

6. “T” has an associated idea that’s obscure, and
doesn’t have an associated idea that’s clear.
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In other words, in asserting (1), Hume intends to assert
that “T” doesn’t have a distinct meaning, that is, an
associated idea which is a distinct idea. Instead, an
expression like “thick causation” has an obscure or
confused meaning, and it’s this obscure or confused meaning
that Hume seeks to explain. In the case of causation, our
obscure meaning is supplied by our attending to our words,
and our confused meaning is supplied either by our
projecting our idea of the determination of the mind onto
objects, or our applying our idea of a relation between
ideas to objects.
Thus, Hume has an answer to the nasty problem. When one
uses the word “power,” the only clear and distinct idea —
and thus meaning — that one can have is an idea of the felt
determination of the mind. In short, the only idea of power
that we have is thin.

Fruit of the Hume

Thus far, we’ve seen that Hume denies that we have any
clear and distinct idea of thick causation. Our causal talk
is either (i) obscure, because we attend to words that lack
associated ideas, (ii) confused, because we project an idea

231
of reflection onto objects, (iii) confused, because we take
causes and effects to be conceptually linked, or (iv) clear
and distinct, because we conceive of causation as thin.
The nasty problem doesn’t arise, because, when we talk
about causation in a manner other than (iv), the idea that
we’re employing is either (i)-(iii). Thus, our causal talk
is either clear and distinct, or obscure and confused.
When we fully appreciate this, we can clearly see how
later positivists drew inspiration from Hume. Consider, for
instance, Antony Flew’s famous gardener example:

Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in
a jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers
and many weeds. One explorer says, ‘Some gardener must
tend this plot.’ The other disagrees, ‘There is no
gardener.’ So they pitch their tents and set a watch.
No gardener is ever seen. ‘But perhaps he is an
invisible gardener.’ So they set up a barbed-wire
fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds.
(For they remember how H. G. Wells’s The Invisible Man
could be both smelt and touched though he could not be
seen.) But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder
has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever
betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never
give cry. Yet still the Believer is not convinced.
‘But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible,
insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who comes
secretly to look after the garden which he loves.’ At
last the Sceptic despairs, ‘But what remains of your
original assertion? Just how does what you call an
invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener
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differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no
gardener at all? (1955: 96)5

Thus, when the believer states “[T]here is a gardener,
invisible, intangible, insensible, etc.,” he or she isn’t
actually asserting anything at all. Flew doesn’t deny that
this sentence is linguistically meaningful. His point is
that it’s not cognitively meaningful: it doesn’t make an
assertion that’s either true or false. The assertion has no
content.
It’s difficult to definitively see whether Hume’s a
positivist in the sense that Flew, for example, is. There’s
some indication that he may be. Consider, for instance,
Hume’s discussion of the concept of God. Demea contends:

The question is not concerning the BEING but the NATURE
of GOD. This I affirm, from the infirmities of human
understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and
unknown to us. The essence of that supreme mind, his
attributes, the manner of his existence, the very
nature of his duration; these and every particular,
which regards so divine a being, are mysterious to
men… They are covered in a deep cloud from human
curiosity: It is profaneness to attempt penetrating
through these sacred obscurities. (DNR 2.1)

5

The example originally comes from John Wisdom.
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The nature of God is immersed in obscurity, Demea claims,
and that is precisely as it should be. But — and this is
the relevant point — Cleanthes retorts as follows:

It seems strange to me, said Cleanthes, that you,
Demea, who are so sincere in the cause of religion,
should still maintain the mysterious, incomprehensible
nature of the deity, and should insist so strenuously,
that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to
human creatures. The deity, I can readily allow,
possesses many powers and attributes, of which we can
have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as
they go, be not just, and adequate, and correspondent
to his real nature, I know not what there is in this
subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any
meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you
mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility
of the deity, differ from sceptics or atheists, who
assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and
unintelligible? (DNR 4.1)

Thus, Cleanthes concludes that since Demea has removed
experience-based content from his idea of God, he’s an
atheist “without knowing it” (DNR 4.3). But if Demea isn’t
asserting anything different from atheism, then Demea isn’t
asserting anything at all. This supports the view that
Hume’s a positivist of the sort Flew is.
But even if this interpretation of Hume isn’t
ultimately sustainable, it’s clear that something weaker
but still very important can be attributed to Hume. His
statements about the science of human nature make it clear
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that: only statements informed by clear and distinct ideas
are worth asserting or believing. We can put the point as
follows: a proposition p has distinct content (or meaning)
only if p is traceable to an impression (or experience),
and a proposition p is worth asserting (or believing) only
if p has distinct meaning. Thus if causal talk is obscure
or confused, that’s a good reason to refrain from indulging
in it. Indeed, as has been noted, the principal objection
of Hume’s science of human nature is to remove obscurities
and confusions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Hume explains our
causal talk by appealing to four possible kinds of ideas:
(i) an obscure idea of words that lack associated ideas,
(ii) a confused idea based on the mind’s projecting an idea
of reflection onto natural objects, (iii) a confused idea
of the cause and effect that takes the two to be
conceptually linked, and (iv) a clear and distinct idea of
causes and effects understood in terms of Hume’s two
definitions.
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I argued that Hume’s distinction between distinct and
indistinct meaning — which hinges on whether the associated
ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused —
certainly leans in a positivist direction. It’s unclear
whether Hume is a positivist in the full-blooded,
twentieth-century sense of the term, but it’s clear that
Hume recommends that we pursue only what can be clearly and
distinctly understood, and that in the case of causation
the only thing that can be clearly and distinctly
understood is an idea of thin causation.
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Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I argued that clear and
distinct perception has an essential role in Hume’s
philosophy, indeed that failing to appreciate its
importance leads to misunderstanding key components of his
philosophy. Hume considers the moral sciences be immersed
in obscurity and confusion, and his self-proclaimed
“microscope of the moral sciences” is intended to expose
and ultimately remove this obscurity and confusion.
Hume aims to do this because he believes that a
correct science of human nature is a prerequisite for
progress in the other sciences. According to Hume, then,
our impressions are naturally clear and distinct, whereas
our ideas are naturally faint and obscure. Since ideas are
ultimately traceable to impressions, Hume’s microscope
involves our discerning the origin of our ideas, thereby
rendering them clear and distinct.
In the case of causation, Hume claims that the only
clear and distinct idea of causation that we have is an
idea of thin causation, that is, a felt determination of
the mind to infer like effects from like causes. However,
when characterized solely in terms of the objects, Hume
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claims that causation is nothing more than regular
succession. Nonetheless, some have advocated for — and
Hume’s own project seems to demand — an idea of thick
causation. This, as we’ve seen, is the foundation of the
New Hume interpretation.
I’ve argued that Hume denies that we have an idea of
thick causation, for we can’t clearly and distinctly
conceive of the relationship between causes and effects as
conceptually necessary. At most, the ideas that we have
when take ourselves to be contemplating thick causal
connections are obscure and confused. Hume believes that we
should stop theorizing about such connections, thereby
permitting progress in the other sciences. Despite the
exciting nature of the New Hume, it turns out that it’s not
the real Hume. If I were playful, I would say that despite
the current boom in the New Hume, the proper attitude is
gloom, for textual evidence indicates that the figure is a
cartoon for which there’s no room, and thus I advocate his
doom. It’s a good thing I’m a serious philosopher and thus
would never say such a thing.
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